all domestic passengers traveled through a hub
city before arriving at their final destination. Of
those passengers, eight out of ten remained on
the same airline throughout their journey. By
1992, there were at least 12 “fortress hubs,” or
airports where one airline controlled more than
60 percent of the traffic. Passengers who flew out
of these hubs paid over 20 percent more than they
would have for a comparable trip out of an
airport that was not a hub.
After deregulation, the a irlines also c a me to
realize that they needed a more efficient way to
book reservations and issue tickets. It is difficult to
imagine, in these days of highly sophisticated
computers and split-second communications, that
until the late 1970s and early 1980s, airline
schedules were contained inlarge printed volumes,
reservations wer e taken o ver the telephon e and
tallied manually at the end of each day, and tickets
were written b y hand. To streamline this process,
the large companies initially proposed a joint
computer syst em, l i sting schedul e s and fares. The
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE objected on the grounds that
such a system would be anticompetitive and would
violate the
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT (15 U.S.C.A. § 1
et seq. [1890]). Instead, each airline developed its
own computer system and entered data in a
manner that unfairly biased t ravel agents’ choices
in favo r of t he carrier that owned the system.
Through s killful m a nipulation of t he data, the

738.6
769.2
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 800700
Revenue passenger
miles (billions)
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
652.0
651.7
656.9
779.0
829.0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 900
700 800
a
Excludes bankruptcy-related charges.
Annual profit/loss (billions of dollars)
2007
a
2005
a
2003
2001
1999
Ϫ8.0
Ϫ7.0
Ϫ6.0

nization. USAir and Northwest required cash
infusions through cooperative arrangements
with foreign airlines. Even financially strong
carriers such as United and American laid off
employees and abandoned plans to purchase new
aircraft, which added to the burdens on the
depressed aerospace industry.
The mergers and buyouts of the 1980s were
often accomplished in an atmosphere of hostility
and distrust. Charges of predatory pricing and
other unfair business practices were leveled by
one carrier against another. During the 1980s
the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division
made a number of
GRAND JURY investigations
into alleged anticompetitive activity by the major
airlines, but no indictments were handed down.
However, the companies that survived did not
emerge unscathed. Many of the acquisitions
were highly leveraged buyouts that left the
reconstituted companies heavily in debt. With
profits insufficient to cover their enormous debt
loads, the companies frantically competed for
business, engaging in fare wars that produced a
dizzying array of pricing plans with equally
numerous and confusing restrictions. Some of
the tactics were questionable, but, again, not
clearly illegal. In 1993 American Airlines was
sued by Continental and Northwest for alleged
predatory pricing during a 1992 fare war. The

would be effective in the long run because of
inherent conflicts between labor and manage-
ment, or between different labor groups. “It can’t
work,” declared former Chrysler chairman Lee A.
Iacocca. “What do you think will happen when
it’s a choice be tween employee benefits and
capital investment?”
Safety
One troubling criticism of deregulation is that
aggressive competition has forced airlines to cut
corners, resulting in safety lapses. In 1990
Eastern Airlines was handed a 60-count federal
INDICTMENT charging it with shoddy and dishonest
maintenance practices. The indictments came
after years of complaints by the financially
troubled airline’s mechanics, who claimed that
pressures to cut costs led to maintenance short-
cuts and falsification of maintenance records.
In January 1991 Eastern ceased operation.
Critics contend that Eastern was hardly
alone in its cavalier approach to safety. They
charge that the FAA is understaffed and poorly
managed and that money shortages have caused
all the airlines to relax safety standards. They
point not only to increased pressures on the
labor force but also to companies’ reluctance to
replace their aging fleets, the congestion of
airspace caused by increased air travel, crowded
hub airports that create security risks, and
overworked and sometimes poorly trained air

crash forces the issue. Even after safety measures
are recommended by the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTA-
TION SAFETY BOARD
(NTSB), the agency charged
with investigating accidents, the FAA has been
criticized for not always following through.
Aging aircraft became a major concern
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988
an Aloha Airgroup Boeing 737-200, purchased
in 1969, lost the top of its fuselage while flying
at 24,000 feet. A fli ght attendant was immedi-
ately sucked out of the plane. The plane made a
harrowing emergency landing, but not before
65 passengers suffered injuries, some serious.
Congress responded in 1991 by pas sing the
Aging Aircraft Safety Act (49 App. U.S.C.A.
1421 note), which requires airlines to demon-
strate that their older planes are airworthy.
Critics claim that enforcement of the law has
been lax and that it ignores other compelling
reasons to replace aging aircraft, such as the
availability of newer fire-retardant seat materials
and of updated seats designed to be more
resistant to the impact of a crash.
Concerns over airline safety became even
more acute in the early 1990s with a series of fatal
crashes. The Boeing Company, a major producer
of aircraft, predicted that the number of jet
crashes worldwide could double by 2010 if

safety
AUDIT of the entire airline industry. As a
result, commuter airlines, which had previously
been held to a lowe r standard of safety than
major carriers, were placed under new operat-
ing rules that required them to bring their safe ty
standards up to those of the other companies by
the end of 1996. Industry experts said the
elimination of the two-tier safety standards was
“the most imp ortant decision affecting the
industry since it was deregulated in 1978.”
Several other safety and health issues have
been publicized. Some have questioned the
quality of air aboard an airplane. As a result of
intense
LOBBYING by passenger groups and flight
attendants, federal law prohibits smoking on
all domestic fli ghts and on many international
flights as well. Air quality was again questioned
in 1993 when it was revealed that, as a cost-
saving measure, many airlines were circulating
fresh air into their aircraft less frequently than
they had in the past. This led to complaints
by passengers and crew of headaches, nausea,
and the transmission of respiratory illnesses.
Although the FAA conceded that circulating
more fresh air would be beneficial, it backed
off from requiring airlines to do so, because of
the cost involved.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION

stringent safety standards for babies.
Another major concern is delayed and/or
cancelled flights. On Valentine’s Day in February
2007, an ice storm hit the Northeast and resulted
in many delayed and/or grounded flights. At
New York area airports, passengers were
grounded on the runway in planes for three to
ten hours without water, food, and other basic
needs. The air inside the planes became stale, and
the restrooms on board were inadequate and/or
malfunctioning. Following that disaster, in June
2007 the state of New York became the first in
the nation to enact a Passenger
BILL OF RIGHTS
[N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §251(g)(1)]. The law, which
took effect in January 2008, was short-lived. The
Air Transport Association of America (ATA)
filed suit, arguing that the new legislation
regulated a “service” provided by air carriers.
Accordingly, the ATA argued, this meant that it
was preempted by the federal Airline Deregula-
tion Act, the scope of which extended to
anything “related to a price, route, or service of
an air carrier.” (49 U.S.C. §41713). The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Secon d Circuit agreed.
Air Transportation Assn v. Cuo mo, 520 F.3d 218
(2d Cir. 2008). In the
INTERIM between legislation
and court decision, nine other states had
proposed similar legislation relating to lengthy

and take their chances.
The ADFAA and September 11, 2001
In 1996, to address concerns that the families of
airline crash victims were not receiving timely
information, Congress passed the Aviation Disas-
ter Family Assistance Act (ADFAA) (49 USCA
§ 1136; 49 USCA § 41113). The act requires air lines
to submit a plan to the National Transportat ion
Safety Board that would address the needs of the
families of passengers who are involved in any
aircraft accident that results in a major loss of life.
Once approved, the carrier must make a
GOOD
FAITH
effort to carry out t he plan.
Plans approved under the ADFAA have
some minimum requirements for notification
and care of families affected by an airline crash.
Among them are that the airline carrier must set
up, publicize, and staff a toll-free telephone line
that passengers’ families can call for informa-
tion. The carrier must al so cooperate with the
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
AIRLINES 201
independent, NTSB-appointed NONPROFIT (i.e.,
the Red Cross) to provide an appro priate level
of aid and support. In addition, the carrier must
assist a passenger’s family in traveling to the
crash site, as well as provide for their physical
needs while at the accident location. Finally, the

(Pub.L. 107-42, Sept. 22, 2001, 115 Stat. 230).
This act took into consideration the devastation
wrought on U.S. airlines on September 11 and
enacted measures to try to ensure their survival.
In addition to compensating airlines for
direct losses incurred as a result of September
11, the ATSSSA established a framework for
computing the maximum grant that an airline
could claim as
COMPENSATION. To streamline
efforts, it set up the Air Transpo rtation Stabiliza-
tion Board to review the prospective loan
applications. The act attempted to protect the
insurance industry, as well as the aviation
industry, by limiting the claims that could be
made upon them. It also established the Septem-
ber 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 to
deal directly with the needs of families who were
victims of the
SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKS. The fund
provided direct financial assistance to families so
they would not have to endure lengthy court
battles. Liability for all third-party losses was
transferred from the airlines to the U.S. govern-
ment, and a
WAIVER system was established so that
families could not sue the airlines for damages as
a result of the terrorist attack at any future date.
Security measures for airlines have also been
upgraded since September 11. The government

business plans of most major airlines inviable.
Following a few mergers and reorganizations, the
airlines appeared to be more stable by 2009.
FURTHER READINGS
Dempsey, Paul Stephen. 2003. “Aviation Security: The Role
of Law in the War against Terrorism.” Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law (spring): 649-733.
Schroeder, Kristin Buja. 2002. “Failing to Prevent the
Tragedy, but Facing the Trauma: The Aviation Disaster
Family Assistance Act of 1996 and the Air Transporta-
tion Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001.”
Journal of Air Law and Commerce 67 (winter).
Schwieterman, Joseph. 2002. “From Consolidation to
Crisis: The Airline Industry in Transition. (Terrorism,
Security, and Competition: The Future of the Airline
Industry).” DePaul Business Law Journal 14 (spring):
269-277.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
202 AIRLINES
Sheth, Jagdish N., and Fred C Allvine. 2007. Deregulation
and Competition: Lessons from the Airline Industry.
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Stempel, Jeffrey W. 2002. “The Insurance Aftermath of
September 11: Myriad Claims, Multiple Lines, Argu-
ments over Occurrence Counting, War Risk Exclu-
sions, the Future of Terrorism Coverage, and New
Issues of Government Role.” Tort and Insurance Law
Journal 37 (spring).
Transportation Security Administration. 2009. “TSA:
Programs and Initiatives.” Available online at http://

for Georgia in 1866. Four years later, he
was named attorney general of the United States.
Akerman’s
TENURE as attorney general coin-
cided with the Grant administration’s early
attempts to enforce
CIVIL RIGHTS laws in the
South during
RECONSTRUCTION. Initially, Aker-
man believed prosecutions for violations of
criminal
CIVIL RIGH TS ACTS should be left to state
and local authorities. However, he soon chan-
ged his mind and advocated a more aggressive
federal role in the prosecution of crimes related
to civil rights.
His change of mind can be attributed to the
growth of the
KU KLUX KLAN in the South, and the
results of a congressional investigation. Investi-
gators found that state and local legal systems in
Amos Tappan Akerman 1821–1880
1821 Born,
Portsmouth,
New Hampshire
1841 Graduated
from Dartmouth
College
1850
Opened law

AKERMAN, AMOS TAPPAN 203
the South were inadequate to protect the rights
of free blacks or to PROSECUTE the increasingly
violent actions of the Klan.
Akerman agreed that the federal govern-
ment should step in, and he wrote extensively
on the subject. In his opinion, some South-
erners would never acknowledge the rights of
free blacks and government attempts to “con-
ciliate by kindness” were a waste of time. He
noted that Southern klansmen and other
malcontents “take all kindness as evidence
of timidity, and hence are emboldened to
lawlessness by it.” He concluded that the federal
government should “command their respect by
the exercise of its powers.”
With Akerman’s leadership—and his suc-
cessful effort to obtain a financial commitment
from Congress—attorneys from the newly created
DEPARTMENT OF JUST ICE worked with l ocal U.S.
attorneys to bring hundreds of indict ments under
the Enforcement A ct of 1870 (16 S tat. 140
[codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 et
seq.]) and the
KU KLUX KLAN ACT of 1871 (§ 2, 17
Stat. 13 [current v ersion at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3 )
(Supp. V 1976)]).
Together, these government officials prose-
cuted, convicted, and i mprisoned hundreds o f
Klan members from 1870 to 1872, and, for a short

in the Attorney General’s Office, 1789–1990. Lawrence:
Univ. Press of Kansas.
Kousser, J. Morgan, and James M. McPherson. 1982. Region,
Race, and Reconstruction. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press.
Sobel, Robert. 1990. Biographical Directory of the United
States Executive Branch. 1774–1989. Westport, CT:
Greenwood.
CROSS REFERENCES
Civil Rights Acts; Grant, Ulysses Simpson; Ku Klux Klan
Act; Railroad.
ALASKA BOUNDARY DISPUTE
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, a dispute
erupted between the United States and Canada
regarding the legal boun daries of Alaska, which
the United States had purchased from Russia in
1867. The primary point of contention in the
dispute related to a several thousand mile long
strip to the west of British Columbia and to the
southeast of the Alaska
TERRITORY. Although the
dispute was resolved by way of a treaty signed in
1903, it caused a severe threat to U.S Canadian
relations.
Russia was the first nation to claim the Alaska
territory after it was discovered by Vitus Bering, a
Danish explorer who received a commission from
Peter the Great to lead Russian sailors on a
expedition of Siberia on August 20, 1741. Russia
named the land Russian-America, and Russian

TWENTIETH
.
—AMOS TAPPAN
AKERMAN
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
204 ALASKA BOUNDARY DISPUTE
The United States maintained that it had
taken over the territory that appeared on Russian
maps at the time of the purchase. However, the
Russian maps indicated that Russia had owned
more of the land than had been stipulated in the
1825 treaty. As early as 1872, British Columbia
petitioned the United States for an official survey
of the boundaries between Alaska and western
Canada, but the United States refused due to the
costs that would have been involved. Both the
United States and Canada conducted surveys of
particular areas in the region in the 1870s and
1880s, but no widespread survey was conducted
during that time.
The dispute regarding the proper boundaries
between Alaska and western Canada heated up
during the 1880s after gold was discovered in the
area. Between the 1880s and 1890s, an estimated
100,000 fortune seekers moved to the Klondike
region in search of gold. Though only a fraction
of the se miners and prospectors actually discov-
ered gold, more than $100 million was eventu-
ally extracted from the region. Although the
Klondike gold rush was not a direct factor in the

with the United States because it needed the
latter’s assistance in an arms race between Great
Britain and Germany. After three weeks of
discussion, the
PANEL of judges voted in favor the
United States’ position.
The tribunal established an International
Boundary Commission to mark the official
boundaries between Alaska and Canada. The
commission was made permanent by a treaty
between the United States and Great Britain in
1908. Another treaty in 1925 required the com-
mission to maintain a 20-foot wide demarcated
line along the border. The boundary is several
thousand miles long and spread over mountains
and through rivers, marshes, and forests.
Although the Alaska Boundary Dispute has
fallen beyond the American consciousness, it
remains a point of contention among some
Canadians. The United States and Canada have
had several disagreements regarding the proper
land and water division in parts of the area.
Moreover, environmentalists decry the clearing of
timber along the border because of the potential
for destroying biological diversity of plant and
animal life. The Alaskan boundary remains,
however, exactly how it appeared in the 1903
agreement, and the 1925 treaty remains intact.
FURTHER READINGS
Carroll, F. M. 1987. “Robert Lansing and the Alaska

THAT TRUE DEMOC-
RACY IS NEVER
ACHIEVED
; IT IS AL-
WAYS A PURSUIT
.
A
ND WE KNOW THAT
IF WE WHO LOVE
LIBERTY GROW WEA-
RY
, THOSE WHO LOVE
ONLY POWER WILL
ONE DAY SWEEP US
AWAY
.
—MADELEINE
ALBRIGHT
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE KORBEL 205
Albright earned a bachelor’s degree in politi-
cal science from Wellesley College in 1959 and
then studied at the School of Advanced Interna-
tional Studies at Johns Hopkins University. She
then entered the graduate program at Columbia
University, receiving her master’s degree and
doctorate from the university’s Department of
PUBLIC LAW and Government. While working on
her advanced degrees, Albright served in the
diplomatic corps, acting as counselor for eco-

politics. She was also responsible for developing
and implementing programs designed to en-
hance women’s professional opportunities in
international affairs. From 1989 to 1993 Albright
was president of the Center for National Policy, a
NONPROFIT research organization formed in 1981
by representatives from government, industry,
labor, and education to promote the study and
discussion of domestic and international issues.
Albright began working with Democratic
presidential candidates in 1984 when she advised
Walter F. Mondale on foreign policy. She served
in a similar role for 1988 nominee Michael
Dukakis and did the same for
BILL CLINTON in
1992. After he was elected president, Clinton
named Albright chief U.S. representative to the
UNITED NATIONS, a cabinet-level position.
After President Clinton was reelected in
1996, he made changes in his cabinet. In
Madeleine Albright.
AP IMAGES
Madeleine Korbel Albright 1937–
▼▼
▼▼
1935
2000
1975
1950
❖

2008 Memo
to the
President
Elect published
1992–96 Chief U.S.
representative to the UN
1982–93 Taught at Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service
1989–93 President of the
Center for National Policy
1983 Poland, the Role of the
Press in Political Change published
◆◆
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
206 ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE KORBEL
December 1996 Clinton nominated Albright as
secretary of state. After being unanimously
confirmed by the U.S. Senate, she was sworn
in as secretary of state on January 23, 1997.
The outspoken and dynamic Albright rein-
forced U.S. alliances, promoted American trade
and business, and sought to establish international
standards on trade and
HUMAN RIGHTS.Albright
advocated forthe expansion and modernization of
NATO and helped coordinate NATO’s successful
campaign to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. She
helped to promote peace in Northern Ireland, the
Middle East, and the Balkans.
Albright sought the expansion of democracy

Albright, Madeleine. 2003. Madam Secretary: A Memoir.
New York: Miramax.
Blackman, Ann. 1998. Seasons of Her Life: A Biography of
Madeleine Korbel Albright. New York: Scribner.
Blood, Thomas. 1997. Madam Secretary: A Biography of
Madeleine Albright. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Dobbs, Michael. 1999. Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth-
Century Odyssey. New York: Henry Holt.
Georgetown University. Available online at www.georgetown.
edu (accessed August 24, 2009).
Hirsh, Michael. 2000. “The Lioness in Winter.” Newsweek
(July 10).
Lippman, Thomas W. 2000. Madeleine Albright and the New
American Diplomacy. New York: Westview.
Special Libraries Association. Available online at www.sla.
org (accessed August 24, 2009).
ALCOHOL
Alcohol is the active principle of intoxicating
drinks, produced by the fermentation of sugars.
A Congressman was once asked by a constitu-
ent to explain his attitude toward whiskey. “If
you mean the demon drink that poisons the
mind, pollutes the body, desecrates family life,
and inflames sinners, then I’m against it,” the
Congressman said. “But if you mean the elixir
of Christmas cheer, the shield against winter
chill, the taxable potion that puts needed
funds into public coffers to comfort little
crippled children, then I’m for it. This is my
position, and I will not compromise.”

but the abuse of drink is from Satan,
the wine is from God, but the Drunkard is
from the Devil.
(Increase Mather, Puritan clergyman, Wo to
Drunkards [1673])
Alcoholic beverages have been consumed in the
United States since the days of Plymouth Rock.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
ALCOHOL 207