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iii
Preface
is monograph, prepared by the RAND Corporation and the Centre

by terrorism—ailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia—as well as the
impact of U.S. CT and law enforcement assistance that has been pro-
vided to each of these countries.
e subsequent gap analysis should help to provide a comprehen-
sive picture of the overall terrorist environment in Southeast Asia and
the specific nature of the militant support networks currently operating
in this part of the world. It is hoped that these findings will assist the
United States and regional partner-nation governments to better shape
and refine the parameters of their respective assistance programs and
mitigation efforts.
is research was sponsored by the Australian Federal Police and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the Inter-
national Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National
Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and develop-
ment center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
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v
Contents
Preface iii
Figures
ix

Patterns of Recruitment and Radicalization
23
Traction Among the Local Population
25
External Dimensions
26
Assessment
29
vi The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment
CHAPTER THREE
Muslim and Communist Extremism in the Philippines 33
Militant Context
33
Militant Groupings
37
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
37
Misuari Breakaway Group
46
Abu Sayyaf Group
49
Communist Party of the Philippines–New People’s Army
57
Assessment
63
CHAPTER FOUR
Terrorism and National Security in Indonesia 67
Militant Context
67
Militant Groupings—Nationalist Islamists

97
Terrorist Activity: 2002–2005
98
JI Traction in Southeast Asia
100
JI’s Future Prospects
102
Contents vii
CHAPTER SIX
Counterterrorism and National Security in ailand 105
Historical and Political Context
105
Security Resources Deployed to the South
107
Key Counterterrorism Measures in the South
111
e aksin Administration
111
e Post–September 2006 Situation
115
Peace-Building and Reconciliation
116
Security
118
Dialogue
120
Assessment
122
CHAPTER SEVEN
Counterterrorism and National Security in the Philippines 131

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
169
Economic Support Fund
170
U.S. Security Assistance to Primary Partner Nations in
Southeast Asia
170
viii The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment
ailand 170
Indonesia
172
e Philippines
175
Challenges Associated with the Implementation of U.S. Security
Assistance in Southeast Asia
179
CHAPTER TEN
Conclusion 185
e Current Terrorist Environment in Southeast Asia
185
Policy Recommendations
188
APPENDIX
Exploring the Potential for Emergent Operational and Logistical
Terrorist Hubs in Cambodia
199
Bibliography
215
ix
Figures

The Current Terrorist Threat
Overall, the terrorist threat to the countries covered in this mono-
graph remains a serious but largely manageable security problem. In
ailand, while the scale and scope of Islamist-inspired violence in the
three southern Malay provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat have
become more acute since 2004, the conflict has (thus far) not spread
to the country’s majority non-Muslim population nor has it taken on
an anti-Western dimension.
1
Indeed, at the time of this writing, out-
side demagogues and radicals had singularly failed to gain any con-
certed logistical or ideological foothold in the region, which suggests
that ailand’s so-called “deep south” is unlikely to become a new
hub for furthering the transregional designs of fundamentalist jihadi
elements.
In the Philippines, Moro Muslim extremism has declined mark-
edly since its high point in the 1990s and early 2000s. e Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) and Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) both remain
factionalized with the bulk of their existing cadres mostly confined
to isolated pockets across the Sulu archipelago. e leadership and
1
In this monograph, Islamist is used when describing Islam as a religiopolitical phenom-
enon. e term is an immediate derivation of Islamism, which has its moorings in significant
events of the 20th century, such as the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan, and the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. It is distinguished from Islamic,
which is more correctly understood as signifying religion and culture as it has developed
over the past millennium of Islam’s history. For more on these terminological nuances, see
Denoeux, 2002; Roy, 1994; and 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 562, fn. 3.
xiv The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment
mainstream membership of the largest and best-equipped Moro rebel

“soft” hearts-and-minds initiatives is likely to continue regardless of
the political complexion of future ai governments.
Summary xv
In the Philippines, the armed forces have made significant prog-
ress in defense reform and civil-military relations and are now reaping
significant rewards in the ongoing battle against Islamist and Moro
extremists in Mindanao. e admittedly halting negotiations with
MILF have made progress, and, with the notable exception of ances-
tral domain, most outstanding issues have now been settled. Manila
has also made headway against the NPA insurgency through a com-
bination of “hard” and “soft” security policies aimed at normalizing
(former) hostile communist areas.
Finally, in Indonesia, the central government has fully committed
to professionalizing the police force and ensuring that it is internation-
ally recognized as adept and accountable. In addition, Jakarta is slowly
augmenting what hitherto have been very weak coastal surveillance
capabilities, and it now recognizes the need for a concerted deradical-
ization program. Most significantly, the government has established
a credible and effective CT unit—Special Detachment [Detasmen
Khusus] 88—which reports directly to the military and has been cred-
ited with the neutralization of at least 450 militants since 2005.
Policy Recommendations
While U.S. security assistance to Southeast Asia has been important to
the development of a more efficacious regional CT strategy and struc-
ture, much more could be done to inoculate this part of the world
against the possibility of a renewed terrorist threat, from either domes-
tic extremists or an emboldened transborder jihadist network. Accord-
ingly, this monograph offers the following recommendations.
Better integrate CT, law and order, and development policies to
address the issue of corruption in the region. is enduring and pervasive

for political or logistical reasons.
Press all 10 ASEAN countries to sign and ratify each of the 16 United
Nations (UN) conventions dealing with CT. Although political agree-
ment was reached at the Jakarta Sub-Regional Ministerial Meeting in
March 2007 on the need to strengthen legal CT tools, the fact remains
that many Southeast Asian countries have yet to enact a broad range of
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
Emphasize the use of soft power to enhance local governance in regions
susceptible to fundamentalist propaganda (through INCLE); foster greater
military and police awareness of human rights and appropriate rules of
engagement (through U.S. Department of Defense–sponsored Interna-
tional Military Education Training program, or IMET, courses); and
promote general socioeconomic development (through the U.S. Agency
Summary xvii
for International Development [USAID] and DoS Economic Support
Fund, or ESF). To ensure that these types of endeavors have a long-
term, sustainable impact, it is critical that they be carried out in close
cooperation with national and local authorities and are executed with
due regard for community consultation in civic action planning.
Supplement the use of soft power with “smart” power. is can
be achieved by (1) spearheading public diplomacy, exchange, and
educational efforts to discredit perverted interpretations of Islam;
(2) empowering moderate Muslim leaders as voices for greater reli-
gious negotiation; (3) investigating possible alternatives for reducing
the pull of pan-regional sentiment from the inside out, by ascertain-
ing the extent to which emergent fissures between JI’s mainstream and
the pro-bombing faction can be exploited; and (4) promoting prison
reform to reduce the potential for jails to be exploited as recruiting
or radicalization hubs. ese dialogue and communication initiatives
should focus not only on Southeast Asian states with established mili-

ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
AKKBB Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama
dan Berkeyakinan
AMIN Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara
ANFO ammonium nitrate–fuel oil
ARMM Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATA Antiterrorism Assistance program
BAKIN Baden Koordinasi Intelijen Negara
BIAF Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BIN Baden Intelijen Nasional
BNPP Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani
BRIMOB Brigade Mobil
BRN Barisan Revolusi Nasionale
BRN-K Barisan Revolusi Nasional–Koordinasi
xxii The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment
CMO civil-military operation
CNS Council for National Security
COIN counterinsurgency
CPM Civilian-Police-Military Task Force
CPP Communist Party of the Philippines
CT counterterrorism
DI Darul Islam
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
DoJ U.S. Department of Justice
DoS U.S. Department of State
ESF Economic Support Fund
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

LM Laskar Mujahidin
LPSA Local Peace and Security Assembly
MBG Misuari Breakaway Group
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MoA-AD memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MoU memorandum of understanding