Corporate and Marketing
Strategies in the High-Tech
Industry
All the firms that managed to navigate successfully in the
techno storm at the beginning of this decade did not survive or
thrive by chance. They knew how to articulate their marketing
strategy with their corporate strategy.
Indeed, the goal of a marketing strategy is to respond to the
needs and wants of customers with a solution—product or serv-
ice—that has a significant competitive advantage, at a profit.
However, the development of a marketing strategy lies within
the framework of a company’s corporate strategy. Strategy may
be defined as “the direction and scope of an organization over
the long term which achieves advantages for the organization
through its configuration of resources within a changing envi-
ronment in order to fulfill stakeholder expectations” [1].
Just consider the case of one of the most significant success
story in the recent years of the otherwise stagnant computer
industry—Dell Computer. Although part of Dell’s success is its
ability to offer customized configurations at low prices to a
wide variety of customers, the key success factors of the com
-
pany go beyond its direct sales model, whether through the
Internet, sales teams, or on-line—but never through indirect
channel partners. The “Dell model” builds on three other ele
-
ments that none of its competitors have been able to match
fully.
First, Dell’s “build-to-order system” translates into almost
no inventory, 4 days of DSI (Day Sales in Inventory), and
benefits from the advantage of a negative float: Its custom

Automation and standardization make for an inexpensive and com
-
moditized product, which is emphasized by a vision of the founder M. Dell
to have a “low-cost leadership” and to keep every cost, not only R&D but
overhead, too, down. Finally, within the organization, a “single point of
accountability” makes quality control easier and provides customers with a
sense of reliability.
Competitors, most notably Gateway and HP, have tried to duplicate
the Dell model but to no avail. It requires a sound strategy to integrate
fully all the elements of the model in operational excellence that delivers
value to the customer and profit to the company. Smart marketing is not
enough.
The overlap between corporate and marketing strategy is obvious. Actu
-
ally the marketing strategy contributes to the definition of the corporate
strategy through the analysis of the environment and of the customers, as
we will see in Chapter 3. Furthermore, marketing strategy helps the com-
pany identify its competitive advantage through a careful observation of the
competitors, as we will see in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, this marketing strat-
egy is designed to fit with the overall direction or mission of the firm. It must
also build on the resources and competences available within the firm; chief
among them is technology. Those competences can be “stretched” by seek-
ing out markets where such competences have special value, or creating
new markets on the basis of such competence. Finally, it has to contribute to
the long-term development of the firm, which can be achieved either by
organic growth or by external growth.
An absence of vision, a lack—or an underestimation—of resources avail
-
able, or an inappropriate fit with the growth strategy may kill the best
designed marketing strategy. This may happen either at the conception

on the market and the customers, because products and technologies will
pass but the needs and wants of the customers will continue to exist. There
-
fore, for instance, a company’s mission is not to manufacture computers,
resins, or lasers but to offer the possibility of faster calculations, increased
fire resistance, or a more precise cut of steel.
To focus on markets and not technology has a very important strategic
consequence regarding the entry market strategy. Some companies will try
to push radical technology to reap the profit of innovation and market lead-
ership [6]. For instance, in 2002 Nokia’s strategic intent was to “take a lead-
ing, brand-recognized role in creating the Mobile Information Society by
combining Mobility and the Internet while stimulating the creation of new
services.” Similarly, Kunitake Ando, Sony’s president, thinks that ”Sony’s
mission is to make our own product obsolete. Otherwise somebody else will
do it.”
Others firms will go for a less risky strategy of “innovative imitator,” by
incorporating the key element of the “dominant design” or standard in their
products, as Dell computer does (see the discussion of Dell at the beginning
of this chapter) [7]. A third category of firms will just try to project a high-
tech corporate image in order to impress their customer [8]. So, in the
defense industry some service firms fashion themselves as being innovative
just because the environment emphasizes technological innovation and sci
-
entific research [9].
Furthermore, because of the quick evolution of technology and the envi
-
ronment in the high-tech sector, the time frame for the definition of a stra
-
tegic intent, and sometimes for staying at the top of a firm, is always much
shorter than in more traditional businesses. This point is confirmed by S.

According to Eric Kim, one of the firm’s executive vice presidents for
marketing, the main reasons for this success are twofold. First, the com
-
pany has exploited new opportunities provided by the “market disconti
-
nuity” caused by new digital technology making consumers more open
to consider new brands. Second, there was a determined marketing
strategy to move up market very aggressively.
Samsung Electronics defines its strategic vision as “Leading the Digi-
tal Convergence Revolution” and its mission to carry out this vision is to
be a “Digital-ε Company.”
This vision is split in two elements. First, being “Digital” means pro-
ducing not just digital products, but products that inspire digital integra-
tion across the entire company. Second, being an “ε” company requires
using ε-processes to connect R&D, production, and marketing to cus-
tomers, partners, and the market. This disciplined approach relies on
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) to bring value to every part of the
supply chain.
Consequently, Samsung Electronics pledges to network its core com
-
ponents (i.e., memory chips and system LSI and LCDs as well as
audio/video, computers, telecommunication devices, home appliances,
and other stand-alone products) into a total solution ushering in an era
of of digital convergence.
Question 1: How are Samsung Electronics’ mission and vision
reflected in its product strategy?
Question 2: What are the implications of Samsung Electronics’ mis
-
sion and vision in terms of business portfolio strategy?
why so many companies are usually unable to anticipate the market impact

Trough of disillusionment
Technology performance curve
Technology adoption curve
Visibility
Development
Figure 2.1 Technology life cycle.
those customers are usually technology specialists who long for this kind of
situation, as we will see in detail in Chapter 3.
In the growth phase, the accumulation of knowledge and competence
leads to significant earnings. At this stage, one may find a wide range of
early experiments with radically different designs aimed at improving the
technology.
Very often, the growth phase in performance is not mirrored in the
adoption rate by the market. Indeed, the early success of technology tends
to create hype and unrealistic expectations. Technology reaches a peak of
perception that the Gartner group [10] adequately names the “peak of
inflated expectations.” This is usually followed by a time of disenchantment,
because the new technology’s performance does not match the expectations
of customers. This was the reason why so many dot-com companies like
Webvan, Boo.com, and others, imploded at the beginning of 2000: They
were not able to deliver quickly and nicely what they had trumpeted to the
world. However, technology keeps improving and once the gap between fad
and reality is bridged, the real value of the technology appears to the
market.
“Pervasive computing” or “extended Internet” technologies illustrate the
point. Today the whole model that a personal refrigerator would dial Web-
van and order groceries for the consumer is clearly dead, but pervasive com-
puting applications are taking root slowly in industrial settings, far from the
consumer market. Chips, sensors, and wireless and software applications are
improving constantly in order to collect and interpret data remotely and

Legend appear to be the champions in mastering the mass manufacturing
process required at that stage. In the software industry, Java and XML are
two typical examples of mature technologies whose performance is reaching
a plateau.
The last phase, a decline or saturation, arises when the physical limits of
a technology have been reached, and/or when additional spending and
efforts in R&D do not increase penetration or sales, such as in the fixed
phone business today for instance.
As seen in Chapter 1, the technology life cycle is similar in phasing to the
product life cycle; however, it is different because a product is an output of
technology at a given time. This translates to the fact that in each step of a
given technology there may be various products with their own life cycles
(Figure 2.2). For instance, mainframe technology is at the maturity stage. In
2003 mainframe computers constituted 13% of the computer market, and
IDC estimates that they will decline to 8% by 2006, but companies still
launch new mainframes, such as the IBM z990, which comes equipped with
the latest software available such as WebSphere, Java, and Linux.
More than an absolute physical limit, companies should evaluate a tech
-
nology’s relative limit compared to other technologies. In general, compet-
ing technologies are linked together along a growing spiral, which indicates
that a new technical procedure requires a higher investment, but with a
starting performance much closer to the maximum that it replaces (see
Figure 2.3).
This positioning of different technologies is not always easy to carry out.
Emerging technologies are often difficult to identify, and performance levels
cannot be determined easily because the products still are not well known
2.2 The strategic dimensions of technology 37
Product A
Product B

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tancy on the supply side.
2.2.2 The introduction phase of technology: why are
companies usually unable to anticipate the market impact of
technologies?
Sometimes, it takes a very long time for a new technology to emerge. Just
consider the case of Speech Recognition software, whose goal is to replace
keyboards, pushbuttons, and knobs with speech input. The prospective
potential has attracted both big and small firms—IBM and ScanSoft, as well
38 Corporate and Marketing Strategies in the High-Tech Industry
Technology
performance
Man-hours
invested
Figure 2.3 Competitive evolution of technologies.
as Voice Signal Technologies and Sensory, Inc. However, even after 50 years
of basic research, this is still a market in the making.
Even in the case when the technical feasibility of an innovation has been
confirmed, it seems that very frequently people are unable to anticipate the
future business impact of auspicious innovations. For instance, the inventor
of the radio, Marconi, believed it would mainly be used by steamship com
-
panies, newspapers, and navies needing to transmit private messages over
long distances where communication by wire was impossible. No one origi
-
nally conceived of communicating to a large and dispersed audience of lis
-
teners, rather than to a single point. The first public broadcast imagined was
the transmission of Sunday sermons—the sole event where one individual
would address a mass public [12].

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ress in performance, size, price, and economic consequence. The first elec
-
tronic digital computer, the ENIAC, was unreliable and consisted of more
than 18,000 vacuum tubes that filled a huge room. It was difficult to imag
-
ine in the 1940s that one day a computer more powerful than the ENIAC
would be the size of a laptop (or even smaller). Similarly, when the transis
-
tor was invented, few people would have believed that one day the inte
-
grated circuit, a component in itself, would eventually become a computer
with the creation of the microprocessor in 1970.
2.2 The strategic dimensions of technology 39
Second, identifying uses for new technologies is difficult and takes time,
especially when they emerge from pure scientific research. Faraday discov-
ered the principles of electromagnetic induction in 1831, but it took many
decades to find applications for electricity.
At the same time in 1947, when the transistor was invented, it was first
proposed that this new device might be used to develop better hearing aids
for the deaf. None envisaged the future connection with computers.
The third reason why it is difficult to beat the uncertainties associated
with new technology is that, frequently, the impact of an innovation relies
on complementary inventions, which contribute to a full system solution
that will add to its performance and, consequently, its demand. For
instance, Edison’s system of incandescent lighting required the simultane
-
ous development of lamps, generators, sockets, and wiring.
Similarly, the telephone has existed for more than 100 years, but only
recently has its performance been improved by facsimile transmission, voice

BL[(bps)-km]
Figure 2.4 Increase in the bit rate-distance product for five generations of
fiber-optic communication systems. (After: [13].)
addition, fiber-optic technology provides a better quality of transmission
because of its lack of electromagnetic interference.
The recent explosion of demand for PCs has been fueled by network sys
-
tem add-ons, such as modems, LANs, and connections to the Internet, as
well as by the integration of various software applications in one package,
chief among them being Office by Microsoft and SmartSuite by IBM.
The development time for these complementary innovations can fluctu
-
ate very significantly. For example, after the dynamo was invented in the
early 1880s, electrolytic techniques were created contiguously, giving birth
to a prosperous electrochemical industry, but it took more than 50 years to
see the arrival of the electric motor.
Similarly, the transistor and, later, the integrated circuit were introduced
into computers years behind their invention to transform the computer
industry. Ultimately, the integrated circuit itself became a computer with
the advent of the microprocessor in 1970.
One must note that the development of such interconnected innovations
integrated into a system solution creates barriers to aspiring competitors
because of the complexity of the offer to build. As we will see later, the exis
-
tence of complementary inventions intensifies the need for technological
standards and alliances.
The fourth reason that makes predicting the uses of a new technology
difficult is that many inventions proceed to solve a specific problem, but
often turn out to have unexpected uses in unexpected conditions.
Consider the role of the computer in the car industry. Computers are

meta accounted for the remainder. Similarly, in the PDA market, the two
leaders represent 81%of the total market; in video game stations, three
firms control virtually the entire market. Similarly, in the computer data
-
base software area, the top five relational database software companies rep
-
resent nearly 90% of sales worldwide. Dynamic random access memory
(DRAM), the most common kind of random access memory (for personal
computers and workstations), reflects slightly less dominance, with four
leading companies representing 73% of the market. Finally, the five biggest
players in the PC market represent 40% of the market.
Standardization usually appears during the growth phase, when a tech
-
nology starts to reach its peak and new competitors want to offer solutions
or products to a growing number of customers. For instance, in the on-line
service industry, after initially pursuing a nonstandard strategy, late
entrants into the field, such as Microsoft and AT&T, followed the standards
in foundation technologies first adopted by Prodigy and AOL.
Contrary to what a lot of technologists think, the “best” technology does
not always manage to become the de facto standard. A large catalog could
be filled with the list of firms that developed a superior technology but
which failed to establish their technology as a standard. In the field of PCs
alone, one may think of Apple, IBM, and Next, which have lost a battle
against the so-called Wintel alliance. Today, Microsoft is fighting hard with
Nokia to impose its operating software as the standard of the new genera-
tion Web-friendly phones.
Actually, experience shows that in growth markets where two or more
incompatible technologies compete, any modification, even a small one, in
the original situation may help one technology secure a lead big enough
eventually to lock in the market and become the de facto industry standard.

to stimulate the creation of a standard.
1. Provide an open architecture The first condition of success pertains to
marketing. It depends on the willingness of the industry to expand opportu
-
nities for other participants.
Keeping a proprietary technology exclusive is a must, but is extremely
difficult. Some firms have managed to build powerful patent and/or copy
-
right walls around their original technology coupled with aggressive legal
enforcement to prevent copying by potential competitors, such as Xerox did
with its proprietary dry-toner xerographic technology, or Intel with its X86
and Pentium microprocessor series.
However, thanks to the use of reverse engineering techniques, in many
industries patents can be quickly circumvented. As a rule, patents ordinarily
delay but do not stop competition. They may even push efficient competi-
tors to invent in-house technology that may be better, like in the photocop-
ier business where Xerox’s competitors developed their own liquid-toner
xerographic technology.
Consequently, in order to become a winner, one has to make its technol-
ogy ubiquitous, readily accessible, and widely available not only to custom-
ers but also to “complementors” [14]—companies that provide the products
and services around the technology. Complementors and users will grow
the total market.
The classic example involved the strategic decisions made by Matsushita
and Sony at the dawn of the age of the videocassette recorder (VCR). Mat
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sushita licensed its VHS technology to other consumer electronic enter
-
prises, including Hitachi, Sharp, Mitsubishi, and Philips NV, and formed an
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) agreement with GE, RCA, and

cult: the first customers were the United States and French armies in the late
1970s. CFM worked hard to improve its technology and, in 1981, Boeing
made the decision to equip all of its B737 airplanes with CFM engines exclu
-
sively. Next, CFM developed a new version of the engine to be installed on
the Airbus A320 and A321, and then the A340, constantly improving the
cost/quality ratio through an aggressive management of the experience
curve. In the end, the growing number of customers provided a de facto
monopoly position for the CFM engine in the medium-sized aircraft range.
By the early 1990s, CFM received more than 6,000 orders from 160 differ-
ent airline companies.
We see the same outcome in a completely different technology-
dependent industry—media and entertainment. Mental Images, a German
software firm, has managed to control more than 90% of the market for
movie visual-effects. Its core product is Mental Ray, a complex software
using powerful algorithms to interpret instructions describing a three-
dimensional scene and turning these instructions into images that look real
-
istic on screen. Mental Ray was not conceived as a product for end-users, but
as a module that other software makers such as AutoDesk or Softimage, or
visual effects companies such as Industrial Light & Magic, or Sony’s Picture
Imageworks, incorporate into the programs they made for the film industry.
However, to create a standard, a company must own a key platform
technology. In the beginning of the 1980s, IBM decided to create an attrac
-
tive standard for the desktop computer by offering an open architecture.
IBM relied on Microsoft and Intel to provide the core technology and mobi
-
lized various firms behind it, but failed to hold ownership of this platform
technology and lost its ability to control the evolution of standard to Micro

audience: the more the audience, the greater the value of the network (and
the more you can charge advertisers). This is sometimes known as Sarnoff’s
law, named after one pioneer of the broadcast industry.
A second type of network is the “many-to-many” telephone network,
where everyone can communicate with everyone else. AT&T’s long distance
network, Yahoo or AOL provide good examples of this second category. In
this case, the total value of a communications network grows with the
square of the number of devices or people it connects (N2), as pointed out
by Bob Metcalfe, inventor of the Ethernet.
A third category of networks provides the ability to interconnect inde
-
pendent networks, such as Group Forming Networks (GFNs) on the Inter
-
net, whose conferencing capabilities allow more than just two-way
conversations. Chat rooms, discussion groups, auction hosts such as eBay,
2.2 The strategic dimensions of technology 45
Value of
memberN
net
Sarnoff N
Metcalfe N2
GFN (Reed)
2
N
Numb
er ofmembers
Figure 2.5 The different increasing value returns of the different categories of
networks.
user groups buddy lists, trading rooms, and marketplaces allow groups of
network users to combine and communicate around a common interest,

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tion. In the electronics industry, for instance, product costs—measured by
the cost of goods sold (COGS)—are critical to profitability, because of their
proportion of the total revenues, which is about 80%. Most of the differ
-
ences in profitability between the more and the less successful companies
are attributable to COGS, rather than operating expenses. A 5% savings on
COGS may have a positive impact of between 50% and 200% on the profit
-
ability before taxes. This is one of the reasons why many industry leaders
are transferring production (assembly) to China: since the labor element of
most electronic products accounts for 10–15% of the total cost, it can have a
direct, bottom line improvement of 7% in COGS, and even taking into
account added logistics costs [16].
Let us consider the success of Kodak in the photography industry. One
may wonder how a small provincial American firm became the global mar
-
ket leader instead of the mighty German firms that were mastering the sci
-
ences and technologies of optics, fine chemicals, and camera design. A likely
explanation lies in the fact that German products frequently were very
expensive and hence manufactured in small quantities, while George East
-
man, the founder and president of Kodak, targeted his resources on an
46 Corporate and Marketing Strategies in the High-Tech Industry