VNU Joum al of Science, Social Sciences and H um anities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36

In the crossíìre: Vietnam’s relations with China
and Soviet Union during the Vietnam W ar (1965-1972)
Pham Quang Minh*
College o f Social Sciences and Humanities, VNU
336 Nguyen Trai, Thanh Xuan, Hatioi, Viettĩatĩì
Receivcd 13 November 2009

Abstract. Although most điplomatic history is written as an a c c o u n t of relations between tvvo
nations, in reality niany interactions in international rclations involve morc than simplc bilateral
exchanges. This paper is intcnded to rcmedy this weakness in the litcrature by analyzing thc
strategic triangle created by Vietnam, Soviet Union, and the Pcoples' Repubhc of China during the
Vietnam War (1965-1972).
A tria n g u la r fra m e w o rk is a p p ro p ria te for ih is p u rp o se b e c a u s e e a c h o f th e b ila tc ra l lin k s -

Vietnam - Soviet Union; Vietnam - China; China - Soviet Union was affcctcd by thc third membcr
of ihe triangle. Although both the Soviet Union and China claimcd to be "cioing their intemational
proletarian duty" by supporting Vietnam in thc war against the United States, at the same time both
countries folỉowed theirovvn policy and interests.

Based on Victnam ese sources, the paper
tries to exam ine the com plexity o f this triangle
relationship and argues that, although Victnam
achieved its aim, it vvas a pawn in 2 global
ideological and pow cr struggle am ong big
powers.

1. R ationalc
Although m ost diplomatic history is written
as an account o f relations betw een two nations,


to take advantage o f its great size to push
Vietnam into a clcarly subordinatc status.
In com parison to China and thc United
States, the Soviet U nion’s position on Vietnam
was more uncomfortablc bccause it was
inlluenccd by two coníìicting intcrcsts: a desire
to reach a detente with the U nited States, and an
interest to gain VictnartTs support in its struggle
with China. In general, Sovict policy tovvards
Vietnam
dunng
the vvar
had
several
dim ensions. Firsí, M oscow ilid not want to
sacnfice its stratecy o f dctentc in its rclations
w ith the u s . Second, M oscow w as ready to
provide all the necessary m ilitary and economic
aid n e e d e d for Hanoi to pursuc its war. Third,
M oscow prcferrcd negotiating a sctticmcnt to
the vvar rather than being draw n further into
It[ 1J. In other w ords, the S oviet U nion tried to
have greai iníluencc in V ietnam in order to
realize its foreign policy goals: to rcach an
appropriate settlem cnt to thc vvar and to make
the DRV a reliablc Sovict ally in thc world
com m unist movement.
In short, during thc w ar, V ictnam was a
pawn in a global ìdeological and pow er struggle

tblloNvcd its Hve principles o f peaceíul coexistence in Indochina, with two Vietnams and
a protracted strugglc in the country’s South.
Howcver, both the Soviet Union and China
continued to support N orth Vietnam in
reconstructing its econom y, in order to build up
Vietnam as an “advance p o st” o f socialism.
China was a main supporter as well as a
beneficiary o f the G encva A ccords o f 1954[2].
On M arch 3, 1954, the C hinese N ews Agency
announced that C hincse govem m ent accepted
the invitation o f Sovict Union to participate in
the G eneva confcrcnce on Korea and
Indochina[3]. Jcan Chauvel called the Geneva
Conferencc as thc íirst m ceting betw een the
East and the W est with participation o f
Beijing[4Ị. R ealizing thc importance o f the
confcrencc China had preparcd very carefully,
and sent to G cneva a largc delegation o f 200
persons[5]. D uring thc G eneva conference,
Chou Enlai show ed his skills as a diplom at and
negotiator. B ased on the fact o f détente among
powers, China tried to pcrsuade Vietnam to
sign the G eneva A ccord by accepting a division
o f the country into tw o parts the N orth and the
South along the 16th parallcl. However, China
suggested that if France will not accept this
proposal, V ietnam w ould makc Hai Phong a
free port allow ing Francc to settle a certain
forces. In w orst case, Victnam could propose
that the H ighw ay N o 5 and Hanoi and Hai

c o n s o lid a te th e ir in te m a l affa irs. Third , the
conflict bctwccn Sovict Union and C hina still
did not appcar serious.
The harmonized relations betw een Soviet
Union and China were clear during the Geneva
confcrence. In a speech delivered on M ay 12,
1954, Chou Enlai relerrcđ to Soviet Union as a
guarantee for solving the conílict in Indochina:
“It is also necessary to m ention the peaceful
policy o f Soviet Union - Soviet U nion is alvvays
patient to sole the conílict in Indochina in
peaceful way, and to support the national selfdetcrm ination o f Indochinese people.”[3]. In a
tclcgram datcd o f M ay 30, and in a spcech o f
June 8, 1954, Choư Enlai m entioned again and
again about Soviet Union that shared the idca o f
China in the issue o f intem ational control in
Indochina aíìer Geneva coníerence. W ithout the
agreement betwcen Soviet Union and China,
the Geneva confcrence vvould have taken morc
time. It was Soviet U nion and C hina who
played an important role in settlem ent o f the
conílict in Indochina. N ot only in Vietnam ese
issucs, but also in solving thc questions o íL a o s
and Cambodia, both C hina and Soviet Union
shared the same idcas. The đifference w as in
the vvay that China dealt w ith Laos and

Cambodia. A ccording to C hina all parties,
including V ietnam , had to vvithdravv th eir íorces
from Laos and C am bodia. W hile, in Laos, the

Chou Enlai, C hina w as especially displeased
\vith hegem ony in the relationship between
countries. Although hegcm ony was not a major
trend. Chou continued, it existed in some
relations, and could iníluence badly on the
masses. Secotĩd, on the question o f Vietnam
unification, Chou advised Vietnam to follow a
protractcđ struggle. A ccording to Chou,
Victnam should regard the principle o f
reunification through free election as a slogan


P Q. Minh / VNU lounm l o f Science, Social Sciences and Hunmiúties Humanities 25, No.5K (2(X)9) 24-36

for political struggle. rathcr than as a guidcline
for daily actìon. D iscussing thc issue o f
economic policy, cspccialiy thc land reíbrm,
Chou was o f thc opinion that thc program was
esscntially succcsslul,
w hilc m istakes and
shortcomings Nvere isolated and local. Using
this opportunity Chou Enlai dcfcndcd Stalin
IVom the attack o f Sovict leadcrship: “Comrade
Stalin made scrious m istakes, but it is to
contìrm that in thc m ain his policics vvere the
coưect and victorious."[3].
In 1957, thc split bctw een Sovict Union and
China becam e more open. NVhilc dcfcnding
Stalin, China becam e criticize Soviet policy
tow ard building Socialism through focusing on

on D eccm ber 8, 1955. D cng Xiaopm g \vas the
opinion that V ietnam had to prepare for a
prolonged war o f 10 or 20 years[3].
In general, in thc period from 1954-1963,
China
w ieldcd
cnorm ous
intluence
on
Vietnam csc dom estic issues. Following this
stralegy, Beijing tricđ to convince the Norlh
Vietnam to acccpt a dcfinitive division o f
Vietnani by advising it to consolidate thc
revolutionary achicvcm cnts in the North[6].
Unlike Chm a. thc Soviet Union recognized
the role o f Victnam csc rcvolution rather late in
its global stratcgy. Even aftcr 1954. Soviet aid
to Vietnam was far behind that o f China[7]. In
order to help Victnam to carry out the íìrst five
vear plan (1961-1965) Soviet Union provided
Vietnam a rcnt o f 430 million rubles with
íavorable conditions and anothcr 350 million
rubles to cultivate Iropical trees in agricultural,
state-run farms. In addition, a grant o f 20
m illion rublc was providcd for combating
m alaria[8]. Until 1964, with assistance o f
Soviet Union about 90 important projects were
renovatcd or ncw built up. Among these there
were projccts in thc íiclds o f hydroelectricity,
m ining, m cchanics, chcm istry, light industry,

intem ational affairs and after thc visit o f Liu
Shaoqi in M ay 1963. Although thc Vietnam
W orkers Parly recognized the conílict betvveen
the Soviet U nion and C hina early on, It w as too
late in expressing its attitudes about the
problem . On Fcbruary 12, 1963, thrce years
after the conílict had opened, the polilburo o f
the V ietnam ’s W orker Party callcd the íratem al
parties to stop attacks against each other in the
m ass m cdia, and called for a m ecúng to solve
the disunity w ithin the w orld’s com m unist and
w orkers m ovem ent. T he silcnce o f thc
V ietnam ’s W orkers Party can be explained by
its w ish to w in thc support from both sides for
its o\vn struggle against thc
How ever,
silence was not alw ays the bcst policy. The late
reaction o f the V ictnam ’s W orker Party made
both sides unhappy, especially C hina, and vvas
criticized by Icadcrs o f other socialist
c o u n tn es|9 ].
M oreovcr “the politics o f
neutrality exacted a high pricc on H anoi’s war
eíĩort. [10].

us.

In M ay 1963, President Liu Shaoqi decidcd
to pay an o íĩicial visit to Victnam. The niain
objective o f this visit w as to discuss with the

w as
a
vvidc
dissem ination
o f falsification
to sprcad
suspicions about the country o f Lenin, to stir
bad sentim ent tow ard thc country o f Lenin.”
The letter concludcd: “ Rightly wc believe that
íriendship
m ust
bc
rcciprocated
with
fhendship.” [8].
In short, thc trianglc V ictnam -Soviet-U nion
relations werc vcry com plicated and covered by
intem ational, rcgional and intem al íactors. This
relation also reĩlcctcd the split in relationship
betvvecn Soviet U nion and China. B oth o f them
tricd to have morc inllucnces on V ietnam , and
used this for their purposes.

3. T h e trỉa n g lc in th e p crio d o f 1964-1968
The ycar o f 1964 w as a tum ing point in the
triangle rclations bctw ecn V ielnam -Soviet
Union-China. There wcrc som e reasons to
explain this change. F irsty in O ctober 1964,
K hrushchev w as rcm ovcd from the position o f
the First Secrctary o f thc C PSV by Leonid

placc in 1956 after the 20lh C ongress o f the
Sovict Com m unisl Parly. Through its support to
Victnam, thc Chincsc leadcrship tricd to shovv
that China was the country that could provide
Vietnam with suíĩìcient support for its national
libcration movcmcnt, and that C hina w as a Irue
com m um st country. in com parison to Soviet
Union. Fourth, C hina’s support to Victnam can
also bc cxplained through its desire to play a
lcading
rolc
in
hclping
rcvolutionary
m ovements in thc third vvorld. In sum , through
support to Vietnam, C h in a’s leadcrship tried to
achicvc both intcrnational and dom cstic goals.
As part o f this proccss, during A ugust 1964,
China cam cd out changcs to its military
presencc in thc South o f China, such as the
redcploymcnt o f its air forcc and anti-craft
artillcry, as well as thc construction o f new
airportsỊ 14]. In political and social life, there
was a trcm cndous movemcnt know n as “ Resist
Am erica and Assist Vietnam " which was
organizcd throughout thc country w ith the
parlicipation o f morc than 20 m ilhon people(2).
In latc 1964 and carly 1965, China even madc
clear that it was rcady to scnd its arm y to fight
together with thc Victnamcse pcople, and that it

o f the visit w as m ultidim cnsional. Firsty the
Soviet U nion w anted to makc clcar its eíĩorts to
đcfend lỉan o i from A m erican air attacks by
eqưipping ihe DRV with anti-aircraíì vveapons.
Second, thc Soviet U nion vvanted to c m p h a s iz e
its position in Southeast Asia. Third, the Soviet
Union intcnded to w am Victnam not to
undcrestim atc
the
us
plans
regarding
com m unism in Asia. L ast bui not ỉeast, the
Soviet U nion planned to comc to an agrcement
with Chincse lcadcrship on thc Vietnam W ar,
taking into account K osygin’s two visits to
Beijing[16].
D uring this pcriod, Sovict Union vvas
intcndcd for V ictnam a strong politica! support.
On May 8, 1965, thc First Sccretary Leonid
Brezhncv stated: “T o support Victnam in the
strugglc against aggrcssion o f American
impcrialism is an honorahlc cause, and vital


P.Q M inh / VN U Ịournal o f Science, Soàal Sciences and Humanities Humanities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36

31

intcrest o f all people deíending íreedom and

departure to V ictnam o f those Soviet citizens
who expressed their w ish in accordance with
the feelings o f intem ational proletarian spirit to
struggle for the ju st cause o f Vietnamese
people, for defense o f socialist achievcm ents o f
the DRV ” [17]

In term o f economy, like during the
previous period, Soviet support continued
playing an important role. In February 1965,
Soviet Union decided to defer Vietnam ese
debts.
A fter the visit o f K osygin, S oviet aid to
Vietnam increased every year. Hovvever,
Moscovv (lid not want to risk its relations with
the u s and the W est. As a result, M oscow ’s
foreign policy was in a dilem m a. O n the one
hand, the Soviet Union had to show its
intemational prolctarianism to its V ietnam ese
fricnds. On the other hand, it did not like to
block its com m unication w ith the W est. In
addition, the m eeting vvith C hina did n o t bring
positive results. China rcíused to coordinate
support to V ietnam . All these factors gave an
im p r e s s io n that the Soviet U nion, despite its
statement to support V ietnam , still tried to
avoid involvem ent in the V ietnam c o n ílict and
to cooperate w ith the u s in m aking a political
settlement.
From M arch 1965 on, due to the escalation

coĩnm unist and national liberation movements.
Soviet aid to V ielnam grew steadily from
1965 to 1968. By 1967 total socialist-country
aid to the DRV accounted for about 1.5 billion


32

p Q. M inh / V N U Ịournnì o f Science, Sociaỉ Sciences and Humanities 25, No.5E (2(X)9) 24-36

rubles (more than 1.5 billion USD), among
vvhich M oscow ’s share was 36.8 percent (608
million USD). By the cnd o f 1967, Soviet
supporl grcw to 50 pcrccnt o f total socialistcountry aid. Among this, m ilitary aid comprised
two-thirds o f all Soviet assistance, and
accounted for 396.7 m illion USD in 1968. In
addition in Septem bcr 1965 thcrc vvcrc betwecn
1,500 to 2,500 Sovict m ilitary pcrsonnel
serving in V ietnam . T hey w ere m ostly
tcchmcians, pilots and SAM opcrators. In
addition thcrc vvas a spccial group rcsponsible
for obtainm g sam plcs o f American vveapons to
lcam about up-to-datc u s arm s[7]. In 1968, the
Soviet Union took ovcr thc top position in
supporting Vietnam from China. HoNvever, it
was a bitter m om ent for the Soviet Union,
according to one rcport from thc Soviet
em bassy in H anoi, as the Sovict U nioi^s
ìníluence in Vietnam did not grow accordingly
\vith their support.

by China[8].
In the context o f the dccp split bctvvecn
Soviet U nion and China, the atm osphcre o f the
triangle relationship was charactcrized by
distrust. Both China and Sovict U nion vvere
w orried about thc position o f Vietnam.
A lthough Soviet Union providcd V ietnam with
hea\ 7 support during this period, it w as still
w o m cd that V ictnam vvould m o ve from thc
Sovict side to Chincse onc. T he S ovict Union
was o f thc opinion that V ietnam w as biascd
tow ards
C hina.
During
high
ranking
ncgotiations in A ugust 1966, the Sovict Union
did not hesitate to raise questions regarding
vvhat C hina had advised V ictnam to do, and
w hat V ietnam had agreed w ith C hina. Sovict
Union also suspected that V ietnam w as too
depcndcnt on C hincse International policy, and
that V ietnam had scparatc talks w ith C h im to
oppose ihc Sovict Union. M orc over, according
to the Soviet U nion, V ictnam had treatcd Soviet
specialists coolly, prevented V ietnam esc pcoplc
from contacting thc specialists, and limited thcir
travel. V ictnam did not allow Sovict spccialists,
but rathcr C hinese ones to visit a missilc basc
that had bcen built by thc Soviet U nion. Also,

were ihc supporters ol'V ietnam , ncither o f them
vvas satisiìed w ith thcir V ietnam esc íriends. In
order to placate thc C hinese as wcll as to lieter
thc Sovicts, Vietnam dccided to arrest a group
o f high ranking officials supposed to be proSoviet in 1967. T hcy wcrc accused for treason,
espionage and transm itting State secrets [10].
This campaign w as kno\vn as the “ Revisionist
Anti-Party AíTair.” The arrcsts o f these persons
ihow ed on the one hand that the V ietnam ’s
VVorkers Party w ould not fall into the sphere o f
iníluence o f M oscow , w hile on the other hand
affirming V ictnam ’s continued policy o f
neutrality in thc Sino-Soviet split.

4. The Triangle in thc last pcriod of the war
(1968 1973)
The year o f 1968 w as tum ing point in the
Vietnam W ar. Inilucnccd by thc T et offensive
n January 1968, on O ctobcr 3 1 ,1 9 6 8 President
íohnson ordcrcd thc ccssation o f bom bing in
sỉorth Vietnam [18].

33

During this pcriod, Soviet Union continued
assisting Victnam to íìght America on the one
hand, and tried to play a rolc o f m cdiator in
V ietnam -USA negotiation. In doing so, Soviet
Union from the bcginning tried to persuade
Vietnam to acccpt thc "low conditions” raised

Union also tricd lo persuadc Vietnam to accept
Soviet proposal. At thc beginning o f 1968,
Soviet U nion proposcd to m eet in Moscovv or in
W arsaw. In April 1968, Sovict Union advised
Prem ier M inister Pham V an Dong during his
visit to Moscovv that N orth Victnam and
A m erica could m eet on a Soviet m ilitary ship.


P.Q. Minh / VN U Ịournal of Science, Social Sciences and Humanities 25, No.5E (2009) 24-36

34

In May 1968 the Soviet Union proposed that
North Vietnam and America to meet at the
Soviet Embassy in Paris. On June 13, 1968 the
Central Com m ittee o f CPSU sent to Central
C om m ittee o f VW P a letter in w hich contained
"packagc solutions.” On O ctobcr 19, 1968
Soviet Union again asked that Vietnam to
inform the Soviet Union o f V ietnam ese opinion
on the proposal. On October 25, 1968, Soviet
Union even prepared a draft o f statement
betwcen Vielnam and America on issue o f
stopping
the
negotiations[8].

bom bing


the meeting vvith Prcm icr M inister Pham Van
Dong on June 3, 1966 Brezhnev said: “There
arc two ways to libcratc thc South: m ilitarily
and by negotiations. If vve uscd the first way,
wc do not have cnough forces. A m erica can
increase solders and easily provide assistance,
while m ilitary forces o f N LF are m ostly from
North"[8].
Secotưỉ, Soviet U nion w anteđ to avoid
direct, face-to-face talks with Am erica. O n May
4, 1966, A m bassador Tscherbakov said to
Pham Van Dong: “W e do not like the situation

o f having direct face-to-face ncgotiations with
Am erica.”
Third, Sovict Union w anted to use V ietnam
contlict to havc déíeníe vvith A m erica to serve
Soviet strategy. In the first official statcm ent on
Novem ber 6, 1964, B rczhnev said: “ Soviet
Union is ready to dcvelop Soviet-U S relations
for thc interest o f thc two pcoplcs and for the
ìnterest o f C o n s o l i d a t e d peace” . From M arch to
M ay 1965, Soviet security íorces supprcssed
dem onstrations against A m erican aggression
organizcd by V ictnam csc studcnts in Moscovv
and Leningrad[8].
Fourth, aftcr the Tct offensive, President
Nixon decidcd lo follow the V ictnam ization
strategy, announccd on July 25, 1969.
According to this strategy, USA changed its

P.Q. Minh / VNU Ịournaỉ o f Science, Sociaỉ Sciences and Humanities tìum anities 25, No.5E (20()9) 24-36

support people o f Indochina and Vietnam
depends on relations between Soviet Union and
China, and on the [resolution o f the] split
betvveen two countries.” [8]. In addition, on
March 16, 1971 Chinese M inister o f Foreign
AíTairs stated: “ Soviet U nion and China ha ve a
principle
disagreement
about
American
attitudes; thcreíore China cannot act togethcr
vvith Sovict U nion.”[8].
The tuming point in the triangle happened
in 1971, as China started looking for a
rapprochem ent vvith the u s through “ ping pong
diplom acy” in April, and H enry K issinger paid
a visit to China in July o f the sam e year.
Responding to this dcvelopm ent, the People
Newspaper - an organ o f VietnarrTs W orker
Party- published an article w ith the title “The
N ix o n

d o c trin c

vvill

be


hat us vvould like, through Peking, to
;onsolidate its position in Indochina. Thereíbre
hc visil o f Prcsident Nixon to B eying? w as a

35

reaction o f the Soviet U nion’s protest o f the
rapprochem ent betw een us and China. The
C hinese íactor was in fact catalysis for SovietVietnam, and Soviet-ƯS relations dunng this
period.

5 . C o n c lu s io n s

The
developm ent
o f the
tnangular
relationship am ong V ietnam , China, and the
Soviet Union during the Vietnam W ar was a
classic exam ple o f C old W ar politics. In this
game, all o f them tried to win over the other
with different m eans and m ethods to further
thcir own interests.
In the context o f the C old W ar, where in
this case the game was being played on
Vietnam ese territory, the V W P was in an
uncom íortable situation. For the Party, the most
important
task
w as

36

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th c cu rĩc n t d isu m ty problcm , F o n d N o 82, Unit
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G . (c d .), Vietnam: The Dẹfìnitive
Documcntation o f ỉỉu m a n Decisioỉis f Vo!.II,