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When the People Speak
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When the People Speak
Deliberative Democracy and
Public Consultation
James S. Fishkin
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
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Eight methods of public consultation 21
2. The Trilemma of Democratic Reform 32
How am I included? 32
Deliberation 33
Political equality 43
Participation 45
Three conflicting options 46
Mass democracy 47
Mobilized deliberation 53
Deliberative microcosms 54
Avoiding tyranny of the majority 60
3. Competing Visions 65
Four democratic theories 65
Competitive democracy 66
Elite deliberation 70
Participatory democracy 76
Deliberative democracy 80
Deliberation versus aggregation? 85
Scale and the forms of democracy 88
vii
Contents
4. Making Deliberative Democracy Practical 95
Bringing the public sphere to life: Four questions 95
How inclusive? 96
How thoughtful? 99
Avoiding distortions: The problem of domination 100
Avoiding distortions: Polarization and groupthink 101
To what effect? 102
Under what conditions? 104
5. Making Deliberation Consequential 106

Bruce Ackerman and I have had a dialogue now over three decades, a
dialogue which led to our book Deliberation Day. The late Peter Laslett,
with whom I coedited some volumes of Philosophy, Politics and Society,
set an inspiring example for how to make political theory practical. He
was also a key adviser in my effort to bring the first Deliberative Poll
(DP) to reality, during my year as a Visiting Fellow Commoner at Trinity
College, Cambridge. Other moral, political, and social theorists who were
notably helpful at various stages included the late Bernard Williams,
Doug Rae, William Galston, Charles E. Lindblom, Robert Goodin, Cass
Sunstein, Brian Barry, Carole Pateman, Sandy Levinson, Philippe Van Pa-
rijs, Philippe Schmitter, Claus Offe, Albena Azmanova, Jane Mansbridge,
T.K. Seung, Dan Wikler, Dan Brock, David Miller, Beth Noveck, and the
late Iris Young. Larry Lessig has been very helpful in thinking about new
technology and deliberative democracy. I am also grateful to Josiah Ober,
with whom I have been teaching a seminar at Stanford on “Models of
Democracy.” The dialogue in that class allowed me to test out many of
the ideas of this book and I have also learned much more about Athenian
institutions from the experience.
On the empirical side, I owe most to my longtime collaborator Robert
Luskin. He and I are preparing a systematic empirical book on these issues.
In addition, he and I are coauthors, with a number of other collaborators,
on various scholarly papers. These papers, many of which are either in
press or in the “revise and resubmit” stage, are all referred to in the book
with web links. I have left all the actual analyses to be presented in the
papers and the later book as they are all the fruit of collaborative research.
My intellectual debts to Luskin are too numerous to mention but they
ix
Acknowledgments
are evident throughout this work, not just where I refer to our empirical
work, but also on the normative theory side.

When I thought of the idea, I immediately consulted two Fellows I
especially trusted for advice, Bob and Nan Keohane. They raised enough
interesting and tough questions that I continued to pursue it. Soon after
that, I published it in the Atlantic (August 1988). But it only became practi-
cal when I met with Max Kampelman and Jeff Kampelman in Washington
and we realized that it could be piloted by a television program on PBS.
The idea for what became the “National Issues Convention” was born at
that time.
x
Acknowledgments
The National Issues Convention, and then the many DPs in the United
States that followed, would not have happened were it not for two
extraordinary persons: Dan Werner, Executive Producer, MacNeil/Lehrer
Productions, and Charls E. Walker, who taught me, more than anyone
else, how an idea could be turned into reality. I also want to thank
David Lloyd, Commissioning Editor, Channel Four, who made the British
projects happen and who supervised them with care and vision. Andreas
Whittam Smith, Founder and Editor of The Independent, was also a key
partner in making the first DP happen. The five British DPs on Channel
Four were also successful because of superb talent at Granada Television
such as Sheena MacDonald, Charles Tremayne, Dorothy Byrne, and the
late Sarah Mainwaring-White.
The various “energy” DPs were based on an insight of Dennis Thomas,
a former Chairman of the Texas PUC. Along with Will Guild, Ron Lehrer,
and Robert Luskin, we went on to work together on all the projects
discussed here on energy choices. The Rome project was an initiative of
Giancarlo Bosetti, publisher of Reset. The Chinese projects are based on
the insight and initiative of our collaborator Baogang He. Deliberative
Polling was brought to Bulgaria by the Centre for Liberal Strategies headed
by Ivan Krastev working with the Open Society Institute. George Soros,

Invision (PITV). My thanks to Bill Cran, Clive Sydall, Anne Tyerman, and
all those at PITV who turned out to do such superb work, not only in
coordinating the television coverage of the weekend but also in producing
a compelling narrative.
There are too many other collaborators and supporters to list here but
many are mentioned in the text. I do, however, want to especially thank
Shanto Iyengar for conceiving of the idea that I could move my research
program to Stanford and establish the Center for Deliberative Democracy.
In addition, then Dean Sharon Long and then Associate Dean Karen Cook
deserve special thanks. Two visionaries in the foundation world, Paul Brest
of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and Sterling Speirn of the
W.K. Kellogg Foundation, have been instrumental in making it possible
for the Center to thrive and develop thus far. Their support has been
central to the work reported on here.
Lastly I want to thank my wife, Shelley, my two sons, Bobby and
Joey, my mother-in-law, Carol Plaine Fisher, and most especially my late
father-in-law, Milton Fisher. They have not only tolerated my quest for
deliberative democracy, but on many occasions they have joined me in
the effort and done a great deal to make it all possible.
xii
Charts
I. Forms of consultation 21
II. Options in the trilemma 46
III. Four democratic theories 65
IV. Preference formation and modes of decision 87
V. Participation and opinion 89
VI. Deliberative Polls, 1994–2008 97
III. Four democratic theories (from Chapter 3) 197
VII. Sixteen possible positions 198
xiii

distortions in how public views are expressed. There are also distortions
in how they are shaped. Elites and interest groups attempt to mold public
1
When the People Speak
opinion by using focus-group-tested messages in order later to invoke
those same opinions as a democratic mandate.
2
From the standpoint of
some democratic theories these practices are entirely appropriate. They
are just part of the terms of political competition between parties and
between organized interests.
3
But from the perspective outlined here—
deliberative democracy—they detour democracy from the dual aspiration
to realize political equality and deliberation. And at least for some issues
some of the time, there ought to be ways to represent the views of the
people equally under conditions in which they can think and come to a
considered judgment.
Why is it difficult to achieve both inclusion and thoughtfulness, both
political equality and deliberation? Consider some of the limitations of
mass opinion as we routinely find it in modern developed societies. We
can then ponder the problem of how those limitations might be overcome
in a way that, in some appropriate sense, includes everyone.
First, it is difficult to effectively motivate citizens in mass society to
become informed. Levels of information about most political or pol-
icy questions are routinely low. Social scientists have an explanation—
“rational ignorance.”
4
If I have one opinion in millions why should
I take the time and trouble to become really informed about politics or

talk about the weather than to talk about the political issues one dis-
agrees about.
6
Why put your relationships at risk by raising flashpoints of
conflict? In a highly partisan environment, having a mutually respectful
conversation with those one disagrees with takes work and the right social
context. Actually talking—and listening to others—across the boundaries
of political disagreement would seem to take too much effort and too
many (potentially unpleasant) meetings.
7
Perhaps, it might be argued, the Internet makes up for our limitations
in conversation. We can so easily consult almost any viewpoint. In the-
ory, the information available is almost limitless. And technologies, such
as the multichannel cable environment, podcasts, Tivo, Kindle, satellite
radio, all make it so easy to hear or see what we want, precisely when we
want it. J.S. Mill argued in his classic On Liberty that freedom of thought,
expression, and association would facilitate exposure to diverse points
of view allowing us to achieve, or approach achieving, “individuality”
(his word for our thinking for ourselves and living lives which are, in
substantial part, self-chosen).
8
Yet, suppose we exercise this liberty, with all its technological enhance-
ments, not to engage with contrasting points of view but rather to read,
watch, listen to, and converse with the like-minded. Suppose increasing
freedom and ease of choice simply facilitate our exposure to comforting
and confirming points of view. To the extent this is the case, the tech-
nological expansion of our ease of choice backfires on the presumptions
of a liberal/democratic society. Liberty allows us to choose less diversity
and to self-impose a dialogue (to the extent we have one at all) mostly
with ourselves or people like ourselves. There is no reason to presume

probably more common than misinformation is strategically incomplete
but misleading information. If one argument based on true but mis-
leadingly incomplete information has high visibility through expensive
advertising and the counter to it never gets an effective audience, then the
public can be seriously misled. Fifth, another key strategy of manipulation
is to “prime” one aspect of a policy, making that dimension so salient
that it overwhelms other considerations. In effect, a candidate or policy
advocate changes the terms of evaluation so that the issue on which his
or her side does best becomes the one that is decisive.
11
The strategic use of priming to change the terms of competition can
sometimes depend on a true incident magnified many times when taken
out of context by ads, by campaigns, by campaign surrogates, or appar-
ently independent commentators or groups (Willie Horton for Dukakis;
sighing in the presidential debate for Gore; Giuliani taking a cell phone
call from his wife during a speech), or a false claim asserted intensely
(Swift Boats for Kerry), or even an outsider intervening with the inten-
tion of influencing the election (a plausible interpretation of Bin Laden
appearing in video just before the 2004 presidential election). By priming
a dimension, whether crime or character or national security, the incident
can be intentionally employed to change (or further emphasize) the terms
of evaluation to the neglect of other issues.
12
As campaigns (and outside
actors) compete to reshape the playing field, the result is literally MAD or
what might be termed mutually assured distraction.
4
Democratic Aspirations
The enormous growth in financing of campaign ads in the United States
from legally independent groups (527 groups named after a section of

of the public dialogue. The Internet can spread misinformation, such as
claims that Senator Obama is a Muslim, and this information spreads
virally in emails. Text messages that spread from an anonymous or fake
source tell Obama voters to vote Wednesday due to long lines when
the election is Tuesday.
14
Asymmetrical (campaign) warfare can come
from anywhere and the result can be manipulative even on the eve of
elections.
15
Our US system began with an aspiration for deliberation—for
representatives to “refine and enlarge” or “filter” the public voice, as
5
When the People Speak
James Madison theorized. But the technology of the persuasion industry
has made it possible for elites to shape opinion and then invoke those
opinions in the name of democracy. Techniques of persuasion tested in
focus groups and measured by people meters have been developed for
commercial purposes to sell us products ranging from detergents to auto-
mobiles. The same techniques are routinely employed to sell candidates
and policies or to mobilize or demobilize voting. As our political process
is colonized by the persuasion industry, as our public dialogue is voiced
increasingly in advertising, our system has undertaken a long journey
from Madison to Madison Avenue.
Efforts to manipulate public opinion work best with an inattentive
and/or uninformed public. If the public is inattentive, then it may not
take much to persuade and it may be easy to prime. If it is uninformed,
it may be manipulated even if it is highly engaged or even emotionally
gripped by an issue. In that case, it may be easily misled through misin-
formation or primed to consider only certain dimensions of an issue.

16
These are only some of the limitations of public opinion as we find it in
mass society. But even with this incomplete list, we can see the difficulty
of achieving both inclusion and thoughtfulness. Most people are not
effectively motivated to get information, to form opinions, or to discuss
issues with those who have different points of view. Each citizen has only
one vote or voice in millions and most have other pressing demands on
their time. The production of informed, considered opinions for politics
and policy is a public good. And the logic of collective action for public
goods dictates that motivating large numbers to produce a public good
requires selective incentives (incentives that apply just to those who
produce them) otherwise there will be a failure to provide them.
17
Bar-
ring some transformation of preferences in which people valued forming
informed and considered judgments for its own sake (maybe after some
transformative form of civic education
18
) there is every reason to believe
that a large-scale public opinion with the limitations just sketched will
be the norm. The bulk of the public will lack information, often lack
opinions about specific policy issues on the elite agenda, and will limit
its conversations and sources to those from similar social locations and
viewpoints. It will also be vulnerable to manipulation (largely as a conse-
quence of the first three limitations). In short, we can expect an under-
informed and nondeliberative mass public. In that case, if we include
everyone, it seems that we are unlikely to get a thoughtful public input
from our democratic institutions. We might, if we somehow selected
only elites or opinion leaders, but then we would be risking violations
of political equality. A democracy of elites or opinion leaders would at

Hence, in at least some cases, deliberation makes a con-
siderable difference and the uninformed do not simply reach the same
result.
A second line of counterargument is that we can make do without a
public that is generally well informed by dividing up the electorate into
“issue publics.” Farmers may be very concerned about agricultural policy.
Jews may be especially interested in Middle East policy. And Cuban-
Americans may be especially interested in policy about Cuba. For those
issues, the relevant issue publics may in fact become well informed. If
I do not care about farm policy I can just leave it to the farmers (or so
the argument goes). But from the standpoint of democratic theory, the
worry is that farmers have special interests. And all the other issue publics
have their own distinct interests and values. To what extent do we want
to delegate policy to the relevant issue publics? As Robert Dahl noted
years ago, leaving policy to those especially interested leads to a pattern
not of majority rule but of “minorities rule.”
22
While such a picture may
have plausibility as an interpretation of how our system actually works, it
does not fare well if the aspiration is to realize both political equality and
deliberation. There is little reason to think that the minorities who self-
select to become engaged in their areas of special interest would approx-
imate the views of the rest of the electorate.
23
However, if the minority
deliberating were a random sample of the whole public, rather than a
self-selected group with special interests (farmers, Cuban-Americans, etc.),
then it might be plausible for a representative microcosm to combine
both political equality and deliberation. However, issue publics are spe-
cial; they are not representative of the broader public. That is part of

together and make important public decisions.
26
Before the day’s deliberations, a party committee had narrowed down the
candidates to six finalists. Then, a scientific random sample of voters
had responded to a survey on the candidates and issues. The survey
respondents were invited to a day of deliberation both among themselves
and with the candidates. When the sample arrived, participants spent the
day discussing nineteen local issues and questioning the six candidates
about their positions. At the end of ten hours of deliberation, they filled
out the same questionnaire as on first contact and then went to a polling
booth to cast a secret ballot to select the nominee.
Panos Alexandris, a local lawyer who had been the least well known
among the six candidates at the start, led the first round of balloting that
evening. As the ballots were counted, the voters went to dinner. Since no
candidate got a clear majority, a second round to choose among the two
finalists was held. Alexandris emerged with a clear majority. For the first
time in 2,400 years, a random sample of citizens had been convened
9
When the People Speak
in Athens to deliberate and then officially make an important public
decision.
The process fit the pattern of other Deliberative Polls: first a random
sample of a population (in this case eligible voters) responded to a tele-
phone survey, then they were convened together for many hours of
deliberation, both in small groups and plenary sessions, directing ques-
tions developed in small groups to competing candidates, experts, or
policymakers in the plenaries, and then, at the end of the process, they
filled out the same questionnaire as the one they had been given when
they were first contacted in their homes. In this case, the questionnaires
were supplemented by a secret ballot in a separate polling booth because

world . . . and to use it in other cities (of the country) and for different
issues.”
30
10