It may cover a different range of legal topics
than does the Multistate Bar Examination,
although some topics are duplicated by the
two tests.
In addition, as of 2007 all states except
Maryland, Washington, and Wisconsin require
a passing score on the Multistate
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Examination (MPRE), a standard-
ized multiple-choice test of legal and profes-
sional ethics. Bar applicants normally take this
two-hour test several weeks before or after
they take the bar examination. The Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination tests
the applicants’ knowledge of the Amer ican
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Topics include attorney-client confi-
dentiality, conflicts of interest, and attorney
advertising.
In 2008 a total of 34 jurisdictions incorpo-
rated the Multistate Performance Test (MPT) as
part of their bar examinations. This test was
designed to assess an examinee’s ability to
complete fundamental legal tasks that most
beginning lawyers face in real life practice.
The MPT assesses an examinee’s ability to
sort factual materials, separating relevant from
irrelevant facts; analyze statutory, case, and
administrative materials to extract the relevant
principles of law; apply the relevant law to the

whereas repeat-takers had only a 43 percent
pass rate. The examination can be taken more
than once. In rare cases , an attorney who has
been disbarred or suspended can take a speci al
bar examination for reinstatement. In 2008,
only 20 disbarred or suspended attorneys across
the United States took a reinstatement exam
(seven, or 35 percent, passed).
In a few states, an attorney may be licensed
to pract ice law without taking the state’s bar
examination. Wisconsin permits graduates of
accredited Wisconsin law schools to become
licensed attorneys without taking any bar
examination. Other states offer reciprocity, by
accepting Multistate Bar Examination scores
attained in other jurisdictions or by waiving the
bar examination requirement for experienced
attorneys licensed in other jurisdictions.
Jurisdictions also differ in their approach to
legal education requirements. Most states re-
quire bar applicants to graduate from law
schools accredited by the American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA). Some states, such as California
and Georgia, will admit bar candidates who
received law degrees from unaccredited law
schools under certain circumstances. California,
Maine, New York, Vermont, Virginia, Washing-
ton, and Wyoming do not require law degrees at
all, but alternatively require several years of legal
study—also known as reading law — with a

National Conference of Bar Examiners, 2009. “2008
Statistics.” The Bar Examiner, May. Text available
online at />downloads/Bar_Admissions/2008_Stats.pdf; website home
page: (accessed
August 5, 2009).
Pobjecky, Thomas A. “The Florida Board of Bar Examiners:
The Constitutional Safeguard between Attorney Aspir-
ants and the Public.” Nova Law Review 18.
Rogers, W. Sherman. 1989. “Title VII Preemption of State
Bar Examinations: Applicability of Title VII to State
Occupational Licensing Tests.” Howard Law Journal 32.
“Society of American Law Teachers Statement on the Bar
Exam, July 2002.” 2002. Journal of Legal Education 52
(September): 446–52.
v
BARBOUR, PHILIP PENDLETON
Philip Pendleton Barbour, an ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
of the U.S. Supreme Court, was a strong
advocate of states’ rights and the
STRICT
CONSTRUCTION
of the Constitution.
The son of a wealthy planter from one of
Virginia’s oldest families, Barbour was born
May 25, 1783, in Orange County, Virginia. He
was educated locally and excelled in languages
and classical literature. At seventeen, he became
an apprentice to an Orange County lawyer.
After less than a year clerk ing and studying law,
Barbour left Virginia for Kentucky, where he

◆
❖❖
1775–83
American Revolution
1783 Born,
Orange County,
Va.
1789 U.S.
Constitution ratified
1800 Began
apprenticeship
with Orange
Co. lawyer
1812 Elected to
Virginia House of
Representatives
1827–30 Served in U.S. House of
Representatives a second time
1836 Appointed
associate justice
of the U.S.
Supreme Court
1830 Appointed federal judge
for eastern Virginia
1841 Died,
Richmond, Va.
1821–23 Served as speaker of the House
1825 Appointed state judge
in General Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia

states against what he often saw as the growing
encroachment of the federal government.
In 1825, after consid ering and then declin-
ing an offer from
THOMAS JEFFERSON to join the
law faculty at the University of Virginia, Bar-
bour was appointed to the General Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, a state trial
court, where he served for almost two years. In
1827, at the urging of his constituents, Barbour
ran unopposed for Congress, though he lost
the Speaker’s race to fellow Virginian Andrew
Stevenson. During his second stint in Congress,
Barbour was a vocal opponent of President
Adams, even though Barbour’s brother James
Barbour was a member of the Adams cabinet.
Barbour objected to the administration’s spend-
ing policies and to the imposition of a
TARIFF in
1828. He also continued his relentless advocacy
of states’ rights and the narrow construction of
the Constitution, introducing an unsuccessful
bill in 1829 requiring that five of the seven
justices on the U.S. Supreme Court concur in
any decision involving a constitutional question.
In the late 1820s Barbour became a strong
supporter of
ANDREW JACKSON, who defeated the
incumbent Adams in 1828. Barbour was
considered for a position in the Jackson cabinet

bour’s states’ rights and strict constructionist
views, opposed Barbour as a possible candidate
for the Court. In 1836 Barbour was nominated
to succeed retiring justice Gabriel Duval, at the
same time that
ROGER B. TANEY was nominated as
chief justice and confirmed to succeed
JOHN
MARSHALL
, also retiring. As expected, Barbour’s
nomination drew criticism, but he was never-
theless confirmed by a vote of 30–11.
Barbour wrote only a dozen opinions for the
Court. His most important majority opini on
was in City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 11
Pet. 102, 9 L. Ed. 648 (1837). At issu e in Miln
was a New York state law requiring captains of
vessels arriving at ports to provide harbor
authorities with the names, ages, birthplaces,
and occupations of arriving passengers. The
Court considered whether the law was an un-
constitutional invasion of the exclusive federal
right to regulate interstate and international
trade. The Court ruled that the law was a
legitimate exercise of the state’s “police power”
to protect the health and welfare of its citizens.
The decision provided the perfect opportunity
for Barbour to expound upon his states’ rights
views. He wrote that the state not only had the
right to impose such laws but also the “solemn

Federal Judicial Center. Available online at .
gov (accessed August 28, 2009).
BARGAIN
A reciprocal understanding, contract, or agree-
ment of any sort usually pertaining to the loan,
sale, or exchange of property between two parties,
one of whom wants to dispose of an item that the
other wants to obtain. To work out the terms of an
agreement; to negotiate in good faith for the
purpose of entering into an agreement.
A union engages in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING on
proposed contract terms.
BARGAINING AGENT
A union that possesses the sole authority to act on
behalf of all the employees of a particular type in a
company.
A b argaining a gent is certified by the
NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(NLRB) as the exclusive
representative of a certain type of employee. The
International Garment Workers Union, for ex-
ample, might act as the bargaining agent for all
seamstresses employed at a particular dress factory.
CROSS REFERENCES
Labor Law; Labor Union.
v
BARLOW, FRANCIS CHANNING
Francis Channing Barlow achieved prominence

v
BARR, WILLIAM PELHAM
William Pelham Barr served as attorney general
of the United States from 1991 to 1993 under
President
GEORGE H.W. BUSH.
The son of Donald Barr and Mary Ahern
Barr,
WILLIAM BARR was born May 23, 1950, in
Francis Channing Barlow 1834–1896
◆◆◆
❖
❖
1834 Born,
Brooklyn, N.Y.
1861–65 U.S.
Civil War
1871 Began “Tweed Ring” prosecution;
helped found American Bar Association
1861–65 Fought in Union Army;
attained rank of major general
1855 Graduated from
Harvard University
1871–73 Served as attorney
general of New York State
1876 Participated in
Hayes-Tilden presidential
election investigation
1896 Died, New
York City

in 1978. Also in 1978, Barr accepted an associate
position at the Washington, D.C., law firm of
Shaw, Pittman, Potts, and Trowbridge. There he
concentrated on civil
LITIGATION and federal
administrative practice.
In 1982 Barr was named to President
Ronald Reagan’s Domestic Policy Council.
During his two years of service, he became well
known and respected by the administration and
leaders in the
REPUBLICAN PARTY. Barr returned
to Shaw, Pittman in 1984, to resume his legal
career. He was made a partner of the firm
in 1985.
After several years in private practice, Barr
reentered public service in 1989, when he was
named assistant attorney general by the George
H. W. Bush administration. He took over the
Justice Departm ent’s Office of Legal Counsel,
where his role was to advise the White House
and the attorney general and other administra-
tion officials. Historically, the Office of Legal
Counsel has been called upon to reassure
presidents that their intended actions are within
the law.
As assistant attorney general Barr auth ored
two controversial advisory opinions that
allowed President Bush to expand his war on
drugs and to apprehend Panamanian drug lord

1950–53
Korean War
1961–73
Vietnam War
◆
1973 Graduated with M.A. in Chinese
from Columbia; joined CIA
1977 Earned J.D.
from George
Washington
University
1982–84 Served
as counsel for
President
Reagan’s
Domestic Policy
Council
1989
Appointed
assistant
attorney
general by
President
George H.
W. Bush
◆
2001 Advised George
W. Bush administration
on terrorism-related
legal issues; advocated

and Thornburgh, Congress welcomed
Barr’s appointment. Members of Congress
praised his candor and cooperation, and they
supported his decision to launch internal
investigations into the Justice Department’s
handling of the Bank of Credi t and Commerce
International (BCCI) scandal and the Inslaw
computer scandal. BCCI was shut down by
bank regulators in 1991 for massive
FRAUD,
THEFT, MONEY LAUNDERING, and the financing of
arms deals and terrorist activities. Depositors
lost billions when the bank’s assets were seized.
Inslaw, Inc., accused the
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT of
conspiring to steal its proprietary software after
the company’s government contract had been
revoked.
The
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION was encour-
aged by Barr’s willingness to reconsider a
Thornburgh decision that prevented local bar
associations from interviewing judicial nomi-
nees, and an editorial in the November 25,
1991, issue of National Law Journal praised the
department planned by the new attorney
general as less poli tical, more open, and more
“inclined toward integrity” than the depart-
ments run by his immediate predecessors in the
RONALD REAGAN and George H. W. Bush admin-

istration had commi tted a crime by giving aid to
Saddam Hussein prior to the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait and the resulting Persian Gulf War.
Ongoing questions about the administra-
tion’s knowledge of, and involvement in,
Iraqgate contributed to Bush’s defeat in the
presidential election of 1992 and ended Barr’s
tenure as the nation’s attorney general.
In spite of his bright beginning, Barr was
unable to depart significantly from the agendas
and operational styles of his predecessors and
the presidents they served. According to the
December 7, 1992 issue of National Law
Journal, “Under Presidents Reagan and Bush
and their Attorneys General Ed Meese, Dick
Thornburgh and
WILLIAM P. BARR, the nation
witnessed the politicization of the
JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT
beyond anything that has gone
before”.
In 1993 Barr returned to Shaw, Pittman and
resumed the
PRACTICE OF LAW. At the time, he
was a member of the American Bar Association,
the Virginia State Bar Association, and the
District of Columbia Bar Association.
Barr later joined Verizon Communicatio ns,
a provider of phone services, as head of its legal

had m ade f alse reports that Verizon had obs-
tructed Covad’s installation services, was dis-
missed by a federal d istrict court judge in
November 2002.
While working for Verizon, Barr lectured to
groups such as the Federalist Society and offered
advice to the administration of
GEORGE W. BUSH
concerning legal measures against TERRORISM.
Barr retired from Verizon Communications
in late 2008, after serving as executive
VICE
PRESIDENT
. While at Verizon, he led the legal, regu-
latory, and government affairs group. In early
2009 he joined Kirkland & Ellis LLP in an Of
Counsel capacity, in its Washington, D.C., office.
FURTHER READINGS
Baker, Nancy V. 1992. Conflicting Loyalties: Law and Politics
in the Attorney General’s Office, 1789-1990. Lawrence:
Univ. Press of Kansas.
Department of Justice. 1991. 200th Anniversary of the Office
of the Attorney General, 1789-1989. Washington, D.C.:
Department of Justice, Office of Attorney General and
Justice Management Division.
Fletcher, Martin. 2001. “Terror Leaders Could Die By Firing
Squad.” London Times. (November 16).
“Legal Job No. 1.” 1992. National Law Journal 15
(December 7).
BARRATRY

Aformofbarratryismisconductofthe
master of a ship in taking commodities on board
that subject the ship to
SEIZURE for SMUGGLING.Itis
essential in barratry that a criminal act or intent
exist on the part of the master or mariners which
inures to their own benefit and causes injury to
the owners of the ship.
BARRISTER
In English law, an attorney who has an exclusive
right of argument in all the superior courts.
A barrister is a counselor who is learned in
law and who has been admitted to plead at the
bar. A barrister drafts the pleadings in all cases,
with the exception of the simplest ones.
Distinguished from an
ATTORNEY, which is an
English lawyer who conducts matters out of
court, a barrister engages in the actual argument
of cases or the conduct of the trial.
BARRON V. BALTIMORE
In Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (U.S. 1833), the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the
FIFTH AMENDMENT to the U.S.
Constitution bound only the federal government
and was thus inapplicable to actions taken by
state and local governments. In 1868 the states
ratified the
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT in part to

house, Barron claimed that the city appropriat-
ed his private property for a public use without
providing him
JUST COMPENSATION, as he said was
required by the Takings Clause of Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The trial
court agreed and awarded Barron $4,500 in
damages. The city appealed, and a Maryland
appellate court reversed. Barron then petitioned
the U.S. Supreme Court by
WRIT of error and
review was granted. Chief Justice
JOHN MARSHALL
delivered the Court’s unanimous opinion.
The sole issue before the Court was whether
the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution
applied to actions taken by state and local
governmental entities. The federal Constitution
“was ordained and established by the people of
the United States for themselves, for their own
government, and not for the government of the
individual states,” Marshall wrote. When the
Founding Fathers made an exception to this rule
in particular provisions of the U.S. Constitution,
Marshall said, they made clear that those
provisions were in fact applicable to the states.
For example, Marshall observed that section 10 of
Article I provides that “No State shall pass
any Bill of Attainder.” Yet none of the first Ten
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution makes any

In 1868 the states ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides that no state shall
“deprive any person of
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
[or]
EQUAL PROTECTION of the laws.” During the
Congressional debates, JOHN BINGHAM,aRepubli-
can representative from Ohio and the primary
architect of the Fourteenth Amendment, argued
that enacting the Fourteenth Amendment was
necessary to nullify the Supreme Court’sholding
in Barron v. Baltimore.
Despite Bingham’s stated intentions, the Bill
of Rights was not made applicable to the states
through the doctrine of selective incorporation
until the twentieth century. Under this doctrine,
the Supreme Court has ruled that every protec-
tion contained in the Bill of Rights—except for
the right to bear arms, the right to an indictment
by a
GRAND JURY, the right to trial by jury in civil
cases, and the right against quartering soldiers—
must be protected by state governments under
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has explained that each
of the incorporated rights is “deeply rooted in
the nation’s history,” and is “fundamental” to the
concept of “ordered liberty” embodied in the
Due Process Clause. Palko v. Connecticut, 302

exchanges the performance of various mainte-
nance tasks around a house for free room and
board, a barter has taken place.
BASE FEE
An interest in real property that has the potential
to last forever, provided a specific contingency does
not occur.
For example, a grantee might be given an
estate in blackacre, “provided the land is not
used for illegal purposes.”
This type of fee is also known as a con-
ditional, determinable, or qualified fee.
BASE LINE
Survey line used in the government survey to
establish township lines. Horizontal elevation line
used as a centerline in a highway surv ey.
BASEBALL
Although certain laws have protected citizens
for decades from various forms of monopolistic
practices, the legal dec isions surrounding
“America’s favorite pastime” have allowed it to
be exempt from most forms of government
intervention. Through the years, Major League
Baseball (MLB) has escaped measures that
would have ended its exc lusive control over
contracts and copyrights and its all-around
monopoly on professional U.S. baseball. Mean-
while, as contracts and team expenditures have
run well into the millions of dollars, many
have come to see baseball as less of a sport and

STRAINT OF TRADE
on commerce between states.
In 1920, an appeals court ruled that baseball is
unobjectionable in part because it operates on
an interstate level (Nation al League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore, 50 App. D.C. 165, 269 F. 681). It
stated, in general reference to other forms of
trade and commerce, that “the Sherman Anti-
trust Act does not apply, unless the effect of
the act complained of on interstate commerce is
direct, not merely indirect or incidental.”
Baseball, the court found, did not pose a threat
to the economy of the world of sports.
The National Lea gue case stemmed from
allegations made by the Federal League’s
Baltimore Terrapins. In the early 1900s the
struggling Federal League sought to be a venture
of the major leagues and competed with other
major league franchises. But the National and
American Leagues bought out many of the
Federal teams, sometimes player by player.
The Terrapins, one of the last surviving teams
in the Federal League, sued the National League.
Representatives of the Terrapins argued that
MLB owners had treated the Terrapins with
scorn, offering the team only $50,000 in
settlement for damages incurred by the buyouts.
In court, the Terrapins argued that MLB had
violated antitrust laws and had participated in

baseball’s reserve clause, the earliest symbol of
the sport’s under lying business nature. The
reserve clause stated that once a player had
accepted a contract to play for a certain team,
the player was bound to serve that team for one
year and must enter into a new contract with
the same team “for the succeeding season at a
salary to be determined by the parties to such
contract.” It was agreed that if a player violated
the reserve clause, he would be guilty of
“contract jumping” and would be ineligible to
serve in any club of the leagues until formally
reinstated.
The reserve clause guaranteed players little
more than an in come. Players attacked it. I n
the 197 0s, Curtis C. Flood, center fielder for
the St. Louis Cardinals, brought charges
against Bowie K. Kuhn, acting c ommissioner
of baseball. The issue was a player’s
FREE
AGENCY
, which Flood had requested and Kuhn
had denied. Free agency is the option to
negotiate a contract with any team, basically
a release from the reserve clause. Taking his
case to the Supreme Court, Flood argued that
the reserve clause unfairly prevented him from
striking deals with other teams that would pay
him more for his services. The Supreme Court
decided on June 19, 1972, that it did not have

lacked sufficient artistic merit. Refusing to cut
With a payroll of
approximately
$11,000, the 1869
Cincinnati Red
Stockings were the
first professional
baseball team.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
BASEBALL 527