pursuing elements of a possible weapons pro-
gram and was ignoring demands of suspending
production of uranium. Additionally, North
Korea had not only withdrawn from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty but had also tested two
nuclear devices. With Washington laying out its
largest defense spending in a quarter century,
arms control and disarmament were clearly
perceived to not be a priority of the Bush
administration.
Under President
BARACK OBAMA, the United
States once again changed its focus back toward
arms control and non-proliferation. In an April
2009 speech, Obama outlined a number of
concrete steps that the United States was
planning to take in order to address the threat
of nuclear weapons. Specifically, the United
States introduced a resolution on nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament during the
UNITED NATIONS Security Council meeting
chaired by President Obama on September 24,
2009. The Security Council unanimously ap-
proved Obama’s resolution, which set forth a
series of goals to eliminate nuclear weapons,
ban the production of fissile material used to
make such weapons, outlaw atomic tests and
safeguard stockpiles of weapons. Additionally,
the resolution advocated actio ns to be taken
against nations that violate the International
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY by having their

September 26, 2009).
“Project on Strengthening Arms Control and Nonprolifera-
tion.” Center for Arms Control and non-Proliferation.
Available online at http://www. armscontrolcenter.org/
resources/strengthening_nonproliferation/ websitehome
page: (accessed S eptem-
ber 25, 2009).
Sheehan, Michael. 1988. Arms Control: Theory and Practice.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Varner, Bill. September 25, 2009. “Obama Gets UN Nuclear
Accord as U.K., France Put Heat on Iran.” Bloomberg.
com. Available online at />apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aiiuAu6px_Cw website
home page: (accessed September
26, 2009).
Weisman, Steven R. March 23, 2003. “A Nation at War: A
New Doctrine, Pre-emption, Idea with a Lineage whose
Time Has Come.” New York Times, 1B.
CROSS REFERENCES
Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty of 1972; Blockade; Hot
Line Agreement, 1971; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty; International Law; NATO; Nixon, Richard
Milhous; Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; Nuclear Weapons;
Terrorism; War.
ARRAIGNMENT
A criminal proceeding at which the defendant is
officially called before a court of compet ent
jurisdiction, informed of the offense charged in
the complaint, information, indictment, or other
charging document, and asked to enter a plea of
guilty, not guilty, or as otherwise permitted by law.

trial under federal law, the Court has also ruled
that failure to arraign a defendant is not a
reversible error where the failure is inadvertent,
the defendant knows that he is the accused, the
defendant is apprised of the charged offense, the
defendant is able to assist in preparing a defense,
and the defendant is not otherwise prejudiced by
the lack of an arraignment. Thus the importance
and necessity of being arraigned before trial
varies from case to case and from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The law governing arraignment
procedures is spelled out by statutes and court
rules at both the state and federal levels.
The Federal Rules of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
provide that during the arraignment federal
courts must read the indictment or information
to the defendant or state the substance of the
charge to the defendant and ask him or her to
enter a plea thereto. FR Crim P, Rule 10. The
defendant must also be given a copy of the
indictment or information before he or she is
called upon to plead. Generally speaking, the
federal rules require defendants to be present at
the arraignment. However, in prosec utions for
offenses punishable by fine or imprisonment for
not more than one year, the court, with the
written consen t of the defendant, may permit
arraignment in the defendant’s absence.
The court rules in some states only require

arrested and charged with an offense and the
time the defendant is arraigned, state and
federal courts will dismiss the criminal procee d-
ings as having violated the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial .
Many jurisdictions require that defendants
be arraigned within seventy-two hours of arrest.
As a result, defendants arrested over the
weekend are usually arraigned on Mondays,
which can make for a packed courtroom. To
speed up the arraignment process on busy days,
defendants are often arraigned in groups, which
is constitutionally permissible so long as each
person being arraigned identifies himself or
herself to the court and the court advises all
defendants in attendance that the remarks of the
court apply to each person individually. Courts
conducting group arraignments must also
ascertain on the record that each defendant
was present throughout the entire course of the
arraignment, heard the remarks, and under-
stood them.
The right to be arraigned may ordinarily be
waived, even when the charge is for a felony-
level offense, provided the accused knows the
nature of the charge offense and has a full
opportunity to present a defense. The power to
waive an arraignment must usually be exercised
by the accused in person. Where the right of the
accused to waive an arraignment is recognized,

only been paid in part at the time it is due.
A person who is “in arrears” is behind in
payments due and thus has outstanding debts or
liabilities. For example, a tenant who has not
paid rent on the day it is due is in arrears.
Arrears may also refer to the late distribution of
the dividends of cumulative
PREFERRED STOCK.
ARREST
A seizure or forcible restraint; an exercise of the
power to deprive a person of his or her liberty; the
taking or keeping of a person in custody by legal
authority, especially, in response to a criminal
charge.
The purpose of an arrest is to bring the
arrestee before a court or otherwise secure
the administratio n of the law. An arrest serves
the function of notifying the community that
an individual has been accused of a crime
and also may admonish and deter the arrested
individual from committing other crimes.
Arrests can be made on both criminal charges
and civil charges, although civil arrest is a
drastic measure that is not looked upon with
favor by the courts. The federal Constitution
imposes limits on both civil and criminal arrests.
An arrest may occur (1) by the touching or
putting hands on the arrestee; (2) by any act
that in dicates an intentio n to take the arrestee
into custody and that subjects the arrestee to

SEIZURE under the
FOURTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution,
and thus the procedures by which a person is
arrested must comply with the protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment or the
arrest will be invalidated and any evidence seized
during the arrest or confessions made after
the arrest will typically be suppressed. The
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that arrests made
without a valid
ARREST WARRANT based on
PROBABLE CAUSE are presumptively invalid under
the Fourth Amen dment. Similarly, arrests made
pursuant to a warrant that is later ruled defective
may also be declared invalid, unless the officer
in procuring the warrant and making the arrest
acted in
GOOD FAITH.
However, warrantless arrests do pass con-
stitutional muster under some circumstances.
The Supreme Court has ruled that warrantless
arrests can be made when the circumstances
make it reasonable to do so. For example, no
warrant is required for a
FELONY arrest in a
public place, even if the arresting officer had
ample time to procure a warrant, so long as the
officer possessed probable cause that the suspect
committed the crime. Felony arrests in places
not open to the public generally do require a

is about to be committ ed. Courts will deny
requests when the warrant fails to describe in
particularized detail the person to be arrested.
The evidence upon which a warrant is based
need not be ultimately
ADMISSIBLE at trial, but it
cannot be based on
KNOWINGLY or intentionally
false statements, or statements made in reckless
disregard of the truth. However, inaccuracies
found in a warrant due to ordinary
NEGLIGENCE
will not typically jeopardize a warrant’s validity.
Police officers need no justification to stop
someone on a public street and ask questions,
and individuals are completely entitled to refuse
to answer any such questions and go about their
business. However, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits police officers from detaining pedes-
trians and conducting any kind of search of
their clothing without first possessing a reason-
able and articulable
SUSPICION that the pedes-
trians are engaged in criminal activity.
TERRY V.
OHIO, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 21 L. Ed. 889
(1968). Police may not even compel a pedestri-
an to produce identification without first
meeting this standard. Similarly, police may
not stop motorists without first having a

and obstruction of
government
administration by
a New York police
officer. The
procedures by which
a person is arrested
must comply with
the protections
guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.
AP IMAGES
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
ARREST 371
A sample arrest
warrant
F.C.A. §§153, 153-a
Arrest Warrant
General Form 3
(Warrant of Arrest)
FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF

In the Matter of
Petitioner(s)
against
Respondent(s)

IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

make arrests only for serious crimes, such as
felonies and gross misdemeanors, and then only
when the arresting citizen has probable cause to
believe the arrestee committed the serious crime.
Witnessing the crime in person will normally
establish probable cause for making an arrest.
Both private citizens and law enforcement
officers may be held liable for the tort of
FALSE
ARREST
in civil court. An ACTION for false arrest
requires proof that the process used for the
arrest was void on its face. In other words, one
who confines another, while purporting to act
by authority of law which does not in fact exist,
makes a false arrest and may be required to pay
money damages to the victim. To make out a
claim for false arrest, the
PLAINTIFF must show
that the charges on which he or she was arrested
ultimately lacked justification. That is, the
plaintiff in a false arrest action must show that
the arrest was made without probable cause and
for an improper purpose.
CROSS REFERENCES
Accusation; Charge; Civil Procedure; Contraband; Criminal
Action; Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; De Facto;
Evidence; Felony; Fourth Amendment; Hot Pursuit;
Liability; Probable Cause; Seizure; Tort Law.
ARREST OF JUDGMENT

FAMILY COURT JUDGE
BAIL IN THE SUM OF ($ ) DOLLARS IS RECOMMENDED.
___________________________________________________
FAMILY COURT JUDGE
A sample arrest
warrant (continued)
ILLUSTRATION BY GGS
CREATIVE RESOURCES.
REPRODUCED BY
PERMISSION OF GALE,
A PART OF CENGAGE
LEARNING.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
ARREST OF JUDGMENT 373
Although the Federal Rules of CIVIL PROCEDURE
make no such prov ision, state codes of civil
procedure should be c onsulted concerning the
issuance of an arrest of judgment in actions at law.
In criminal proceedings, a
DEFENDANT must
make a motion for an arrest of judgment when
the indictment or information fails to charge
the accused with an offense or if the court lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged. State and
federal rules of
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE govern an
arrest of judgment in criminal prosecutions.
ARREST WARRANT
A written order issued by authority of the state

tion of arson to include the burning or exploding
of commercial and public buildings—such as
restaurants and schools—and structures—such
as bridges. In many states, the act of burning any
insured dwelling, regardless of whether it belongs
to another, constitutes arson if it is done with
an in tent to
DEFRAUD the insurer. Finally, the
common-law rule that the property burned must
belong to another person has been completely
eliminated by statute in some states.
Elements
The main elements necessary to prove arson are
evidence of a burning and evidence that a criminal
act caused the fire. The accused must intend to
burn a building or other structure. Absent a
statutory description of the conduct required
for arson, the conduct must be malicious, and
not accidental. Malice, however, does not mean
ill will. Intentional or outrageously reckless con-
duct is sufficient to constitute malice. Motive, on
the other hand, is not an essential element of
arson.
Unless a statute extends the crime to other
property, only a house used as a residence, or
buildings immediately surr ounding it, can be
the subject of arson. If a house is vacated, is
7,986
692
7,600

LEARNING.
GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3
RD E DITION
374 ARREST WARRANT
closed up, or becomes unfit for human habita-
tion, its burning will not constitute arson. A
temporary absence from a dwelling will not
negate its character as a residence.
Generally, the actual presence of a person
within a dwelling at the moment it is burned is
not necessary. It may, however, be required for
a particular degree of the crime. The fact, and
not the knowledge, of human occupancy is what
is essential. If a dwelling is burned under the
impression that it is uninhabited when people
actually live in it, the crime is commi tted.
Absent a statute to the contrary, a person is
innocent of arson if that individual burns his or
her own property while living there. The
common exception to this rule is the burning
of one’s own property with an intent to defraud
or prejudice the property insurer. In addition,
under statutes that punish the burning of a
dwelling house without expressly requiring it to
be the property of another, a person who burns
his or her own property might be guilty of
arson. An owner, for purposes of arson, is the
person who possesses the house and has the
care, control, and management of it. In those
states that have maintained the common-law

than a finding that it was done recklessly. When a
human life is endangered, the penalty is most
severe.
ART LAW
The Framers of the Constitution acknowledged
the importance of the arts when they wrote
that Cong ress shall have the power “[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and use ful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries” (Art. I, § 8). Despite
this provision, or perhaps because of its very
limited nature, the federal government offered
little assistance to artists until the 1930s. Early
unsuccessful attempts to aid the arts included
an effort by President
JAMES BUCHANAN to
establish the National Commission of Fine Arts,
a project that failed within a year when
Congress did not appropriate funds. President
Number of Intentionally Set Fires, 2003 to 2007
Year
Number of fires, in thousands
0
100
2003 2004 2005 2006
38
482
37
489

the Council of Fine Arts, but success came when
his successor,
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, persuaded
Congress to create the National Commission of
Fine Arts.
Even after the National Commission of Fine
Arts was established, the federal government
continued to play a minor role in funding the
arts, but several municipal programs attempted
to fill the void. In New York City the Civil
Works Administration (CWA) sponsored paint-
ings, murals, and art education. The primary
goal of the CWA was to create employment for
artists receiving government relief. With the
only requirement for employment being an
assertion that the applicant was an artist, the art
produced under the CWA was often the work of
unskilled amateurs.
Federal funding for the arts took off during
the Great Depression with the creation of the
Federal Art Project, a branch of the Works
Progress Administration (WPA). The Federal
Art Project was modeled on some of the earlier
municipal attempts but avoided their problems
by emphasizing the production of wor ks of
high technical competence, utilizing defined
hiring guidelines, and encouraging creativity
and experimentation. The Federal Art Project
paid a security wage, an amount that was
calculated to fall between the prevailing wage

the best art depended on the discretion and
charity of a few patrons. As a result, opportu-
nities for artists were limited, and rural audiences
had few chances to see the best productions or
visit outstanding exhibitions.
In the mid-1990s, federal financial support
for the arts and humanities was provided
through several distinct agencies: the National
Commission of Fine Arts, the National Endow-
ment for the Arts (NEA), and the National
Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). The
Commission of Fine Arts, established in 191 0,
advises the president, Congress, and govern-
ment department heads on matters of architec-
ture, sculpture, painting, and other fine arts.
The commission’s primary function is to
preserve and enhance the appearance of the
nation’s capital, Washington, D.C. (40 U.S.C.A.
§ 104 [1986]).
The National Foundation for the Arts and
Humanities Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.A. §§ 951–
968 [West Supp. 1990]) established the NEA
and the NEH. The NEA provides grants to, or
contracts with, groups and individuals of
exceptional talent, and state or regional organi-
zations engag ed in or concerned with the arts.
NEA programs encourage individual and insti-
tutional development of the arts, preservation of
the American artistic heritage, wider availability
of the arts, leadership in the arts, and the

1990 Congress enacted a law that required the
NEA to take into consideration “general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse
beliefs and values of the American public. ” This
became known as the decency test.
Over the next several years other controver-
sial grants were awarded and challenged, culmi-
nating in a case that went to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The case, National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley 524 U.S. 569, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 141
L.Ed. 2d 500 (1998), was brought by four artists
including Karen Finley. Finley became infamous
for a performance art piece in which she would
remove her clothing and smear chocolate on her
body. The work, she explained, symbolized the
way women were exploited in society. Finley and
her fellow plaintiffs argued that the 1990 statute
was unconstitutional and that the decency test
was a violation of the rights of free speech and
due process.
A district court agreed and the U.S. Court of
Appeals upheld the district court ’s decision in
1996 100 F. 3d 671 (9th Cir.) In 1998 the
Supreme Court ruled 8 to 1 that the law was
constitutional, and that it violated no rights.
Grant-seekers, the court noted, were required to
submit their proposals to a panel representing
diverse points of view; as such, the risk that an
arbitrary ruling of indecency would be reached
was minimal. In his dissent, however, Justice