261
10
Planning and Mitigating
Effects of Natural Disasters
and Terrorist Attacks
The legendary Chinese general Sun Tzu was a strategic military genius. In his classical book,
The Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote
The highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of
the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the eld; and the worst policy of
all is to besiege walled cities….
1
This book is still widely read by people from a diverse range of backgrounds including generals,
politicians, businessmen, and even terrorists. A growing number of terrorist groups, some of whom
are drawing at least in part from Sun Tzu’s strategies, have a common goal not only to undermine
the political and economic structure of the West, but also to throw Western society into chaos.
This being the case, what can Westerners do to prevent this nightmarish scenario from becoming
a reality? The answer is obvious: to thwart their plans at every turn. This implies being at least one
step ahead of them and perhaps a little more clever. As Sun Tzu might have counseled, this can be
achieved by developing superior plans while disrupting their objectives. Plans can be developed for
scattering and splitting the enemies of peace to “prevent the junction of their forces”; and perhaps
most importantly, plans and security measures can be forged for constructing walled cities that
cannot be besieged.
10.1 CAN PLANNING FOR A DISASTER PREVENT A DISASTER?
Nearly all environmental statutes regulate or place substantive constraints on what may be done
and how it is to be done. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is unique in that it neither
regulates nor mandates substantive contraints.
1
NEPA provides the only comprehensive federal
planning process that is applicable to virtually all federal actions. Its purpose is not to place strict
limitations on what can be done, but instead provides a rigorous planning process for ensuring that
actions and alternatives are appropriately considered before a nal decision is made, and before

impacts that are interrelated to environmental impacts must be evaluated within an EIS. Moreover,
under the Regulations, the section of the EIS describing environmental consequences is to address
(§ 1502.16[g])
… Urban quality, historic and cultural resources, and the design of the built environment, including the
reuse and conservation potential of various alternatives and mitigation measures.
This provision implies that if urban quality, historic and cultural resources, or the design of the
built environment (i.e., human-made structure) could be signicantly impacted, such effects should
be investigated in the EIS. Thus, it appears that potential terrorist acts, homeland security issues,
and natural disasters might indeed fall within the scope of NEPA.
10.1.2 SIGNIFICANCE
As described in Chapter 6, the Regulations dene 10 factors that are to be assessed in determining
the signicance of a potential impact (§ 1508.27[b]). Depending on the particular circumstance, vir-
tually each one of the 10 signicance factors could be triggered by various types of potential attacks
or human-induced disasters. An EIS might be required if such events could trigger any one of them.
Table 10.1 compares the relationship between potential terrorist acts and natural disasters, and
NEPA’s 10 signicance factors.
10.2 NRC RULES TERRORISM REVIEWS ARE NOT REQUIRED
What is an agency’s responsibility under NEPA to consider intentionally malevolent acts, such
as those directed at the United States on 9/11? The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
addressed this question in four orders issued in 2002, each holding that NEPA did not require the
NRC to consider impacts of terrorism in rendering licensing decisions.
10.2.1 NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE CASE
The NRC provided a detailed rationale for its conclusion in an order involving a proposal by Private
Fuel Storage, LLC (PFS) to build an independent spent fuel storage installation on the Skull Valley
Goshute Indian Reservation in Utah. The proposed facility was to store spent nuclear fuel from
commercial nuclear power plants pending disposal in a repository.
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Planning and Mitigating Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks 263
TABLE 10.1

environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or
unknown risks.
The impact of many potentially catastrophic scenarios is
uncertain or involves unique or unknown risks.
6. The degree to which the action may establish a
precedent for future actions with signicant effects or
represents a decision in principle about a future
consideration.
Many federal policies, plans, or decisions may establish
precedents that could have far-reaching implications in terms
of the risks of potential terrorism. For example, a decision to
employ a new nuclear technology might result in setting a
precedent that could have grave homeland implications in
terms of future terrorist acts or natural disasters.
7. Whether the action is related to other actions with
individually insignicant but cumulatively signicant
impacts. Signicance exists if it is reasonable to
anticipate a cumulatively signicant impact on the
environment. Signicance cannot be avoided by terming
an action temporary or by breaking it down into smaller
component parts.
Obviously the impacts of a catastrophic event can result in
signicant cumulative impacts. Moreover, segmented federal
actions might result in signicant cumulative impacts if a
terrorist attack was targeted at one or more of these
segmented actions. For example, making a decision
regarding an isolated border crossing without considering the
larger context of border security might trigger this factor.
8. The degree to which the action may adversely affect
districts, sites, highways, structures, or objects listed

the NRC to evaluate terrorism impacts at the proposed MOX facility. The Licensing Board had
stated
Regardless of how foreseeable terrorist acts that could cause a beyond-design-basis accident were prior
to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it can no longer be argued that terrorist attacks … are not
reasonably foreseeable …
10.2.1.1 Basis for NRC’s Conclusion
As explained in the PFS case, the NRC concluded that
… the possibility of a terrorist threat … is speculative and simply too far removed from the natural
or expected consequences of agency action to require a study under NEPA … As a practical matter,
attempts to evaluate that threat even in qualitative terms are likely to be meaningless and consequently
no use in the agency’s decision-making.
In reaching this conclusion, the NRC noted two federal court of appeals decisions that addressed
the issue of terrorism and NEPA in the area of nuclear regulation. Both the decisions upheld an
agency’s refusal to consider terrorism under NEPA as reasonable.
3
It should be pointed out that both
of these court cases were rendered years before the attack of 9/11.
Further, the NRC observed that the risk of a terrorist attack (generally thought of as the product
of the probability of an occurrence and the consequences) cannot be adequately determined because
“the likelihood of attack cannot be ascertained using any state-of-the-art methodology.”
An intervenor in the PFS proceedings asked the Commission to assume an attack with a large
jumbo jet and to analyze the consequences without the consideration of probability. The NRC, how-
ever, concluded that such an analysis
… amounts to a form of ‘worst case’ analysis, which the Supreme Court, in Robertson v. Methow Val-
ley Citizens Council [490 U.S. 332 (1989)], determined is not required under NEPA.
The NRC went on to write
… presumably all other kinds of terrorism, if conceivable, would require NEPA review as well … Such
an open-ended approach to NEPA is unworkable … As the Supreme Court noted in Robertson, it is
always possible to ‘conjure up’ progressively more disastrous scenarios.
In further arguments that NEPA is not an appropriate forum for considering terrorism, the NRC

Court of Appeals. As is common for this type of action, the Supreme Court provided no explanation
for its denial of the appeal request. It is recommended that the reader consult legal counsel in deter-
mining to what degree the impacts of potential terrorist attacks be considered in NEPA analyses.
10.2.2 DOE PRACTICE
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sometimes nds it appropriate to consider potential envi-
ronmental impacts of intentional destructive acts (e.g., sabotage or terrorism) in its NEPA docu-
ments, although the Department has not expressed a conclusion regarding whether or not such
analyses are required under NEPA.
In its guidance document, Recommendations for Analyzing Accidents under NEPA (July 2002),
the DOE stated
In identifying the reasonably foreseeable impacts of a proposed action and alternatives, past DOE
NEPA documents have addressed potential environmental impacts that could result from intentional
destructive acts. Analysis of such acts poses a challenge because the potential number of scenarios is
limitless and the likelihood of attack is unknowable.
The guidance further states that
Intentional destructive acts are not accidents. Nevertheless … the consequences of an act of sabotage
or terrorism could be discussed by a comparison to the consequences of a severe accident …. When
intentional destructive acts are reasonably foreseeable, a qualitative or semi-quantitative discussion of
the potential consequences of intentional destructive acts could be included in the accident analysis.
DOE’s guidance provides two examples of qualitative discussions of intentional destructive acts
that might be appropriate in an EIS.
Regarding security concerns, DOE conducts reviews of its environmental documents to ensure
that security-sensitive information is protected. For example, some DOE EISs have contained a
nonsensitive summary of the results of an analysis of intentional destructive acts; in such cases,
details of the analysis, which may contain nonclassied security-sensitive information, have been
segregated into a separate EIS appendix whose distribution was appropriately limited.
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266 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners
10.2.2.1 DOE Litigation

implementing a proposal. Yet, executed in a streamlined manner, NEPA presents an ideal frame-
work for providing a decision-maker with information regarding the consequences of potential ter-
rorist attacks. Table 10.3 describes how NEPA and NEPA-like impact assessment processes can be
applied to safeguard communities, and government projects and installations.
4,5
10.4.1 STRATEGIC AND PROGRAMMATIC REVIEWS
A NEPA analysis can be prepared to actively identify the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of an
entire program or mission. Here, a strategic, programmatic, or site-wide EIS can be prepared to
assess the risks of an entire program.
Experts can be consulted and the public can be actively engaged in seeking comments that
would help the agency identify potential risks and weaknesses, as well as terrorist and natural
disaster scenarios. In some cases, these comments and the information obtained might need to be
restricted from public distribution. This input would then be evaluated to determine threats and
impacts.
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Planning and Mitigating Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks 267
TABLE 10.2
Why NEPA Provides All Essential Elements Necessary for Comprehensively Evaluating
and Countering Potential Terrorist Threats
Essential Elements Description of How NEPA’s Elements Support a Successful Analysis
Rigorous planning process NEPA requires that a rigorous process be used in assessing impacts of potential
actions.
Scoping NEPA requires a thorough scoping process to identify the range of actions, impacts,
and alternatives that need to be considered. NEPA’s procedures can help ensure that
a reasonable range of potential terrorist threats, and all signicant issues are
identied and ushed out for investigation.
Scope of decision-making NEPA is applicable to the adoption of ofcial policy, formal plans, programs, and
approval of specic projects.
Consultation A successful analysis of potential terrorist acts typically necessitates consultation

and natural disaster threats. NEPA acts as an umbrella planning process for integrating relevant
threats that need to be considered comprehensively during the early planning process. As appropri-
ate, experts should be consulted to consider potential scenarios and their potential impacts. If this
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268 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners
screening process concludes that a reasonable threat exists that could pose a signicant impact, a
detailed analysis of the threats would be performed.
An EIS analysis of potential threats would typically be carried out in much the same way that
accident analyses are performed on high-prole proposals such as nuclear reactors, hydroelectric
dams, and chemical or radioactive processing facilities. If the analysis nds that the impacts could
indeed be signicant, an effort should be launched to identify and evaluate alternatives and mitiga-
tion measures that could reduce or eliminate potential threats. Section 9.2 provides specic guid-
ance for assessing mitigation measures.
10.4.2.2 Environmental Assessments
As appropriate, the proposed action described in an EA should be briey screened for potentially
signicant terrorist acts or threats from natural disasters. As appropriate, experts should be con-
sulted to consider potential scenarios and impacts.
If there is a reasonable possibility that a terrorist threat related to the proposal could result in a
signicant impact, an EIS can be prepared.
Conversely, if the screening process concludes that there is no reasonable scenario for a
signicant terrorist or natural disaster threat and that there are no other signicant environmental
impacts, the proposal qualies for a nding of no signicant impact (FONSI).
10.4.2.3 Categorical Exclusions
Where a categorical exclusion appears to be appropriate, the action should be screened in terms of
any signicant impact that could result from a potential terrorist attack or natural disaster. In the
vast majority of cases, this would not be the case. However, if the screening review concludes that
such a threat could result in signicant impacts, this would meet the criteria for extraordinary cir-
cumstances, and an EA or EIS can be prepared.
For instance, moving a tank of chlorine gas from a fortied building onto an outdoor pad might

trum. A maximum reasonably foreseeable accident is therefore an event with the most severe con-
sequences that can reasonably be expected to occur for a given action. Typically, this kind of event
has a very low probability of occurrence.
Most facilities or operations have operational lifetimes measured in decades. Therefore, accident
scenarios having frequencies less than 10
–6
per year are so unlikely to occur during the lifespan of
such facilities or operations that they are generally not considered important in making decisions.
Nevertheless, analysis of scenarios in the range of 10
–6
to 10
–7
per year may need to be considered
if the consequences could be catastrophic. As a practical matter, events with frequencies less than
10
−7
per year rarely need to be examined.
In contrast to a standard accident analysis, an investigation of intentional destructive acts
(terrorism or sabotage) poses a challenge because the number of potential scenarios is virtually
limitless, and the likelihood of attack is correspondingly unknowable.
Fortunately, the situation is not hopeless. The physical effects of an intentionally destructive
act—whether caused by a re, explosion, missile, or something else—are frequently nearly the same
as, or bounded by, the effects of accidents, particularly maximum reasonably foreseeable events.
That is, the impacts (release of radioactivity, hazardous materials, explosions, res) of an act of sabo-
tage or terrorism on operations and facilities frequently do not exceed those of a severe accident.
10.5.1.1 Bounding
Under a bounding approach, the impacts of a potential event are generally bounded by the effects of
a maximum credible event; likewise, since experience indicates that the consequences of an inten-
tionally destructive act are generally “bounded” by those of a severe accident scenario. The same
approach may also apply to the analysis of natural disasters.

disaster scenarios, evaluate their potential consequences, and, if appropriate, develop alternatives
and measures for mitigating potential threats.
10.6.1 EVALUATING POTENTIAL THREATS
The purpose of scoping is to solicit input so that the analysis can be more clearly focused on issues
of genuine concern. Experience has shown that a well-orchestrated scoping process provides a
Initiate EIS process
Identify credible terrorist or natural disaster scenarios
Screen credible terrorist or natural disaster
scenarios for significant impacts
Analyze alternatives and mitigation measures for
reducing potential impacts
Complete EIS and reach a final decision regarding the
course of action
Eliminate
nonsignificant
scenarios
from further
review
Are the terrorist scenarios
potentially significant?
Analyze a spectrum of potentially significant scenarios
(low-probability high-consequence to high-probability
low-consequence events)
No
Yes
As appropriate, continue the analysis, evaluating other
potentially significant environmental impacts
FIGURE 10.1 Using an EIS to evaluate potential terrorist and natural disaster threats.
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degree of uncertainty of the event, and
level of technical controversy.
Table 10.4 illustrates how this level of effort varies, according to a sliding-scale approach, as
the risk of impacts increases for workers due to a potential explosion (terrorist attack or other-
wise) at a chemical processing facility. For relatively lower levels of risk, a qualitative analysis
may be appropriate. Correspondingly, a quantitative analysis may be necessary for higher levels
of risk.
In the context of analyzing potential accidents or terrorist scenarios, the environment includes
biota and environmental media, such as the land and water, which may also be affected.
10.6.2 DETERMINING A REASONABLE RANGE OF SCENARIOS
An inverse relationship tends to exist between the probability and consequences of a potential ter-
rorist attack, natural disaster, or an accident. That is, the higher the probability of an event, the lower
the consequences tend to be. Conversely, the lower the probability, the higher the probable conse-
quences. For this reason, a set of potential scenarios should be considered, representing a range or
spectrum of reasonably foreseeable events, including both
low-probability/high-consequence events, and
high-probability/low-consequence events.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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272 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners
10.6.3 SIGNIFICANCE AND POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC SCENARIOS
The need to consider impacts of potential terrorist events, natural disasters, and accident scenarios
is implied by at least 4 out of the 10 factors cited in the Regulations for determining signicance:

considerations
Comparison of chemical concentrations
to appropriate health-related
references, such as
• emergency response planning
guidelines,
• temporary emergency exposure limits,
• reference concentrations.
• An explicit consideration of mitigation
measures, such as engineering
controls, inventory reduction, and
design changes is performed.
A detailed discussion of engineering
controls or other potential mitigation
measures usually unwarranted.
Simplistic exposure assumptions (e.g.,
assume 15-min time-weighted average
for events with long release periods
unless there are counter indications,
such as substances that cause
immediate adverse effects).
• Detailed dispersion modeling is
performed (e.g., time prole and
frequency distribution of releases and
concentrations at receptor locations).
• Determine the potential for physical or
chemical form changes (e.g., phosgene
formation from carbon tetrachloride
combustion; liquid-to-vapor changes).
• Perform a detailed health effects

5. Level or degree of condence that the agency has in predicting the impact;
6. Amount of information available to the agency, which provides a basis for describing the
impacts in a manner meaningful to the decision-maker.
According to Fogleman, an action is likely to be deemed reasonably foreseeable if it is a
logical stepping-stone to potential local or regional development or accelerates such development.
Conversely, the degree of speculation increases as a projected impact becomes removed or dissoci-
ated from the precipitating action. Adding an additional step in the causal chain of events tends to
increase the degree of speculation, even if the incremental step (by itself) is considered reasonably
foreseeable. A seventh test is presented in Section 10.6.4.
10.6.4 RISK–UNCERTAINTY SIGNIFICANCE TEST
As we have seen, events involving impacts that are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown
risks are factors to be considered by a decision-maker in reaching a determination regarding poten-
tial signicance (§ 1508.27[b][5]).
10.6.4.1 Uncertainty
Decision-makers need to understand the nature and extent of uncertainty in choosing among alter-
natives and considering potential mitigation measures. Where uncertainties preclude quantitative
analysis (terrorism), the unavailability of relevant information should be explicitly acknowledged.
The NEPA document should describe the analysis that is used and the effect that the incomplete
or unavailable information has on the ability to estimate the frequency and probabilities or conse-
quences of reasonably foreseeable events (§ 1502.22).
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274 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners
For events where the consequences are relatively low or for which numerical probability esti-
mates are unavailable or difcult to be obtained, qualitative descriptions such as “very infrequent”
or “highly unlikely” may be adequate if the basis for such usage is provided.
An approach proposed by March provides a systematic methodology for determining the
signicance of an impact that involves a degree of uncertainty.
8,9
Determining the signicance of

or circumstances unique to a particular mission.
TABLE 10.5
Frequency Scale for Assessing the Risk–Uncertainty Significance Criterion
Category Level Frequency (f ) Descriptions
Frequent A f > 1 Expected one or more times per year
Likely B 1 > f > 10
–1
Once in 1–10 years
Occasional C 10
–1
> f > 10
–2
Once in 10–100 years
Unlikely D 10
–2
> f > 10
–3
Once in 100–1000 years
Remote E 10
–3
> f > 10
–6
Once in 1000–1,000,000 years
Very remote F 10
–6
> f Less than once in 1,000,000 years
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Planning and Mitigating Effects of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks 275
Where possible, the probability that adverse consequences will occur during the lifetime of a

Subcritical II Human: Minor human injury or illness
Environmental: Minor (small-scale and short-term) damage
to ecosystems, infrastructure, or property
Negligible I Human: No reportable human injury or illness
Environmental: Negligible or no damage to ecosystems,
infrastructure, or property
TABLE 10.7
Guidance for Determining Significance Based on the Severity and Frequency of an Event
A: Frequent
(f > 1)
B: Likely
(1> f >10
–1
)
C: Occasional
(10
–1
> f >10
–2
)
D: Unlikely
(10
–2
> f >10
–3
)
E: Remote
(10
–3
> f >10

need to be the subject of an analysis within a NEPA document.
Chapter 6 provides specic guidance for assessing the signicance of events such as terrorist
attacks.
10.6.5 MODIFICATIONS TO THE APPROACH
Although the proposed process would be performed in a manner quite similar to that of more
typical NEPA analyses, a few methodologies and regulatory procedures for evaluating potential
terrorist attack or natural disasters might need to be performed differently from the more standard
approach. There are a multitude of innovative approaches that can be used to elicit input and inform
interested American citizens while preventing sensitive information from falling easily into the
hands of terrorists.
In particular, methods for enlisting public involvement, scoping terrorist scenarios, circulating
the analysis for review, and classifying sensitive information may need to be modied from the way
NEPA or related planning processes have been practiced in the past. However, it does not appear
that (beyond developing supplemental orders or guidelines) any signicant change would need to be
made to either the NEPA statute or the Regulations.
10.7 A TOOL FOR DETERMINING IF AN ACCIDENT, NATURAL DISASTER,
OR TERRORIST EVENT SHOULD BE EVALUATED
A systematic peer-reviewed tool developed by the author is presented in Figure 10.2, which may
be useful in determining if a given accident, natural disaster, or terrorist event scenario is subject
to NEPA’s requirements.
12
This tool combines the risk–uncertainty signicance test with the six
criteria dened in Section 10.6.3.1.
Application of this tool is initiated with the rst rectangle at the top of Figure 10.2. A pre-
liminary review is performed to ascertain whether a proposal involves any potential scenarios that
might need to be the subject of a NEPA analysis. The rst test (rst diamond) shown in Figure 10.2
considers the potential signicance of adverse impacts associated with a severe event in terms of
the risk–uncertainty signicance test (Table 10.7). If the response to this test is “no,” the potential
impacts are considered nonsignicant and therefore not subject to an accident analysis; the six
remaining tests need not be considered. If the response is “yes,” the review continues down to the

No
No
No
No
No
No
Could the event involve significant adverse
affects (based on the risk–uncertainty test)?
Is the analysis of impacts reasonably foreseeable
(i.e., not considered remote or speculative)?
Would the analysis involve methodologies
Is the analysis of reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts
Within the “rule of reason”
(i.e., reasonable scenario)?
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
FIGURE 10.2 General-purpose tool for determining if an analysis of potential accidents, terrorist events, or
natural disasters should be performed.
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278 NEPA and Environmental Planning: Tools, Techniques, and Approaches for Practitioners
of “yes” to all the three tests tends to support a conclusion that the scenario is subject to NEPA’s
impact assessment requirements. The reader should note that this tool is to be used in conjunction
with other relevant information.
PROBLEMS
1. What is the most commonly accepted denition of risk?
2. Class project: Assume that there is a federal installation with 8000 workers and 100 facili-
ties located on a 30 square mile site. Develop a strategy using NEPA for securing the instal-

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