TheSterlingBondMarkets
and
LowCarbonorGreenBonds
AreporttoE3G
AlexVeys
May2010
1
Abouttheauthor
Alexhasover20yearsexperienceinthebondmarkets,workingforbrokers,asaquantitativeanalyst
for10years,andforFidelityInvestmentsasaportfoliomanagerwherehemanagedalltypesof
bondfund.HealsochairedtheiBoxxoversitecommitteeforseveralyears.Hehasadeepknowledge
ofbonds,derivatives,investorsandbor
companiestopurchaseclimaterelatedbonds.
1.8. IncentivessuchasguaranteesorinsurancefromtheUKgovernmentoranewGreen
InvestmentBankarelikelytoefficientlyleveragepublicmoney.
1.9. Taxincentives,likethoseofferedintheUSMunicipalbondmarket(10%ofthetot
alUSbond
market)couldbesuccessful.Thiswillleadretailinvestorsintothemarket,thoughthiswill
notraisethevolumesofcapitalneededwhichwillcomefromtheinstitutionalmarket
1.10. Greenorclimatebondswillneedtoreflectcurrentbondstructurestoaddressexisting
demand
.Newstructureswithoutfundamentaldemandfrommajorinvestorswillfail.
1.11. Thereisanurgentneedforaclimatebond“ratingagency”to“police” bon ds toensurethat
fundsareusedforgreeninvestmentsandthatinsuranceandguaranteescanthereforebe
reliablyoffered.
1.12. Welldesignedgreengilts,andaGreenIn
vestmentBank,willshowthattheGovernmentis
seriousandcommittedtotacklingclimatechangeaswellashelpingfinancelargeclimate
relatedprojects,leveragingpublicmoneyandleadingworldanddomesticmarkets.
3
Contents
3.7.2. PensionFundDeficits 22
3.7.3. ClimatechangeandPensionDecisions 22
4. GreenorLowCarbonBonds 24
4.1. History 24
4.1.1. WorldBankBonds 24
4
4.1.2. EIBBonds
25
4.1.3. USBonds 25
4.1.4. BreezeBonds 25
4.1.5. Overview 26
4.2. SourceofFunding 26
4.3. CharacteristicsandStructureofaGreenBondMarket 27
4.3.1. CarbonRatings 28
4.3.2. Incentives 28
4.3.3. GovernmentBonds 29
4.3.4. OtherAAARatedBonds 30
4.3.5. InvestmentGradeBonds 30
4.3.6. HighYieldBonds 31
4.3.7. WhatWillNotWork 31
4.4. Benefits
31
4.6 Movingforward 32
Appendix 33
A.1Glossary 33
A.2GiltEdgedMarketMakers(GEMMs) 34
A.3BondCalculations 35
A.3.1RunningorCurrentYield 35
A.3.2SimpleYield 35
airplanesetc).Amongstotherinformationitalsosho
wedhowmuchthecertificatewasworth(i.e.
howmuchhadbe enborrowed),therateofinterest,thecurrencyandtheborrower.
Atthebottomofthecertificatewereanumberof“coupons”attachedtothemainbodyby
perforations(likestamps).Periodically,thelenderwouldgotothepayingagent
1
withthe
certificate;thepayingagentwouldtearofftherelevantcouponandhandovertheinterestpayment.
Atmaturity,thewholecertificatewouldbepresented,the“principal”(ornominalamount)ofthe
loanandfinalcouponpaidandthecertificatecancelled.Westillusethisslightlyarchaic
terminology
2
today,referringto“coupons”and“principal”eventhoughvirtuallyallbondsarenow
heldelectronically.
2.2. RiskFeatures
Whenaninvestorthinksaboutpurchasingabond,therearefourkeyriskattributesthatthey
willassesstodeterminewhetherthebondisagoodfitwiththeirportfolio,howlikelyitisthatthe
expectedreturnswillbeachieved andwhetherthepriceisfair.Theseattributesare:
itsissuer
itscurr
ency
itscoupon
itsmaturity
Issuer−Theissuerofthebond(i.e.borrowerofthemoney)definesthecreditriskofthebond.
Thatis,thelikelihoodthattheinvestorwillberepaidtheirinitialloan.Forexample,governmentsare
generallyconsideredtohavealowcr
editrisk(seesection2.4).
.Thefurtherinthe
futurethematuritydate(the“longer”thebond),themoreriskythedebtasthereismoretimefor
theissuertogetintotrouble.Indeed,somebonds(includingthefamouswarloanfromtheUK
Government)are“undated”,whichmeansthattheissuerneverhastorepayth
edebt.Undated,or
perpetual,bondsoftenhavefeaturesthatallowtheissuertopaybackthedebtundercertain
circumstances:thesearecalled“calloptions”andgivetheissuertheright,butnottheobligation,to
paybackthelender
4
.
2.3. LegalStatusandGrowthParticipation
Therearethreebroadwaysinwhichacompanyorinstitutioncanraisemoney:throughthe
equitymarkets,thebanksorthebondmarkets.Eachofthesehastheirownmeritsasshownin
Table1.
Intermsofle
galstatusandgrowthparticipation,bankloansandbonds areverysimilar.The
maintwodifferencesarethelengthoftheborrowingandwhatrightsthelenderhasifthecompany
goesintobankruptcy.Banksloansareoftenmuchshorterinmaturitythanbondsandbanksusually
gettheirmon
eybackbeforebondholders.
Thekeydifferencesbetweenbondsandequityisthatmostequityhas votingrights and
participatesinthegrowthofthecompany(i.e.sharesintheupside),whereasdebthasneither
votingrightsnortheabilitytoparticipateinthecompany’sgrowth.However,debtorsdohavethe
abilitytocallintheadministratorsifthecompa
nydefaultsonapaymentorbreaksacovenant
5
(and
possiblyclosedownthecompany).Theyalsohaveanearliercallonthecompany’sassets.Soifthe
Creditorranking Low High Highest
Voting Yes No No
Legalrecourse Companylaw Instigatebankruptcy Instigatebankruptcy
Greaterassetsecurity
Greaterpote
ntialriskandreturn
2.4. CreditRatings
CreditRatingsarefundamentaltogoodbondfundmanagement.Notallbondshavearatingbut,
thosethatdonot,sufferfornothavingone, havingtopaymoreforthemoneytheyborrow.
Therearethreemajorratingagencies,Moody’s,StandardandPoor’s(S&P)andFitch.Theyall
havesimilarrat
ingcategories,whichreflectthelikelihoodofabonddefaultingortherating
changing.
Fromthecoarsestperspective,bondsareeitherinvestmentgradeorhighyield
6
.Thearbitrary
bandbetweenthetwosectorswascreatedbyMoody’sintheearlypartofthetwentiethcenturybut
hasremainedimportant−somefundscannotinvestinsub‐investmentgradebonds.
Thenextlevelsplitseachsectorintoratingsbands
7
asshowninTable2.Thisalsoshowsthe
A A 0.09% 1.26%
BBB Baa 0 .2 9% 3 .1 3%
BB Ba 1.36% 9.90%
B B 4.03% 22.42%
CCC Caa
CC Ca 14.28% 41.18%
CC
Defaulted D D 100% 100%
Investme nt
Grade
HighYield
*Source :"CorporateDefaultandRecoveryRates,1920‐2009"
Moodys.Datausedfrom192 0to2009.
2.5. PrimaryandSecondaryMarkets
Thelifeofabondhastwophases,primaryandsecondary.Theprimaryphaseisthegestation
periodofabondbeforeitispricedandlaunchedintothemarkets.Afteritsinitialpricing,itenters
itssecondaryphase.
Theprimaryphaseencompassesalltheworkleadinguptothepri
cingandlaunchingofabond.
Thisincludes:
Creatingtheprospectus
8
Writingresearchtosupporttheissue
Talkingwithinvestorstoseeatwhatpricetheywouldbuythebond
Buildinga“book”(gatheringalistofinvestorswhohavecommittedtobuyingthebond)
shavebeenallocatedbythebrokerstoclients,switches
10
outofotherbondscompletedandthepriceset.Thesecondaryphasethenstarts.
Whenabondentersitssecondaryphaseitisopentobetradedbyall.Generally,thebrokers,or
leadmanagers,thatbroughtthebondtomarketcommittomakingatwowayprice
11
inthebondfor
itslife.Inreality,thisisnotalwaysthecaseespeciallyindifficultmarketconditionswherethereisa
lotofvolatility
12
orifthebondisofasmallsizeand/orhasacomplexstructure(toomanybellsand
whistles
13
).Thisisimportantasitimpactstheliquidityofthebond,itspriceandthewillingnessof
investorstoownit
14
.
10
Abrokeragreestobuyanexistingsecondarymarketbondinexchangeforsaleofthenewprimary
marketbondonfixedterms.
11
Theycommittobothofferingtobuyorsellthebondor“makeamarket”
12
Volatilitycanbecausedbyarangeoffactorsincludingforexampleemergingeconomicdata,loans
globalinterestrateriskcomparedto5%oftheglobalmarketvalue.Thisisimportantasitshowsthat
theUKbondmarkethasastrongdesireforlongertermbon
dswhichislikelytobefromwherethe
supplyofgreenbondscomes
17
.
Figure1:MerrillLynchGlobalBroadMarketIndex
Index
Weight
Average
Duration
(%) (years)
USD 43.7 4.5
EUR 27.8 5.4
JPY 17.9 6.7
GBP 4.9 8.1
CAD 2.9 6.4
AUD 1.0 3.8
KRW 0.7 4.3
PLN 0.3 4.0
DKK 0.3 7.3
OT HR 0.3 5.1
CHF 0.2 6.9
SEK 0.2 6.0
Currency
19
.Byearly2008,thegilt
marketwasonlyabout40%oftheoverallUKBondmarket.Since that timehowever,giltissuance
hasacceleratedasaresultofthegovernmentbailoutoftheUKbanks.Nowthereareover£700
billionofgiltsinthemarketcontributingtoabout60%ofth
eUKbondmarket.Overthelastfew
monthsthesizeofthenon‐giltmarkethasfallen,mainlyduetosignificant maturingbonds,slower
growthanddeleveraging.
Figure2:TotalvalueoftheUKbondmarketendFebruary2010
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
‐
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
sectoriflocalauthoritiesstarttoissue(climaterelated)bondsinthedomesticmarket.Thiswouldbe
especiallytrueifthereweresomeformoftaxincentiveforlocalauthoritybonds(seesection3.5.5
onMu
ni s)Bond
3.3.2. EuroSterlingBonds
ThisisbyfarthelargestsectorintheUKnon‐giltbondmarketcoveringover99%ofnon‐gilt
bonds.TheEuromarketsgrewupinthe1960sasaresultofcomplexinternationaltaxagreements.
Broadly,aEurobond,andspecificallyaEuroSterlingbond,isabondthatisnotissuedundera
particularjurisdictionbu
t,inthecaseofaeuro‐sterlingbond,denominatedinGBP.Itistherefore
notbeholdentoaparticulartaxauthority.Itisneverthelessoftenlistedonastockexchangelikethe
Luxembourgexchangewherethereisnowithholdingtax
20
tofulfillpensionfundrequirements.
AlthoughmanyofthereasonsfortheinitialgrowthoftheEuromarketsarenolongervalid,
becauseofitsflexibility(themarketsareabovecountrymarketsandregulationandthereforelack
nationalbarrierstoentryandaresubjecttolesspoliticalrisk),theEuromarkets,andintheUK’scase
theEuroSt
erlingmarket,continuetogro wandbethemarketofchoiceforissuance.
3.3.3. GlobalBonds
GlobalbondsaresimplybondsissuedintheEuromarketsanddomesticmarketatthesame
time.Thisallowsinvestorswhocannotengageinoneofthesemarketstostillbeabletobuythe
bondsandsoexpandstheinvestoruniverse.Theglobalbondmarkethasbeenparticularlypopular
withthelargestsupranati
onalagenciessuchastheWorldBankandtheEuropeanInvestmentBank
(EIB),whowanttoensurethattheirbondscanbeboughtbybothEuromarketparticipantsandUS
domesticbondbuyers.
3.4.3. AssetBackedandSecuritizedBonds
Assetbackedorsecuritizedbondsaresimilartoordinarybondsbuthavespecificassetswhose
revenuespaytheinterestandprincipal.Anordinarybond’spaymentsaregenerallyguaranteedby
thecompanythatissuesthem.Inassetbackedorsecuritizedbondsasetofrevenuegenerating
assetsareputintoaspecialpurposecompanyandtheseassetspaythebondholdertheirin
terest
andprincipal.
Forinstance,EnterpriseInnssetupaspecialcompanytoholdallitspubs.Therevenuesfrom
thesepubs,aftercertaincosts,werethenusedtopaytheprincipalandinterestofthebonds.This
structureworksbecausetherevenuesarethou
ghttoberobustsotheratingagencycangivethe
bondastrongrating.Indeed,itiscommonfortheretobeanumberofbondsattachedtotheassets
withdifferentclaimsontheassets.Thebondswithstrongerclaimshavehigherrating,perhaps
“AAA”whilstthosebondswithlessercl
aimsmayonlyberated“BBB”astheyhavetowaitforallthe
otherbondstobeservicedbeforetheygettheirsliceofthecake.
Inthearenaofclimatechange,theBreezebonds(seesection4.1.4)areagoodcaseinpoint.
Thesebondsareissuedfro
masecuritizedvehicleorcompanywhichownsanumberofwindfarms
whic fficienttopaytheprincipalinandinterest.hin turngeneraterevenuessu
3.5. IssuersaretheSupply
Withoutborrowers,orissuersofbonds,therewouldbenobondmarket.Fortunatelythereare
manykeenanddiverseborrowersrangingfrominstitutionsliketheUKgovernmenttopre‐profit‐
makingprojectfinance
23
companies.Brokersandindexcompaniesprovideausefulwayof
UKareissuedbyUKinstitutionsand con tributetooverthree‐quartersoftheindex.However,aswe
willsee,muchofthispercentagecomesfromtheUKgovernment.TherearealsomanyEuropean
companiesintheindex(li
keEoNandFranceTelecom)withover100ofthebondscomingfromUS
companies(likeGEandCitibank).
Figure3:UKInvestmentGradeMarketbyCountryofBond
Countryof
Issuer
Numbe rof
B o nds
Percent
ofindex
UK 523 76.7
US 110 4.2
France 65 2.5
Germany 61 4.2
SupraNational 50 4.1
Australia 31 0.9
Netherlands 31 1.0
Italy 30 1.3
Ireland 25 0.9
Spain 20 0.8
Other 116 3.3
Total 1062 100.0
Analternativewaytosplitthebondsisintosectorssuchascorporates(egBritis hTelecom,
Barclaysetc);quasiandforeigngovernments(RoyalBankofScotland,theItaliangovernmentand
theEIB);securitizedorcollateralizedbonds
Seesection2.4.
26
Seesection3.4.3.
27
FormoredetailonCreditRatingsseeSection2.4.
28
Therehasbeenachangehereasthecentreofgravityforfinancialsusedtobe“AA”butwiththecredit
crisis,manyfinancialinstitutionshaveeitherbeendowngradedorbroughtundertheUKgovernmentAAA
rating.
15
Thesovereignsectoriscl
earlythelargestsectorandonlyincludesonlygilts.
Thequasiandforeigngovernmentsector(10.3%)isdominatedbytheEIB(3.5%)andKfW
Bankengruppe(2.5%).Theformerisasupra‐nationalagencyratedAAAandthelatteraGerman
governmentagencyalsoratedAAA.
Thefi
nancialsector(predominantlybanksandinsurancecompanies)ismorebroadlyspreadbut
stillhasahandfulofdominant issuersli keGE(whosedebtcontributestoabout1%ofthetotal
index),Barclays(1%)andHSBC(0.8%).Thesecuritizedorassetbackedsector
29
andindustrialsector
isevenmorebroadlybasedwithnoissuersholdingmorethan0.4%oftheindex.Theutilitysector
hasslightlymoreconcentrationwithissuerslikeEDF(0.5%)andEoN(0.4%)havingreasonable
exposure.
Figure4:MerrillLynchSterlingnon‐giltindex
AAA AA A BBB Total
this,thissupplyislikelytobeneatlyabsorbedbyexistingendinvestorslookingforlongerdat
ed
bondsinsectorsthatdiversifytheirbondexposure.
29
Bondsthataresecuredbyaparticularsetofassets:seesection3.4.3.
16
Figure5:WeightofsectorsintheUKbondmarket
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
1to33to55to77to10 10to20 20to30 30to50
AggregatedWeight(%)
TimetoMaturity Bucket
Weightof SectorsinUKBondMarket
Utility Financial Industrials Se curitized
3.5.2. Gilts
WehaveseenthattheUKGovernmentisthelargestissuerintheUKbondmarketbutitisalso
importanttounderstandthekeyrolethatithasindefiningthereturnonallotherbondsinthe
market.Yieldsongiltsareoftenseenasthereferencepointforallotherbonds.Hencein
creasesin
.Thisisabout10%ofthe
totalsizeoftheUSinvestmentgradebondmarketofaboutUSD9,800billion
31
.UnlikeUStreasury
bondsandconventionalcorporatebonds(eitherinthedomesticoreuromar ket),whicharemainly
ownedbypensionfundsandinsurancecompanies,mostMunibondsareownedbytheretailsector.
Munibondsareissuedbylocalandstategovernments(Municipalities).Theyareusedtofinance
municipalpr
ojectssuchasroads,sewersandbridgesetcandaregenerallysecuredoneitherthefull
“faithandcredit”oftheissuer(e.g.theState)orontherevenuesfromtheprojectthatisbeing
financed.Thisgenerallygivesthemagoodinvestmentgraderating.
However,Munisarenotspecialbec
auseoftheirratingbutbecauseoftheirtaxstatus.Theyare
normallyexemptfromincometax.Theinterestthattheypay,viathebond’scoupon,isnotsubject
totaxationatthefederallevelandisalsousuallyexemptfromstatetax
32
.Foratax‐payingindividual
thismeansthattheyareaverygoodinvestmentcomparedtoothertypesofbond.Foraperson
payingamarginaltaxrateof,say,40%,aMunibondthatpaysacouponof4%isequivalent,after
tax,toanordinarybondpayingacoup
onof6.7%
33
.
ArelativelynewMunisectorhasrecentlybeenintroducedwhichismadeupofPACEbonds
34
(PropertyAssessedCleanEnergybonds).ThesePACEbondsare,andwillbe,usedtofinanceenergy
March2010.
31
MerrillLynchUSCorporateandGovernmentMasterIndexonthe11
th
March2010.
32
TheUStaxationsystemisdifferentinanumberofwaysthanthatintheUK.Inrelationtomunibonds
though,boththefederalandstatecandeducttaxfromanindividual’sincome.Munibonds,aswellasbeing
exemptfromfederaltaxareoftenexemptfromstatetaxiftheholderresidesinthestate.
33
6.7%*(1‐40%)=4%
34
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/PACE_Principles.pdf
35
Seesection3.4.3onassetbackedsecurities
18
Brokershavegeneralskil
lsandparticularspecialtiesdependingontheirhistory,strategic goal s
andthepeoplethattheyemploy.Relationshipswithbrokersareusuallyonaonetoonebasiseven
thoughitisthecompaniesthataretransacting.
Unliketheequitymarket,therearenocommissionspaidinthebo
ndorfixedincomemarkets.
Brokersmaketheirmoneyby“buyinglowandsellinghigh”.Therearetwoprincipalwaysthatthisis
achieved,firstbymakingmoneyfromthe“bid/offerspread”and secondbymanagingabook
36
of
bonds.
andothersubjectstogeneratesales.Thereareoftenquestionsregardingtheirimpartialityaheadof
newbondissuanceasthereisanincentivefortheresearchtobepositiveaboutthenewbonds.
Indeed,thesequestionsextendtoresearchproducedwhenthebondshaveenteredthesecondary
marketsasbrokerstendtoliketomaintaingoodrela
tionshipswiththeissuer.
Therearenumerousbrokersinthemarket.However,thebrokerswiththemostinfluenceinthe
Sterlingmarketsarethesocalled“GEMMs”
38
−theGiltEdgedMarketMakers.Inparticular,the
mostimportantbrokersintheUKmarketarethelikesofRoyalBankofScotland,BarclaysandHSBC.
ThesearethekeyhousesforbothissuingandtradingnotonlyUK‐denomina tedgovernmentdebt
butalsocorporatebondsrangingfromAAAtohighyi
eld.
TobecomeaGEMM,abrokerhastocommittotheDebtManagementOffice
39
(DMO)to
makingcontinuousmarke tsingiltstobothbuyersandsellers,althoughnottootherGEMMs.They
alsohavetomaintainareasonablemarketshare−meaningthattheyhavetoactuallybuyandsell
bonds(ratherthanjustmakingmarketsandnottransacting)inboththeprimarygiltauctionsand
these
condarymarkets.Asabenefit,theyaretheonlymarketparticipantsthatcanbuygiltsdirectly
36
Abookisatrader’sportfolioofbonds.Thiswillbemadeupofbothrealbondsandderivatives.
37
SeesectionA.4.
38
3.7. EndInvestorsaretheDemand
Finaldemandforbondscomesfromfourcoreconstituencies:pension funds,insurance
companies,alternativeassetmanagementcompanies(likehedgefunds)andtheretailinvestor.The
largestsectorsareinsurancecompaniesandpensionfunds.Attheendof2008,thesetwosectors
heldabout£850billionofbondsassets
41
.Thelargestofthesewastheinsurancecompaniesthat
ownedabout£680billionofbondswiththepensionindustryowning£170billion.
Figure6sho
wsthebreakdownoftheseassetsinmoredetail.Itshowsthatboththepension
andinsuranceindustryhaveapreferenceforlongtermassets.Partofthisreasonisthatbothof
theseindustriesareheavilyregulated.Pensionindustryregulationstartedinearnestafterthe
Maxwellenquiry
42
andhascontinuedsincetoprotecttherightofthepensionerandtheirassetsin
definedbenefitpensionschemes
43
.Thepreferenceforlongtermassetsisaresultofprotecting
stakeholderrightswhohavelongtermagreements.
40
http://www.dmo.gov.uk/docs/publications/operationalrules/guidebook211204.pdf
41
“MQ5,InvestmentbyInsurancecompanies,pensionsfundsandtrusts”,OfficeofNationalStatistics,3
rd
3.7.1. AssetsandLiabilities
Oneofthekeystoregulationisthemeasurementandassessmentofthesocalledasset/liability
mismatch.Thishelpsreducetheriskthatthepromisesmadetothepensionerorinsuredbythefund
orcompanyarenotmet.
Apensionfund’sliabilitiesarethepaymentsthat it iscontrac
tedtomaketoboth
existingpensionersandprospectivepensioners.Thesepaymentsoftenstretchout
decadesandpossiblyasmuchas80years.Thefuturesizeandnumberofthese
paymentsisdependentonmanyfactorsamongstwhicharewagegrowth,inflationand
longevity.
Itisdifficulttocalculatethevalueofthe
seliabilitiessincetheyhappenmanyyearsin
thefuture.Pensionfundsuseactuariestobuildmodelsthatendeavortocalcul ateor
estimatethe“presentvalue”
44
oftheseliabilities.
Ontheotherhand, theass etsthatapensionfund ownsaregenerallyintheformof
equitiesandbondswhose valuesareknow.
Thedifferencebetweenthesensitivityorcharacteristicsofthefuturepromises(the
liabilities)andthesensitivityorcharacteristicsoftheassetsiscall
edtheasset/liability
mismatch.
Thedifferencebetweenthevalueoftheassetsandliabilitiesdefineswhetherthe
pensionschemeisindeficitorsurplus.
Clearly,thereissomelinkbetweenthesensitivityoftheassetsandthesensitivityofthe
liabilities.Theyarelinkedmostclearlythroughinterestratesandin
3.7.2. PensionFundDeficits
Possiblythebiggestobstructiontopensionfundinvestinginclimatechangeassetsaretheir
massivedeficits.AccordingtoMercers
45
,attheendof2009,theaggregatedeficitoftheFTSE350
pensionfundswas£170billion.Withaggregateassetsvaluedatabout£450billion,thisisadeficitof
27%.Inotherwordsthisis27%belowthelevelofassetsthatactuariesbelievearerequiredtomeet
thef
undsfuturepensionliabilitiesof£620billion.Thisdeficitclearlyneedstobeaddressedasitis
massive.Toputthisinperspective,attheendof2008,thesamecompaniesrandeficitsofabout
13%andsomewhatlessinpreviousyears.SimilarnumbersholdfortheentireUKdefinedbenefit
pensionschemein
dustry.
Onthelistofissuesthatpensionfundtrusteesareworryingabout,climatechangeis ratherlow
onthelist
46
.Morepressingishowtomakeuptheirdeficitsandthelegalandriskimplicationsof
allocationchangetoachievethis.Therearealsoclearimplicationsfortheirsponsors
47
,asthefund
deficitsimpactonthesponsor’saccountingrecords.Indeed,legislationcanbeusedtoenforce
paymentstothepensionfundfromthesponsorattheexpenseofdividedpaymentsto
shareholders.
Fortunately,insurancecompanieshavenotsuccumbedtothesamesortofdeficits.Partofthe
reasonforthi
sistheextraregulationthattheyexistunder.Insurancecompanies,unlikepension
funds,arerealcompaniesandhavetohaveacertainamountofcapital.
:
Whenthepur poseofthetrustistoprovidefinancialbenefitsforthebeneficiaries,asisusually
thecase,thebestinterestsofthebeneficiariesarenormallytheirbestfinancialinterests.
Thishasbeen(mis)interpretedsuchthattrusteesmustseektomaximiseprofitattheexpenseof
allotherconsiderationsandpu
tasideallsocial,politicalandmoralviews−effectivelynon‐financial
information−whendecidi ngontheirassetallocation.Thishasclearlyledsomepensionfundsto
deducethattheycannottakeintoaccountclimatechangewhendecidingontheirassetallocation.
However,in2008LordMackenzie,intheHouseofLord
s,statedthattherewas“noreasoninlaw
whytrusteescannotconsidersocialandmoralcriteriainadditiontotheirusualcriteriaoffinancial
returns,securityanddiversification.”
ThisisanareathatcouldeasilybecleareduplegallyorviatheHouseofLords.Forinstance,a
clarificationofthecaseco
uldbemadenarrowingthescopeofthecaseorpensionfundscouldbe
explicitlytoldthattheycould,orperhapsshould,takeclimatechangeintoaccountintheirasset
allocationstrategy.
49
ClaireWoods“FundingClimateChange:howpensionfundfiduciarydutymaskstrusteeinertiaand
short‐termism”http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/transformations/wpapers/wpg09‐13.html
23
4. e wCarbonBondsGre norLo
TheWorldBankdabbledinlate2007withEURdenominatedgree nbondstargetedatretail
investors.Thereturnonthebondswastiedtotheperformanceofan“EcoIndex”whichwaslinked
totheequityperformance ofasetofcompaniesdefinedbyABNAmro.Theoutstandingamountis
aboutEUR230million.
Theyalsothenlaunche
dasmallbond(aboutUSD30m)thatwaslinkedtocertifiedemission
certificates(CERs).Thesewerespecificallylinkedtoparticularprojectsandagainretailtargeted.
ThefirstofthemajorseriesofWorldBankgreenbonds
50
wereissuedinNovember2008in
conjunctionwithSEBinSwedishKronatothevalueofaboutSEK3billion(£300m)targetedatboth
retailandinstitutionalinvestors.Theyhavecontinuedtoissue intheseriesasshowninFigure7.The
sizesofissuancearety
picalofWorldBankbondsandsofar,underthisprogram,theyhaveissued
justoverUSD1billion.However,sincethefirstissuanceofthegreenbondinNovember2007,the
WorldBankhasissuedUSD51billionofgeneralbondsandnoneoftheseinGBP.
50
http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/WorldBankGreenBondFactSheet.pdf
http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/Euromoney_
2010_Handbook_Environmental_FinanceforGBPage.
pdf
24
ese
wereiss S atoavalueofSEK2.2Billion(£200m).uedin wedishKron
4.1.3. USBonds
TherehavealsobeenissuesinUSDs(liketheMunibondsalreadydiscussed)butalsoClean
RenewableEnergyBonds(CREB).TheEnergyPolicyActof2005allowedspecialtaxcreditbondsthat
allowedelectricutilitiestoreceiveinterestfreeloansforqualifyingenergyprojects.Thereisalimit
totheam th which,for2009,wasaboutUSD2
.2billionount atcanbeissued
4.1.4. BreezeBonds
52
.
TheBreezeseriesofbondsareassetbackedbonds.Theywereissuedbyacompanycalled“CRC
BreezeFinance”andaresecuredonanumberofwindfarmsmainlyinGermany.Thereareseven
bondsoutstandingtotalingaboutEUR900million.
Thebondsarestructuredsothattherevenuesfromthewindfarmspayin
terestandcapitalback
onthebonds.Thisisclearlyanimportantstructureasitisusingthebondsmarketsdirectly,rather
thanthroughthebanks,tofinancerenewableenergyprojects.
Thecharacteristicsoftherevenuestreamfitneatlywiththeneedsofbondinvestors.Thewind
thatpowerstheturbinesisreasonablyconsistentyea
rtoyear.Thewindturnsthegeneratorswhich
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2007EPOSIIClimateawarenessprospectusat
http://www.eib.org/attachments/fi/prospectus_doc/XS0301665310.pdf
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