Edited by Lungisile Ntsebeza & Peter Kagwanja
South Africa 2008
Edited By Peter Kagwanja & Kwandiwe Kondlo
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Part III: Society
9 Beyond yard socialism: Landlords, tenants and social power
in the backyards of a South African city 203
Leslie Bank
10 Internationalisation and competitiveness in South African
urban governance: On the contradictions of aspirationist
urban policy-making 226
Scarlett Cornelissen
Part IV: South Africa, Africa and the globe
11 South Africa and the Great Lakes: A complex diplomacy 253
Che Ajulu
12 Cry sovereignty: South Africa in the UN Security Council,
2007–2008 275
Peter Kagwanja
13 Praetorian solidarity: The state of military relations between
South Africa and Zimbabwe 303
Peter Kagwanja and Martin Revayi Rupiya
Contributors 332
Index 334
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vii
Tables and figures
Tables
Table 1.1 ANC membership and voting delegates at the December 2007
conference 17
Table 1.2 Polokwane conference election results for top six NEC positions
18
Table 1.3 2004 election results: National Assembly 25
Table 3.1 Major South African political parties represented in the
National Assembly after the 1994, 1999 and 2004 elections,

the hope and optimism of the Madiba period and the orientation towards
policy implementation and public service management of the Mbeki period
with an increasing sense of uncertainty and anxiety as the leadership contests
within the African National Congress (ANC) dominate public attention. The
latter trend culminated in the December 2007 ANC National Conference in
Polokwane, the subsequent recall of President Mbeki, the split within the
ruling party, and the formation of a new political party – the Congress of the
People.
These developments have generated much debate and the expression of a wide
range of views. Some political analysts emphasised the basic dimension of ‘a
changing of the guard’ and its associated manifestations in the redefinition
of existing relations between party and state, between the leadership and the
led, and between the haves and the have-nots, as well as the consolidation
of internal democracy in the ANC-led alliance in a way that amounts to the
reinvention of socio-political and economic emancipation. Other analysts
saw in the changes the settling in of a possible mediation of polarisations
and disparities in our political economy and society. Yet others saw in the
same changes the dynamism of stable continuity. As a result of these varied
perspectives, the conversations and debates about the likely future political,
social and economic trajectory of the country are ongoing and have become
interestingly robust. The chapters in this edition of State of the Nation
encompass these varied perspectives and are a sample of the ongoing debates.
In keeping with its commitment to ‘social science that makes a difference’, the
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) is proud to present the selection of
views contained in this edition, which continues the tradition of contributing
to the ongoing dialogue and wide-ranging debates between researchers,
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
x
policy-makers, public managers and policy activists, as well as revealing

HSRC. The contributions of subsequent editors that variously included
Sakhela Buhlungu and Jessica Lutchman are also acknowledged. Thank you
all for the continuing legacy of scholarship in the nexus of social science and
public policy.
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xi
FOREWORD
For a number of reasons the transitions between various groups of editors
have not been as seamless as we would have desired and we have struggled
with ensuring continuity amidst change. Lungisile Ntsebeza, Peter Kagwanja
and Kwandiwe Kondlo, Executive Director of the HSRC’s Democracy and
Governance Research Programme, deserve a special word of thanks in
this regard. The delayed production of this edition was overcome through
tapping into collaboration networks and by drawing upon an outstanding
commitment to ensuring that this important national project continues. We
will continue to tap into these networks and draw upon this commitment
to ensure continuity for the future. As part of these efforts a new lead editor
will be appointed following the resignation of Lungisile Ntsebeza from the
editorial team. A decision has also been made to publish State of the Nation
at the beginning of each calendar year to coincide with the beginning of the
academic year in South African institutions of higher education, rather than
towards the end of the calendar year as was previously the case.
As with previous editions, Garry Rosenberg, Mary Ralphs, Karen Bruns,
Utando Baduza and all the staff of the HSRC Press have continued to play
their part in ensuring the success of this project and I convey the appreciation
of their colleagues.
State of the Nation is a mechanism for dialogue and public debate aimed at
engendering the kind of knowledge that public policy needs in order to be
more effective. I trust that this edition keeps us on course towards achieving
this goal.

FDD Force for the Defence of Democracy
Fifa Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FLS Frontline States
FNL Forces for National Liberation
FoC Flag of convenience
Frelimo Frente de Libertação Moçambique
GDP Gross domestic product
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme
HSRC Human Sciences Research Council
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xiii
ACRONYMS
ICC International Convention Centre
ICT Information and communications technology
ID Independent Democrats
IDP Integrated Development Plan
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRIN UN Integrated Regional Information Network
IT Information technology
ITF International Transport Workers Federation
JDA Johannesburg Development Agency
JOC Joint Operations Command
MCS Marine Crew Services
MDC Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)
MK Umkhonto we Sizwe
MP Member of parliament
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NDR National Democratic Revolution

Sanco South African National Civic Organisation
Sars South African Revenue Service
Saso South African Students’ Organisation
SASSA South African Social Security Agency
Satawu South African Transport and Allied Workers Union
Sopa Socialist Party of Azania
SRI Socially Responsible Investment
Swapo South West African People’s Organisation
TETA Transport Education and Training Authority
UCDP United Christian Democratic Party
UDF United Democratic Front
UDM United Democratic Movement
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Progrmme
Unita National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNOMSA UN Observer Mission in South Africa
UNSC United Nations Security Council
Wesgro Western Cape Trade and Investment Promotion Agency
Zanu-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
Zapu Zimbabwe African People’s Union
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xv
Introduction: Uncertain democracy – elite
fragmentation and the disintegration of the
‘nationalist consensus’ in South Africa
Peter Kagwanja
Since ethnonationalism is a direct consequence of key elements of
modernization, it is likely to gain ground in societies undergoing
such a process. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that it remains
among the most vital – and most disruptive – forces in many parts

nation, post-apartheid development strategies have created what analysts
have dubbed ‘two different countries’ (Herbst 2005: 93): one Lockean, largely
white, wealthy and secure; the other Hobbesian, overwhelmingly black,
poverty-stricken and crime-ridden. The ‘two countries’, however, share one
of the world’s reputably most liberal constitutions and a vibrant pluralist
democracy characterised by regular free and fair elections – albeit up to this
point dominated by the ruling ANC – and an economy that has grown faster
in the last 15 years than it did in the 1980s, increasingly attracting foreign
investments and its capital penetrating deeper into the African markets.
The glue that held Mbeki’s two countries together was a broad-based elite
consensus grounded on the miracle of transition in the 1990s, clinched under
the eminent statesman Nelson Mandela, and South Africans’ astonishingly
high optimism despite the odds. During his ‘State of the Nation’ address on
3 February 2006, Mbeki declared, ‘Our country has entered its age of hope,’
appealing to this extraordinary sense of optimism even as the impoverished
mounted protests (Mashike 2008: 433). But the glue of nationalist euphoria is
seemingly coming loose, poising the ‘two countries’ on the edge of a dangerous
clash. Post-Mbeki South Africa is at the crossroads: the elite consensus has
fallen apart, optimism is giving way to pessimism and the future of democracy
and the nationalist project is becoming increasingly uncertain. Most of the
contributions to this volume of State of the Nation were written well before
Polokwane and Mbeki’s own exit from the presidency. However, in a profound
sense, the chapters shed light on the dynamics that led to these epoch-making
events now shaping a post-Mbeki South Africa. The editors have, however,
revised this introduction and the first chapter to update the volume and
place it in the context of post-Mbeki politics, with its high point being the
unprecedented split of the ANC and the resultant far-reaching implications
for the future of South Africa’s democracy.
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INTRODUCTION

the need to enforce the solidarity of the liberation movement; the exigencies
of participation in a multiparty democracy; and the desire to govern in a
manner that promotes the interests of all South Africans.’
These contradictions also largely account for the bitter succession struggles
within and between former liberation movements like the ANC, discussed in
this volume of State of the Nation. These struggles have, in turn, eroded the
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
xviii
necessary cohesion of the elite and stoked the embers of ethnonationalism,
threatening what Archbishop Desmond Tutu once celebrated as ‘the rainbow
nation’. The failure of the ‘nation-building project’ under the Mandela
and Mbeki administrations to reverse the entrenched racial and economic
injustice and inequalities and to create access to services, jobs and other
means of livelihood for an increasingly impoverished and disillusioned black
majority has also created fertile ground for ethnonationalism, including
xenophobia. Weak, lethargic and provincial opposition parties and former
liberation movements lack the vision, tactics, ideological force or political
capacity to halt the country’s slide to ethnonationalism. The preponderant
rise of ethnonationalism was recently commented on by one of the founders
of the United Democratic Front (UDF), Allan Boesak, who warned that the
liberation movement was recreating apartheid’s system of racial and ethnic
categorisation, demeaning coloured citizens, ‘ruthlessly and thoughtlessly’
abandoning struggle solidarity, and moving the ANC towards ‘ethnic
nationalism’ (Business Day 25.08.08).1 In the same vein, Anthony Butler
laments that ‘Mbeki and Zuma have…together undermined a century of
efforts to counter tribalism in the liberation movement. Ethnic balance has
been central to the ANC since its founding’ (Business Day 25.08.08). The
divisive succession struggle has turned ethnonationalism into the axis around
which politics in South Africa is increasingly coming to rotate.

continental institutions such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),
founded by pan-Africanists such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere
decades ago, but also created new ones as vehicles for their neo-liberal agenda.
This culminated in the emergence of a web of transnational institutions such
as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU),
designed to ‘conclude the work of earlier pan-African movements and…to
reinvent the African state to play its effective and rightful role on the global
terrain’ (Kagwanja 2006: 159; Ahluwali 2002). Paradoxically, not all South
African citizens shared their neo-liberal vision of improving the image of
Africa in order to attract foreign investments and make the ‘new’ South
Africa an important global trading nation (Ahluwali 2002). Moreover, even
as they enmeshed themselves in this web of continental institutions, Mbeki’s
‘Renaissance knights’ failed to find a healthy balance between their promotion
of the liberal norms of democracy and human rights and the imperative of
African solidarity. Widespread accusations that Mbeki sacrificed democracy
at the altar of nationalist solidarity by failing to openly condemn illiberal
regimes such as Robert Mugabe’s in Zimbabwe have stuck like grease on
his administration. This contradiction, which lingered on throughout the
Mbeki era (1999–2008), reached its acme during South Africa’s tenure as a
non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in
2007/08.
The future of the ‘liberation’ cadres looks uncertain. They suffered a serious
setback when Zimbabwe’s opposition won the 27 March 2008 elections,
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
xx
humiliating Mbeki’s mentor and ally, Robert Mugabe, the latter also celebrated
as a nationalist hero across Africa and its diaspora (Gevisser 2007). Pretoria’s
cynics have written off Mbeki’s African agenda as a drain on their resources,

It emerged as a logical response to the
liberation movement’s need for cohesion, coherence and effectiveness in the
face of the acutely dangerous and harsh environment outside South Africa. In
the succession tussle, Mbeki has emerged as the consummate symbol of the
centralising logic of the ‘exiles’. This centralising logic is contrasted with the
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INTRODUCTION
xxi
decentralised tendency of the ANC ‘inxiles’ or ‘remainees’. The decentralising
logic gained prominence in response to Sharpeville, when leaders of more
centralised movements such as the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress
(PAC) were arrested or forced into exile. Anti-apartheid lobby groups such
as the UDF evolved as decentralised mass movements with deep grassroots
support designed to operate below the radar of apartheid security apparatuses
on the home front. The Zuma faction of the ANC has identified with this
political tradition of the ‘inxiles’.
Upon coming to power, Mbeki prioritised the restructuring of the governance
structures and decision-making machinery – both of the government and the
ANC – to create what one of his spin doctors, Frank Chikane, celebrated as
‘integrated governance’ (Chikane 2001). During Mbeki’s first term (1999–
2004), the presidency was restructured in line with the recommendations of
the 1998 Presidential Review Commission to ensure ‘efficient and effective
management of government by the president together with the deputy
president and cabinet’ (South Africa 1998). The result was an oversized
presidency, which by 2004/05 comprised an establishment of 469 people with
a budget of R170 million, a nearly 100 per cent increase from the R89 million
in 2001 (Southall 2007: 3; Sunday Times 19.09.04).
Mbeki’s second term (2004–2008) saw an accelerated move to tighten the
administrative nuts and bolts and to realign the party with the governmental
structures. In June 2005 the ANC’s National General Council (NGC) produced

friendly Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework was
adopted in 1996 to replace the left-leaning Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP). Critics in Cosatu and the SACP of the ANC’s neo-liberal
turn were not persuaded that GEAR was worth its ink as a blueprint designed
to transform South Africa into a competitive trading nation. They never
hid their bitter feelings that the framework was a stumbling block to the
implementation of the ideals of the Freedom Charter and the RDP (ANC
1997a, 1997b).
The neo-liberal turn created three distinct ideological groupings within
the ANC and its alliance. First were the remnants of the ANC radical past,
clamouring for a return to the party’s traditional populism and socialist
orientation of the exile era, mainly in the SACP and Cosatu; second were old-
regime officials or ‘realists’, urging for a policy driven by economic interests
rather than by the ethical and ideological imperatives of African nationalism;
and third was a small but vocal and powerful group of ‘neo-liberals’ or
‘idealists’ at the helm of government, pushing Mbeki’s pan-African agenda in
Africa and globally (Evans 1999; Mills 2004). The succession struggle widened
the rift between these groups, increasingly contributing to the collapse of
the elite consensus. By 26 June 2005, when the ANC celebrated 50 years of
its ‘socialist manifesto’, the Freedom Charter, ideological cleavages with its
erstwhile leftist allies had reached breaking point. Mbeki’s critics lamented
that the idea of the state controlling the commanding heights of the economy
had been effectively replaced by a pro-market economic policy and a gentle
relationship with private capital, once loathed as the underwriter of apartheid.
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INTRODUCTION
xxiii
Mbeki’s own intellectual aloofness and his hardball style tended to amplify his
existential challenge of holding together the ANC tripartite alliance.
In addition to the centralising proclivity rooted in the exile political culture,

of the party’s 51st conference in Stellenbosch in December 2002. This truce
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
xxiv
paved the way for the ANC’s emphatic victory in the 2004 general election,
which ushered in Mbeki’s second term.
The Stellenbosch conference popularised the notion of the ‘developmental
state’, which the ANC left interpreted as a significant move by the Mbeki
administration to recognise the limits of the market as a tool for social
transformation and to recommit itself to RDP consensus on state-driven
development. In this volume, Sampie Terreblanche argues that ‘the shift
away from a fundamental restructuring of the South African economy (as
was envisaged in the RDP) to address the “deep-seated structural crisis”
towards a strengthening of neo-liberal capitalism…makes it extremely
difficult to institutionalise the envisaged developmental state’. However, the
developmental state remained a vaguely defined concept void of any real
substance except for the official lip-service and high-profile debates. The
Mbeki–Zuma tussle thrust the developmental state back into public debate.
Enter Zuma: the collapse of the elite consensus
As to whether Mbeki had a better alternative to firing his 65-year-old deputy,
Jacob Zuma, after the latter’s friend and financial adviser, Schabir Shaik, was
convicted of fraud and whether such a decision would have preserved ANC
unity will remain one of the ‘might-have-beens’ of history. The reality is that
Mbeki’s decision to ‘release’ Zuma from office was hailed in the west as ‘a
milestone even in South Africa’s history’ (Herbst 2005: 96). Mbeki’s good
intentions and moral responsibility in responding to what the presiding judge
labelled as a ‘mutually beneficial symbiosis’ in the relationship between Zuma
and Shaik and its potential harm to South Africa’s infant democracy never
wholly convinced internal critics, who saw the move as part of the intrigues.
For instance, it was noted that until Zuma was fired, he had remained a loyal

contrasting him to the ‘intellectually aloof and arrogant’, ‘autocratic’, ‘pro-
rich’, ‘pro-business’ and ‘elitist’ Mbeki. For his part, Zuma shrewdly played the
nationalist and ethnic cards in a fierce battle to win the hearts and minds of
the ANC rank and file. Appealing to the nationalist discourse, he presented
himself as a unifier in the tradition of Oliver Tambo, the revered ANC
leader. Analysts noted that during his rape trial, he not only spoke Zulu in
court but also invented ‘new Zulu cultural norms’ to suit his case (Gumede
2008: 262). The succession tussle not only eroded the political capacity of
state institutions (Southall 2007) but, more subtly, it intensified the ethnic
polarisation of politics.
Ethnonationalism after Polokwane
In his chapter in this volume, Somadoda Fikeni examines the ‘Polokwane
moment’ when Mbeki lost the ANC presidency. As early as October 2005,
Mbeki’s policy chief, Joel Netshitenzhe, hinted that it was not clear that the
same person should necessarily fill the offices of state president and president
of the party (Mail & Guardian 14–20.10.05). This gave weight to the view that
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STATE OF THE NATION 2008
xxvi
Mbeki was considering prolonging his political life beyond 2009 when he was
expected to step down as state president but, like other African leaders such as
Namibia’s Sam Nujoma, remaining in control of the powerful party machine
and thus being the real power behind the throne. His public support for a
woman president for the country confirmed this view, with fingers pointing
to his deputy, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.
Mbeki’s decision to stand for a third term as the ANC president raised the
political stakes in the run-up to the ANC’s 52nd National Conference in
Polokwane on 16–20 December 2007. As Fikeni shows, this decision stirred
ethnic antagonism to a dangerous degree. The agenda of ending the Xhosa
dominance in the ANC never featured in the party’s public discussions or

the Order of the Companions of OR Tambo. He closed the introduction to his
speech by referring to the Freedom Charter, adopted nearly 50 years earlier
(Mbeki 2007).
Respective factions also battle for custodianship of ANC traditions and values,
with each camp portraying itself as the genuine custodian while depicting the
rival camp as a betrayer of these traditions. Names of ANC elders such as Luthuli,
Tambo, Mandela and Chris Hani were liberally invoked in political campaigns
and public utterances by both Mbeki and Zuma and their supporters, and the
country plunged into a string of festivities commemorating these icons and
historic events such as the Bambata Rebellion. This instrumentalisation of
nationalism took an ugly turn in July 2007 with the screening of a 24-minute
documentary titled Unauthorised: Thabo Mbeki, a brazen attempt to link
Mbeki to the 1993 assassination of SACP leader Chris Hani.
Broad Daylight Films, the producer of the documentary, claimed that it
was based on a formal investigation into an alleged plot against Mbeki in
2001 where the ‘alleged plotters, Tokyo Sexwale, Mathews Phosa and Cyril
Ramaphosa, were said to have spread a rumour linking Mbeki to the Hani
assassination’ (Mail & Guardian 19.07.07).
5
The documentary’s maker, Redi
Direko, reportedly appeared in the documentary to be debunking the rumour.
Many commentators dismissed the film as ‘unbelievable’ and as ‘merely a sign
of paranoia’ (Mail & Guardian 19.07.07). The South African Broadcasting
Corporation decided not to broadcast the documentary on public television,
but its screening in Johannesburg sparked a ferocious rumour across the
country. In short, a documentary primarily about rumour ended up pushing
the rumour mill into overdrive, badly hurting Mbeki’s standing at a critical
campaign moment.
The Chris Hani rumour reinforced public perceptions of Mbeki’s brutal style
of handling rivals, including the alleged abuse of power with regard to hiring