Download miễn phí Luận văn A systems based theory of organizational information



TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT . iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS . vii
LIST OF TABLES. xii
LIST OF FIGURES. xiv
CHAPTER I . 1
INTRODUCTION . 1
1.1. Background to and research gap of the study . 1
1.2. Research problems and questions . 5
1.3. Rationale of the theory building research . 10
1.3.1. Justification for the research. 10
1.3.2. Importance of the research . 11
1.4. Methodology . 12
1.5. Contributions and Implications . 14
1.5.1. Contributions. 14
1.5.2. Implications . 16
1.6. Dissertation organization. 18
1.7. Chapter summary . 20
CHAPTER II . 21
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURES. 21
2.1. Introduction . 21
2.2. Information system. 22
2.2.1. The phenomena of information . 22
2.2.2. The relationships between information and knowledge . 24
2.2.3. The primacy of information . 32
2.2.4. Information in the field of information systems . 36
2.2.5. The need for a new conceptualization of organizational information. 38
2.3. Pragmatism and systems thinking . 40
2.3.1. Pragmatism . 40
2.3.2. A systems thinking approach to organizational information . 50
2.4. Middle range theorizing . 53
2.4.1. The organization of theory-building research . 53
2.4.2. Systems pragmatism as the research paradigm . 54
2.4.3. Contextualism as the theory of methodology. 58
2.5. Chapter summary . 59
CHAPTER III . 60
METHODOLOGY. 60
3.1. Introduction . 60
3.2. Methodological principles . 61
3.3. Justification of the methodology. 62
3.3.1. For the qualitative approach . 62
3.3.2. For the case study and the grounded theory . 64
3.3.3. Why case study?. 65
3.3.4. Why grounded theory? . 66
3.3.5. Which grounded theory? . 67
3.4. Methods. 69
3.5. Reporting. 74
3.6. Evaluation of the research . 75
3.6.1. Research validity . 76
3.6.2. The assessment of the emergent theory and the research process . 78
3.6.3. Assessment of the evidence grounding the theory. 79
3.7. Research design. 79
3.8. Pilot case studies . 84
3.8.1. VT company. 92
3.8.2. RM company. 95
3.9. Criteria for the case selection and the numberof cases . 98
3.10. Case study protocol . 99
3.11. Research settings . 106
3.12. Data sources. 106
3.13. Chapter summary . 110
CHAPTER IV . 112
ANALYSIS OF DATA AND RESEARCH FINDINGS . 112
4.1. Introduction . 112
4.2. Data collection . 113
4.3. Data analysis. 115
4.4. Empirical findings. 135
4.4.1. Nature of organizational information and organizational information as system . 136
4.4.2. Organizational information formulation process and organizational
information formulation as habit production. 166
4.5. Test of the emerging grounded substantive theory. 170
4.5.1. Background. 170
4.5.2. Testing propositions . 171
4.5.2. Test case selection and theory testing . 172
4.6. Chapter summary . 194
CHAPTER V . 195
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS. 195
5.1. Introduction . 195
5.2. Discussions. 196
5.2.1. Research finding 1: Organizational information-as-system . 196
5.2.2. Research finding 2: Organizational information formulation as habit production. 203
5.2.3. Research finding 3: Distinction among three information categories . 211
5.2.4. Revisiting and extending the systems model of pragmatic information. 212
5.2.4. Relation between information-as-system and information system. 229
5.2.5. A systems theory of pragmatic information . 238
5.3. Research implications. 244
5.3.1. Theoretical implications. 244
5.3.1.1. A pragmatic paradigm of information . 244
5.3.1.2. An information view of organization theories and phenomena . 252
5.3.1.3. A theoretical framework for management research quality . 268
5.3.1.4. An information theory of organization . 277
5.3.1.5. An information based theory of the firm . 280
5.3.1.6. A new taxonomy of knowledge production modes and beyond . 284
5.3.1.7. A new framework of problem solving process . 286
5.3.2. Managerial implications . 288
5.3.2.1. A basis of organizational decision making . 288
5.3.2.2. A design of organizations . 289
5.3.2.3 Project proposal: a virtual clinic for SME management consultancy. 291
5.4. Chapter summary . 297
CHAPTER VI . 299
CONCLUSIONS. 299
6.1. Introduction . 299
6.2. Summary of research findings and implications . 299
6.2.1. Organizational information as system. 299
6.2.2. Organizational information formulation as habit production . 302
6.2.3. Distinction among three information categories. 304
6.2.4. Research implications. 304
6.3. Contributions of the research . 308
6.4. Limitations of the research . 312
6.5. Directions for future research . 313
6.6. Concluding remarks . 314
REFERENCES. 318
APPENDIX A. RESEARCH FLOW AND TASKS . 352
APPENDIX B. ILLUSTRATIVE FITNESS BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND
THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS. 36


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of much hands-on experience played the role
of information or ‘I’.
Moreover, our model resolved three remaining points or shortcomings
above in Weick’s model in a consistent and clear cut way. Organizational information
(nearly the same as meanings), data (as frameworks), and knowledge (as sensemaking)
were formed in a Peircean semiotic triad. The formulation process was defined by an
integration of the Peircean perceptual judgment and inquiry process through both
inference and insight from human action. The phenomena of information, knowledge,
and data could be distinguished by the time indicators and epistemic status.
Finally, getting back to Weick’s suggestions of four sources of resilience in
organizations, especially under sudden changes, it could be found that they were in line
with our model of organizational information formulation, and hence, rooted in the
same foundation of semiotic triad. One, it was improvisation and bricolage, with its
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main theme as creativity (p.639). This was reflected very obviously in phase one of
inquiry process through abductive activities for knowledge creation in our model. Two,
it was virtual role systems. This was for reforming the group or organization in the old
or new role structure, or alternatively, helped each person literally becomes a group
(p.640). In our model, it was on methods of belief fixation that were employed or
implied by community or group to reach information. Three, it was wisdom, which
reflected experience but embodied doubt, and adaptation to novelties. This was clearly
crossing both the stage of information use (for factual surprise by human experiencing
the real world) and the first stage of information formulation (for genuine doubt by
both insight and inference from factual surprise). Hence, it might be a combination of
both data and knowledge. Four, it was a respectful interaction that was showed by “a
good life with others as trust, honesty, and self-respect in moment-to-moment
interaction” (p.643). This was reflected in the whole of organizational information
formulation and use (from action, perception, cognition, to conception or behavior) to
get the factual surprise, genuine doubt, and firm belief, but especially in the final stage
of the inquiry process with methods of belief fixation inside a community of inquiry.
Hence, instead of Weick’s four principles, which were somewhat arbitrary
theoretically, we might propose a semiotic triad of three categories and respective
relations for organizational designs for changes. At this point, our model attempted to
show a little bit more its theoretically comprehensive and concise way to explain
organizational phenomena.
The existing case study 2. Organizational creativity in context: learning
from a failing attempt to introduce IT-support for creativity.
The paper written by Stenmark, published in International journal of
technology and human interaction in 2005, was a research paper on creativity
management. Its author employed an empirical data on Mindpool, an intranet
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electronic brainstorming system, in Volvo information technology (IT) headquarter in
Sweden, a member of the world-wide Volvo group. At the time of the research, Volvo
IT company had about 900 employees and served the group other companies as its only
customers.
The case discussed about the failure of installation and deployment of
Mindpool as a replacement of the traditional box-on-the-wall suggestion system of
Volvo IT. The latter supported employees “to submit ideas and suggestions for
improvement to a proposal-handling committee (PHC), which would honour the
proposer of a good idea with a financial remuneration” (p.84). Meanwhile, Mindpool,
following both principles of brainstorming and suggestion system, was a hybrid system
and featured three outstanding designs: asynchronicity, anonymity, and accessibility (p.
86), all of which are to increase the number and diversity of submissions of new ideas
over the corporate. However, after three week test period, “the creativity-boosting
effect was less than anticipated, and even though the prototype worked well technically
we considered usage a failure” (p.89).
Reconsidering empirical results from employee interviews as presented in
the paper, and coding Volvo IT Mindpool usage as its organizational information, we
argued that Mindpool operation failure resulting from the fact that Volvo IT
organizational information could not be formulated successfully. The key reasons for
this were: (i) data (D) not yet available adequately; and (ii) methods of belief fixation
(M) of communities of inquiry not also yet specified. The former was supported with
informant ideas of the needs of such an online brainstorming system: “Creativity can
cause problems, too. In a production environment that has to work… well, if it is
working, you’d better leave it alone and not try to fix it up, because then you create
problems”, or “You don’t have time to speculate, or be creative in a general sort of
way” (p.90). That Volvo employees actually were in no need using Mindpool indicated
no data for formulation of organizational information as Mindpool deployment. The
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latter was evident in the following comments of Volvo IT respondents: “If you have a
good idea, why post it here [in Mindpool] instead of submitting it to the PHC? There
you might get a reward and you know you’ll get a response. In this system [Mindpool]
you just post things and you’ll never know whether someone uses it” (p.92), or “There
should be someone to make sure that there is some order to it and that the suggestions
are serious. You know - weed out the crap […]. That person could perhaps also direct
certain ideas to the right place in the organization…” (p.91). The fact that Volvo
employees hesitantly participated in the new system revealed that they were not
persuaded strong enough about Mindpool benefits in gathering and transferring their
new business ideas, or alternatively, methods of belief fixation of the involved
communities were not made clear.
Getting back to our testing propositions of the resultant grounded theory, we
found that the three propositions of P1, P2, and P3 held true indirectly. With P3, no
new data (D) formed because Mindpool was just in the test period, no real life benefits
of using the new system recorded. As a result, P2 went right too: no use of Mindpool or
no data, no new ways of using Mindpool or no knowledge gained. For P1, due to
missing some methods of belief fixation (M) of the whole organization as a community
of inquiry, no organizational information (I) could be formulated regardless of the
states of data (D) and knowledge (K).
Finally, we believed that our model, in comparison with Stenmark’s, offered
a more fundamental and consistent way to explain the phenomena of organizational
creativity. Basically, both explanations seemingly had the same root of organizational
factors, which was organizational information formulation as our part and was
contextual factors as Stenmark’s. However, Stenmark’s three suggestions inspired by
Volvo empirical evidences might need to be reconsidered with care. One, he
emphasized extrinsic motivation in financial compensation for increasing the system
use. This was evident but his reasoning was seemingly a bit inconsistent when he stated
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both focus on the reward and an employee needs to interact with her colleagues.
According to him, the former discouraged employees to share thoughts and ideas with
their peers but the latter strikingly was also true because “the employee may never
arrive at the groundbreaking conclusion on her own, without interaction and dialogue
with other humans” (p.96). Two, he tried to seek a balance between anonymity and the
request of IT tools “must make salient who contributes to the system” (p.96), both of
which did belong to work climate, autonomy and settings that in some situations
required instead increased accountability (p.94). Hence, for such specific settings, his
explanations may rather be limited somehow. Three, he proposed an employee time
redundancy for bootstrapping organizational creativity. However, his explanatory
factor was only applicable into goal oriented organizations but not in activity-oriented
ones (p.95).
In short, Volvo empirical data showed the new technology was insufficient
to support organizational creativity. The contextual factors were necessarily invoked
for better explanations. Although Stenmark’s accounts on social psychology provided a
fit in Mindpool evidence, ours on organizational information might offer a more
generic ...

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