more debasing because they do not realize it.” She
urged women to recognize the inequities they
faced and to speak and act for their own freedom.
When Anthony died in 1906, women did not
yet have the right to vote in presidential elections.
When the
NINETEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S.
Constitution finally became law in 1920, it was
called the Anthony amendment in recognition of
her valiant efforts to gain suffrage.
Anthony was also honored in 1979 and
1980, w hen the U.S. Mint issued one dollar
coins bearing her likeness. She became the first
woman to be pictured on a U.S. coin in general
circulation.
FURTHER READINGS
Barry, Kathleen. 1988. Susan B. Anthony: A Biography of a
Singular Feminist. New York: New York Univ. Press.
Cooper, Ilene. 1984. Susan B. Anthony. New York: Watts.
Gurko, Miriam. 1974. The Ladies of Seneca Falls: The Birth of
the Woman’s Rights Movement. New York: Macmillan.
Wells, Ida B. 1970. Crusade for Justice: The Autobiography of
Ida B. Wells. Ed. Alfreda M. Duster. Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press.
CROSS REFERENCES
Fifteenth Amendment; Nineteenth Amendment; Stanton,
Elizabeth Cady; Temperance Movement; Women’s Rights.
ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE TREATY
OF 1972
The Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty of 1972 (ABM
Treaty) limited the numb er of defensive anti-

ment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or
mobile land-based ABM systems. Furthermore,
it excluded the transfer or deployment of ABM
systems to or in other nations. The 15 articles of
the treaty were of unlimited duration and would
come up for renewal every five years.
The principles of the treaty explicitly
reflected the policy of mutual assured destruc-
tion (MAD)—the belief that the best way to
control nuclear arms is to allow both sides
enough power to ensure the destruction of both
nations in the event of war. As stated in Article I
of the treaty, each side agreed “not to deploy
ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its
country and not to provide a base for such a
defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for
defense of an individual region” (Dur ch 1988).
Article II defines an ABM system as “a system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their
elements in flight trajectory, currently consist-
ing of ABM interceptor missiles ABM
launchers [and] ABM radars.” Article III
reiterates the ban on ABM deployment, except-
ing, for each side, one deployment area around
the national capital and one around an ICBM
launcher deployment area. This provision was
later reduced, in 1974, to just one deployment
area for each country, allowing “no more than
100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites.”
Articles IV to XV outline provi sions for, among

grams and policies. Reagan reinterpreted the
treaty liberally, putting it to its most serious test.
His proposal to render nuclear ballistic missiles
ineffective and obsolete, with the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI), a space-based BMD
system popularly known as Star Wars, caused
great debate at home and considerable alarm in
the Soviet Union.
Like Reagan, opponents of the ABM Treaty
believed that its limits were based on one-way
accommodation, that is, allowing the Soviets to
retain their numerical superiority, as seen in
SALT II. The Soviets had previously established
numerical superiority in ICBM deployment,
and the ABM Treaty supposedly held back
the development of further U.S. weapons
technology. Especially troublesome to some was
the Soviet’s Krasnoyarsk radar system in western
Siberia. According to Article VI of the ABM
Treaty, an early-warning radar with this orienta-
tion should have been located on the Pacific coast
or in the outer Arctic reaches of Siberia. Many
believed that Moscow was cheating on its end of
the deal, and thus that the treaty should go.
In the 1980s tensions between the United
States and the Soviet Union flared. In October
1985 the Reagan administration announced a
new interpretation of the ABM Treaty, under
which the development and testing of “exotic”
ABM systems (those not spelled out in the

interest in pursuing at least the spirit of the
ABM Treaty. True arms-reduction talks devel-
oped with the Soviet demise. In 1991 Soviet
nuclear forces were split up among four
countries—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan—and spokespersons on both sides
saw revision of the ABM Treaty as necessary.
The START agreements of 1992 shed new light
on older concessions. As the chief U.S. architect
of the original ABM Treaty,
HENRY KISSINGER now
joined others in declaring it obsolete in the new
era of disarmament. As a gesture of
GOOD FAITH,
the Soviets demolished their controversial
Krasnoyarsk radar system; a shoe factory now
occupies the site.
In the years that followed, the United States
and Russia both worked together and strayed
from the MAD doctrine. They also turned their
attention elsewhere, mainly to the developing
world. New nations on the list of nuclear powers
included Israel, India, Pakistan, Algeria, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria, none of
which had any formal attachment to the ABM
Treaty. U.S. and former Soviet strategists went
from analyzing BMD research provisions set
forth in the ABM Treaty to setting up safeguards
against attack from other powers.
In December 2001, however, the United

strategic nuclear warheads by 2012. Although
Putin expressed regret at the United States’
decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, he
did not signal a move to build a competing system.
Putin was not the only person to express
regret. President George W. Bush’s decision to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty was met with
criticism by members of the United States
House of Representatives. Thirty-two members
of the House of Representatives, led by Ohio
Representative Dennis Kucinich, filed a lawsuit
against President George W. Bush, charging that
he did not have the authority to unilaterally
withdraw the United States from the ABM
treaty without congressional approval. The
district court dismissed the case and ruled that
the members of the House of Representatives
did not have any standing to challenge President
Bush’s decision, because they were not person-
ally injured by the president’s act, and because
the issue of a treaty termination is a “political
question” that cannot be resolved by the courts.
The Bush administration made it clear that
the United States’ withdrawal from the treaty
was motivated by the desire to build and deploy
a long-range missile defense system that would
protect the nation from attacks by rogue nations
such as North Korea and Iran. The deployment
of the missile shield system was set for 2004 and
was planned to have a missile radar system

International Treaties Since 1945. London: Methuen.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1994. Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile
Defense. Joint pub. no. 3-01.5, March 30.
“Judge Allows Bush’s Withdrawal from ABM Treaty to
Stand: Leaves Open Possibility of Future Congressional
Role in Treaty Termination.” Lawyers Committee on
Nuclear Policy. Available online at />disarmament/ABMlawsuit/ABMdecisionpr.pdf website
home page: (accessed September
24, 2009).
Kartchner, Kerry M. 1992. Negotiating START. New
Brunswick, N.J., and London: Transaction.
Martinez, Luis, Raddatz, Martha, Compton, Ann. Septem-
ber 17, 2009. “Obama: New European Missile Plan will
Strengthen U.S. Defenses.” ABCNews.com. Available
online at />Website home page: (accessed
September 24, 2009).
Mazarr, Michael J., and Alexander T. Lennon, eds., 1994.
Toward a Nuclear Peace. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Perez-Rivas, Manuel. December 14, 2001. “U.S. Quits ABM
Treaty.” CNN.com: Inside Politics. Available online at
www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/12/13/rec.bush.
abm/index.html (accessed May 30, 2003).
Voas, Jeanette. 1990. Soviet Attitudes towards Ballistic Missile
Defence and the ABM Treaty. London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies.
CROSS REFERENCES
Arms Control and Disarmament; Bush, George Herbert
Walker; International Law
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) is an agency

KU KLUX KLAN in the 1920s was based as
much on anti-Semitism as racial intole rance.
The ADL responded by circulating pamphlets
that challenged hatred of Jews and demanded
apologies from prominent citizens, such as
automobile manufacturer Henry Ford, for
endorsing anti-Semitic view s.
With the rise of Nazism in the 1930s, the ADL
fought U.S. supporters of Hitler who endorsed his
anti-Semitic policies. During this decade,theADL
began to collect information on extremist indivi-
duals and organizations and to monitor and
investigate fascist groups in the United States.
These fact-finding and monitoring activities have
remained a central part of the ADL’s work.
Since the 1940s, the ADL has lobbied for
CIVIL RIGHTS legislation, filed briefs in courts
supporting the
SEPARATION of church and state,
and educated succeeding generations in reli-
gious tolerance. Since the creation of Israel in
1948, the ADL has also de fended Israel’s right to
exist and has fought against anti-Zionism. In
the 1990s, the organization began monitoring
the
INTERNET for evidence of anti-Semitism and
right-wing extremism. In 2000 the ADL issued a
report titled “Combating Extremism in Cyber-
space,” a review of legal issues raised by hate
groups using the Internet. The ADL’s monitor-

example, this department tracked neo-Nazi
skinhead activity in 33 countries and issued
the first major survey on this movement.
The Civil Rights Division’s legal affairs
department serves as the ADL’s advocate in
court and before legislatures. The department’s
attorneys file briefs, analyze proposed bills and
regulations, draft model laws, and prepare
TESTIMONY and legal reports for ADL staff. The
department’s model hate crimes law has been
adopted by almost four-fifths of the states and
has been upheld as constitutional by the U.S.
Supreme Court in State v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993). In
addition, the department works with local
attorneys in the ADL’s thirty regional offices.
The ADL’s Braun Holocaust Institute, estab-
lished in 1977, serves as a centralized information
center on the Holocaust. The institute
encourages public and religious schools to teach
about the Holocaust by providing curricula for
elementary and high school students. It has also
organized teacher-training workshops and semi-
nars to help teachers incorporate Holocaust
studies into mainstream disciplines. The insti-
tute’s collection of Holocaust-related materials is
recognized as one of the best in the world. In
addition, the institute publishes Dimensions: A
Journal of Holocaust Studies, a general interest
magazine on the Holocaust, and resource guides,

Levin, Jack, and Jack McDevitt. 2002. Hate Crimes Revisited.
New York: Westview.
Stern-Larosa, Caryl, and Ellen Hoffheimer-Bettmann. 2001.
Anti-Defamation League’s Hate Hurts: How Children
Learn and Unlearn Prejudice. New York: Scholastic.
CROSS REFERENCES
Hate Crime; Hate Crime: “Do Hate Crime Laws Restrict
First Amendment Rights ?” (In Focus); Libel and Slander.
ANTICIPATION
The performance of an act or obligation before it is
legally due. In patent law, the publication of the
existence of an invention that has already been
patented or has a patent pending, which are
grounds for denying a patent to an invention that
has substantially the same structure and function
as the earlier invention.
In the law of
NEGLIGENCE, anticipation refers to
the knowledge that there is a reasonable proba-
bility that the consequences of particular conduct
of one individual will result in injury to others.
The anticipation of an invention also occurs
if the later invention is merely an
ADAPTATION of
an earlier patent, which would be obvious to a
skilled person who need only exercise some
mechanical skill to develop the same adaptation.
ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION
The unjustifiable denial by a party to a contract of
any intention to perform contra ctual duties, which

If the nonrepudiating party implores or
insists that the other party perform, this
demand, in and of itself, does not divest the
nonrepudiating party’s right to damages. The
presence or absence of a breach of contract
depends solely upon the repudiating party’s
actions. The prevailing view is that the non-
repudiating party may pursue any remed y for
breach of contract, even though he or she has
informed the repudiating party that he would
await the latter’s performance.
The nonrepudiating party also possesses the
option to do nothing and to commence an
action for breach after the time for perfor-
mance. Under the majority view, such an action
can be instituted without tendering the non-
repudiating party’s performance or even al leg-
ing or proving that the party was ready, willing,
and able to perform. The nonrepudiating party
must demonstrate, however, that he or she
would have been ready, willing, and able to
perform but for the repudiation.
In regard to the law of sales, the
UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
(UCC), a body of law govern-
ing commercial transactions by the states,
provides that anticipatory repudiation entails
the right of one party to a contract to sue for
breach before the performance date when the

the original judicial system became unsatisfac-
tory. Formal
PLEADING and skilled lawyers began
to replace the primitive methods of earlier
colonial times.
After the Revolutionary War, Americans
sought a new form of jurisprudence to interact
with their newly gained freedoms. Laws were
less confining, due to the belief that moral fiber
was more important to satisfactory conduct
than legislation.
During this period, the antilawyer move-
ment gained momentum. Historians speculate
that it evolved as a result of former prejudices
and conflicts toward the legal profession.
Although lawyers in the past had not been
viewed favorably, they achieved prominence
and esteem as strong proponents of freedom
from England during the Revolutionary War.
After the war, lawyers were once again an
important part of the legal system but were used
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
ANTILAWYER MOVEMENT 313
primarily by the wealthy. As a result, they were
often in conflict with those who were poor and
could not pay their debts, which led to a
resurrection of the old negative attitudes against
them.
Lawyers were regarded with suspicion. They
were accused of initiating unnecessary lawsuits,

DEFENDANT
could participate in the arbitration.
The second suggestion provided for a small
group of professional lawyers to practice as
public servants. Their salaries and actions would
be controlled by the state, and their chief
function would be to clarify legal principles of
each case for the jury.
The conflicting feelings toward lawyers
culminated in several incidents, the most
noteworthy of which was known as Shays’s
Rebellion. The rebellion began in 1786 when
Massachusetts voters elected a majority of
nonlawyers to the General Court. This action
led to a
RIOT, and hostile agrarian mobs overran
the courthouses, closing them down. The
governor dispatched the state army, which
successfully quelled the agitators.
Shays’s Rebellion did not stop the people of
Massachusetts from electing lawyers to political
positions. The very tactics they feared in the
courtroom were highly desirable in politics to
control government officials; in spite of their
conflicting feelings, voters were still attracted to
legal skills.
The new methods of justice proved to be
inefficient. Arbitration was fruitless, and laymen
were fallible as lawyers. By 1790, most cases
were again tried by lawyers, and the antilawyer

prices, with the primary goal of safeguarding
public welfare by ensuring that consu mer
demands will be met by the manufacture and
sale of goods at reasonable prices.
Antitrust law seeks to make enterprises
compete fairly. It has had a serious effect on
business practices and the organization of U.S.
industry. Based on the belief that free trade
benefits the economy, businesses, and consu-
mers alike, the law forbids several types of
RESTRAINT OF TRADE and monopolization. These
fall into four main areas: agreements between or
among competitors, contractual arrangements
between sellers and buyers, the pursuit or
maintenance of monopoly power, and mergers.
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 (15
U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.) is the basis for U.S.
antitrust law, and many states have modeled
their own statutes upon it. As weaknesses in the
Sherman Act became evident, Congress added
amendments to it at various times through
1950. The most important are the
CLAYTON ACT
of 1914 (15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq.) and the
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT of 1936 (15 U.S.C.A. § 13
et seq.). Congress also created a regulatory
agency to administrate and enforce the law,
under the
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION Act of 1914
(15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41–58). In an ongoing analysis

blessed and cursed business. Markets expanded
and productivity grew, but output exceeded
demand, and competition sharpened. Rivals
sought greater security and profits in cartels
(mutual agreements to fix prices and control
output). Out of these arrangements sprang the
trusts. From sugar to whiskey to beef to
tobacco, the process of merger and consolida-
tion brought entire industries under the control
of just a few powerful people. Oil and steel, the
backbone of the nation’s heavy industries, lay in
the hands of the corporate giants John D.
Rockefeller and J. P. Morgan. The trusts could
fix prices at any level. If a competitor entered
the market, the trusts would sell their goods at a
loss until the competito r went out of business,
and then they would raise prices again. By the
1880s, abuses by the trusts brought demands for
reform.
History gave only contradictory direction to
the reformers. Before the eighteenth century,
During a December
1998 news conference
in Washington, D.C.,
Bill Gates, founder of
Microsoft, answers
questions, via closed-
circuit television,
about the antitrust
lawsuit filed against

about the trusts, common law in U.S. courts
was somewhat tougher on restraint of trade. Yet
it was still contradictory. The courts took two
basic views of cartels: tolerant and condemning.
The first view accepted cartels as long as they
did not stop other merchants from entering the
market. This view used the rule of reason to
determine this, and it put a high premium on
the freedom to enter into contracts. Bu sinesses
and contracts mattered. Consumers, who suf-
fered from price-fixing, were irrelevant; the
wisdom of the market would protect them from
exploitation. The second view was that cartels
are thoroughly bad. It reserved the rule of
reason only for judging more limited ancillary
restrictions. Given these competing views,
which varied from state to state, no compre-
hensive common law could be said to exist. But
one approach was destined to win.
The Sherman Act and Early Enforcement
In 1890, Congress took aim at the trusts with
passage of the
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT, named
for Senator
JOHN SHERMAN (R-Ohio). It went far
beyond the common law’s refusal to enforce
certain offensive contracts. Clearly persuaded by
the more restrictive view that saw great harm in
restraint of trade, the Sherman Act outlawed
trusts altogether. The

depicts President
Theodore Roosevelt
resurrecting the
Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. Roosevelt’s
administration filed
44 antitrust lawsuits
in eight years.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION
316 ANTITRUST LAW
statute, in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 15 S. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325 (1895).
Rejecting a challenge to a sugar trust that
controlled more than 98 percent of the nation’s
sugar-refining capacity, the Court held that
manufacturing was not interstate commerce.
This was good news for trusts. If manufacturers
were exempt from the Sherman Act, then they
would have little to worry about from federal
antitrust regulators. The Court only began
strongly supporting the use of the law in the
late 1890 s, starting with cases against railroad
cartels. By 1904 some 300 large companies still
controlled nearly 40 percent of the nation’s
manufacturing assets and influenced at least 80
percent of its vital industries.
After the turn of the twentieth century,
federal enforcement intensified. President
Theodore Roosevelt’s announcement that he
was a “trustbu ster” foreshadowed one impor-

Congressional Reform up to 1950
Dissatisfaction brought new federal laws in
1914. The first of these was the Clayton Act,
which answered the criticism that the Sherman
Act was too general. It declared four practices to
be illegal but not criminal: (1) price discrimi-
nation—selling a product at different prices
to similarly situated buyers; (2) tying and
exclusive-dealing contracts—sales on condition
that the buyer stop dealing with the seller’s
competitors; (3) corporate mergers—acquisitions
of competing companies; and (4) interlocking
directorates—boards of competing companies,
with common members.
Quick to hedge its bets, the Clayton Act
qualified each of these prohibited activities.
They were only illegal where the effect “may be
substantially to lessen competition” or “might
tend to create a monopoly.” This language was
intentionally vague. Despite specifying different
tests for violations, Congress still wanted the
courts to make the difficult decisions. One
important limitation was added: The Clayton
Act exempted unions from the scope of
antitrust law, refusing to treat human labor as
a commodity.
The second piece of federal legislation in
1914 was the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Without attaching criminal penalties, the law
provided that “unfair methods of competition in