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ISSN: 2040-9826
Vietnam
Shipping
Report Q4 2009
Business Monitor International
Mermaid House,
2 Puddle Dock,
London, EC4V 3DS,
UK
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7248 0468
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7248 0467
Email:
Web:


Part of BMI's Industry Report & Forecasts Series
Published by: Business Monitor International
Publication Date: October 2009

Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009
© Business Monitor International Ltd Page 2

Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009
© Business Monitor International Ltd Page 3

CONTENTS
Executive Summary .........................................................................................................................................5

SWOT Analysis.................................................................................................................................................6

Vietnam Shipping SWOT........................................................................................................................................................................................ 6

Vietnam Political SWOT........................................................................................................................................................................................ 7

Vietnam Economic SWOT...................................................................................................................................................................................... 8

Vietnam Business Environment SWOT................................................................................................................................................................... 9


Industry Forecast ...........................................................................................................................................29

Table: Major Port Data....................................................................................................................................................................................... 30

Table: Trade Overview ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 31

Table: Key Trade Indicators................................................................................................................................................................................ 31

Table: Main Import Partners............................................................................................................................................................................... 32

Table: Main Export Partners............................................................................................................................................................................... 33

Company Profiles...........................................................................................................................................34

Maersk Line ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 34

Mediterranean Shipping Company ...................................................................................................................................................................... 40

CMA CGM........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 45

Evergreen Line Overview .................................................................................................................................................................................... 50

China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO)........................................................................................................................................... 55

Hapag-Lloyd........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 60

Neptune Orient Lines (& APL) ............................................................................................................................................................................ 64

China Shipping (CSCL) ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 70


container throughput set to decline by 4.76%.
As 2009 draws to a close, BMI answers the question of what is next for the Vietnamese shipping sector.
We predict that a steady recovery in the country's ports throughput will begin in 2010. This is based upon
the fact that our Country Risk desk is forecasting Vietnam's total trade to increase by 4.56% in 2010.
Using the Saigon New Port as an example, BMI predicts that tonnage throughput at the port will grow by
5.73%, while container volumes will increase by 5.31% in 2010. This estimate will see the port handling
a total of 20.2mn tonnes and 2.024mn TEUs in 2010.
We have also calculated expected throughput volumes at the port for the rest of the mid term (2011-
2013). For the country's main ports we predict average yearly changes in the total tonnage throughput and
container volumes for the period. This allows us to predict whether or not these changes will enable the
ports to reclaim their pre-downturn levels of tonnage throughput and to reverse ports' 2009 container
decline during our forecast period.
Vietnam's port recovery is reliant on a revival in Vietnam's trade volumes. For the whole of 2009 BMI
expects Vietnam's imports to decline by 15% and its exports to fall by 13%. A gradual recovery is
forecast to begin in 2010, with total trade forecast to grow by 4.56%. Also in this report, BMI predicts
average yearly change in the country's total trade over the rest of the mid term (2011-2013).
BMI does not expect the country's current main trade partners of China, Japan, the US, Singapore, South
Korea, Thailand, Australia and Germany to change dramatically over the mid term.
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009
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SWOT Analysis
Vietnam Shipping SWOT

Strengths
 A recovery from the 2009 downturn in throughput volumes at the nation's ports is
expected to begin in 2010, with one of country's main ports, the port of Ho Chi Minh

Strengths
 The Communist Party government appears committed to market-oriented reforms
necessary to double 2000's GDP per capita by 2010, as targeted. The one-party
system is generally conducive to short-term political stability.
 Relations with the US are generally improving, and Washington sees Hanoi as a
potential geopolitical ally in South East Asia.

Weaknesses
 Corruption among government officials poses a major threat to the legitimacy of the
ruling Communist Party.
 There is increasing (albeit still limited) public dissatisfaction with the leadership's
tight control over political dissent.

Opportunities
 The government recognises the threat that corruption poses to its legitimacy, and
has acted to clamp down on graft among party officials.
 Vietnam has allowed legislators to become more vocal in criticising government
policies. This is opening up opportunities for more checks and balances within the
one-party system.

Threats
 The sharp slowdown in growth expected in 2009 is likely to weigh on public
acceptance of the one-party system, and street demonstrations to protest economic
conditions could easily develop into a full-on challenge of undemocractic rule.
 Although strong domestic control will ensure little change to Vietnam's political
scene in the next few years, over the longer term, the one-party-state will probably
be unsustainable.
 Relations with China have deteriorated over the past year due to Beijing's more
assertive stance over disputed islands in the South China Sea and domestic
criticism of a large Chinese investment into a bauxite mining project in the central

liberalising the banking sector.
 Urbanisation will continue to be a long-term growth driver. The UN forecasts the
urban population to rise from 29% of the population to more than 50% by the early
2040s.

Threats
 Inflation and deficit concerns have caused some investors to re-assess their
hitherto upbeat view of Vietnam. If the government focuses too much on stimulating
growth and fails to root out inflationary pressure, it risks prolonging macroeconomic
instability, which could lead to a potential crisis.
 Prolonged macroeconomic instability could prompt the authorities to put reforms on
hold, as they struggle to stabilise the economy.
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009
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Strengths
 Vietnam has a large, skilled and low-cost workforce, that has made the country
attractive to foreign investors.
 Vietnam's location - its proximity to China and South East Asia, and its good sea
links - makes it a good base for foreign companies to export to the rest of Asia, and
beyond.


For the Q409 shipping reports BMI's shipping desk set out to answer the most pressing questions for
companies and individuals involved in the box shipping market. These questions are as follows: Just how
bad will 2009 turn out to be? Are the rate hikes going to work? Will there be container shipping line
failures? What's in store for 2010?
Just How Bad Will 2009 Turn Out To Be?
2009 is expected to witness the worst contraction in trade since the Second World War, with the World
Trade Organisation predicting a decline of approximately 9% for the year. The organisation's economists
are forecasting the contraction to hit the developed world hardest with exports predicted to fall by as
much as 10%. Exports in developing countries are expected to decrease by 2-3%. BMI offers an
overview of the indicators that our in-house shipping desk uses to analyse the container market.
The main bellwether economies of the container shipping sector are China, the US and Europe. China is
the major global producer of manufactured goods such as clothes, footwear, toys and electronic
equipment, which are all shipped via container from China's east-coast ports. The US and Europe are the
main markets for these products, and so are the major destinations for container ships.
To gauge the supply side of the global shipping sector, BMI uses one of its in-house indicators to assess
the current atmosphere. BMI's quarterly textile report forecasts that the export growth of Chinese textiles
and clothes will slow in 2009 to just 7.5%, compared with the sector's 2008 year-on-year (y-o-y) increase
of 20.1%. We forecast that this sector's growth projections will begin to recover in 2010, with a y-o-y
increase of 14.5% estimated. This 2009 decline in export growth will have a negative effect on the global
shipping sector as fewer exports will require fewer ships.
The effect of this decrease in the export of textiles and clothing, as well as other manufactured goods, can
be seen by the decrease in throughput at China's major ports. The South China Morning Post reports that
volumes handled at China's major mainland ports have been declining, with the port of Shanghai's
operator, the Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG), reporting a container throughput fall of 17.8%
in June 2009 y-o-y. This fall shows a deepening trend of decline, as it is steeper than May 2009's 12.4%
decrease.
This decline in China's export of manufactured goods has been brought on by the lack of demand from
the country's major customer, the US. The US economy is in recession, with job losses and a weakened
real estate market. The knock-on effect has been the reduction of the country's buying power, or at least a
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009

Q109 show that Asia-Europe trade volumes fell 22% y-o-y. A decline of 25% was recorded for April
2009 (last available data).
Are The Rate Hikes Going To Work?
The 14 members of the Transpacific Stabilisation Agreement (TSA) announced in July 2009 that they
planned to go ahead with the second phase of their rate fight-back by increasing freight rates on 40-foot
equivalent units (FEUs) by US$500. This announcement followed news from Drewry Shipping
Consultants that the average rate for a Hong Kong to Los Angeles sailing has fallen to US$900 per FEU,
compared with a rate of US$2,000 in the same period in 2008. The decision to place a floor on freight
rates could see shipping-line contracts with shippers negotiated two months on (May 2000) from when
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009
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they were first agreed, if original contracts do not provide some form of interim rate adjustment. The
reason for the TSA's decision to increase rates is, according to the association, down to the fact that 'if
current rates were extended over 12 months, it is likely that the trade will encounter significant financial
challenges as well as basic service sustainability issues going forward'. TSA members have also stated
that they will implement a quarterly bunker charge and that they may add a peak-season surcharge if the
market strengthens.
BMI notes that the TSA initiated its rate-hike plan in March 2009, calling a halt to the decline in rates
that had prevailed on Asia-US routes since Q408. The TSA's first step was to end reduced short-term/spot
rates by the end of June 2009. We note that the very nature of the TSA should guarantee a certain amount
of success as the rate hike has been agreed upon and so will be adhered to by the TSA's 14 members,
which are the major players in the Asia-US container shipping sector (Maersk Line and MOL being the
most obvious absentees). BMI notes, however, that reports following the TSA's rate increase
announcement cast doubt on the price hike's success. Lloyd's List quoted NOL as stating that 'the TSA
regularly issues guidelines on freight rates and other issues. However, individual carriers have a
mandatory right of independent action over whether or not to adhere to these guidelines'. NOL cast

2009. BMI believes that like fellow liner conference association the TSA, the AADA hike will only be
successful if all its members adhere to it.
Will There Be Container Shipping Line Failures?
Yes, and they have already started. Drewry Shipping Consultants believe that 'the basic make-up of the
industry will change as companies either go bust, amalgamate or shrink, shedding assets and personnel in
the process'. Maersk Line's CEO, Eivind Kolding, appears to be of the same view, stating in an interview
with the Financial Times Deutshland that he believes that some lines would not survive beyond 2010.
A company's ability to survive the downturn depends on the company's financial health and its strategy
for weathering the downturn. It is difficult to assess a company's financial health, but a firm's downturn
strategy is more easily accessible and so offers an insight into how the company is handling the drop in
trade volumes.
BMI's shipping desk has noted the raft of cost-saving initiatives that the major container lines have so far
launched in our Q3 Container Shipping Overview. A number of the main box lines announced how much
they plan to save in 2009 and also how they plan to do it. The main strategies that we have noted so far
are rate hikes (which we have covered in a separate question), personal layoffs, service-sharing
agreements, idling vessels, deferring newbuilds, and scrapping. BMI offers an up-to-date, in-depth
overview of each of the top 10 liner companies' strategies in the Company Profile section of its shipping
report, and in the Q4 Container Overview will offer a more general global view of the differing strategies.
The popularity of route-sharing agreements has increased over 2009 as lines join up with their
competitors in a bid to stay active in as many regions as possible and so cater to their clients' needs and at
the same time decrease the number of vessels they have running, to save on operating costs. The most
prolific route sharing route is Asia-Europe. BMI notes that the most recent route-sharing pacts for Asia-
Europe services took place in June 2009, with Taiwan's Evergreen Line and the China Shipping
Container Line linking up and the Shipping Corporation of India and the Mediterranean Shipping
Company also uniting.
Laying up vessels has been a common strategy in 2009, as a way of decreasing overcapacity. Major lines
including Maersk Line, CMA CGM, K-Line and CSCL have all deployed this tactic. According to the
latest reports, the global shipping fleet that is currently idled stands at 9%. Of the global containership
fleet, 564 vessels, approximately 11.4% of the total fleet, is laid up. The most popular areas for container
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009

overcapacity. During the boom years box lines built up their fleet to cater for the growing demand; they
have now been left with surplus vessels as trade volumes have plummeted. Companies that are struggling,
refusing to decrease their current fleet size and refusing to adjust their newbuild plans are the companies
that are more likely to end up on shipping analysts' watchlists. BMI asserts that now is not the time to be
concentrating on competing with peers over the size of fleets. An example of how such a strategy can
land a company in dire straits is Zim Integrated Shipping Services. The company had complied a
considerable order book in a bid to increase its fleet size and move up the ratings table. The company has
so far had to cancel six of its newbuild vessels. Even with the cancelling, Zim's newbuild order book is
still considerable, and according to AXS Alphaliner, ranks as the sixth largest in the Paris-based
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009
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consultancy's top 100 box line league despite being placed 18th in terms of current fleet size. Zim,
therefore, is one company that overstretched itself and came close to being in dire straits.
BMI believes that the likely downturn casualty candidates in the box shipping community are those
working in niche sectors, which might struggle to diversify. These companies will be reliant on being
rescued either by their respective governments or by financial institutions. The most recent case of this is
Iceland's Eimship, which looks set to be saved from failure with the sale of the company to its creditors.
The Eimskip brand will be re-launched as New Eimskip and will be majority owned by the Icelandic
Bank Landsbanki and the US investment group Yucaipa.
BMI doubts that any of the top 10 container lines will fail as they will have easier access to finance.
Having said that, one major line has so far gone bust in 2009. In February 2009 Senator Lines, the
German subsidiary of South Korea's Hanjin Shipping went under. At the time BMI noted that the
severity of crisis the container sector faced in 2009 could be seen from the fact that a major shipping line
(Hanjin) had been unable to step in and help its struggling subsidiary. BMI notes that two other major
box lines have also had close shaves in 2009. In May 2009 Chilean shipping company CSAV faced an
uncertain future until it agreed a financing programme with its German owners. A similar fate was faced

succession over a period of weeks. We expect this volatility to continue in Q409 as the demand and
supply of raw materials fluctuates in line with a slow and hesitant global recovery. We caution that there
remains a risk of a further marked decline in the Baltic Dry Index as Chinese demand for commodities
slows and other major import nations struggle to fill the gap in demand.
BMI highlights some of the key concerns facing dry bulk operators over the rest of 2009.
China's Commodity Boom Drives the Market, But For How Long?
Strong Chinese demand for dry bulk shipments has kept the sector afloat over the past few months with
total iron imports rising by 29% year-on-year during H109, closely followed by other major seaborne
commodities such as coal, copper, aluminum and soybeans.
We see increasing levels of Chinese demand as a core long-term trend as China's economic development
recovers from its 2009 blip and construction and industrial growth drive steel production. The majority of
this demand will be met with iron ore from overseas sellers since China's own iron ore mining sector is
highly fragmented and is reportedly far less cost effective than Brazilian, Australian and Indian mines,
leading The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to forecast a 'severe' fall
in Chinese iron ore production in the next few years. Evidence of this long-term trend has been seen in a
spate of long-term supply contracts signed over the past few months by producers and major bulk
shipping lines including Mercator Lines, Mitsui OSK (MOL) and NYK.
The short-term outlook, however, may be different, and most observers are predicting a marked drop in
iron ore shipments to China in H209. There are several factors behind this forecast, the most obvious of
which is price. Much of China's incessant import drive has been the result of traders and speculators
taking advantage of a sharp drop in spot ore prices by stockpiling the commodity and waiting for prices to
rise before offloading into the market. Spot prices have risen sharply in the past few months from a low of
just US$62.5 in April to approaching US$100 at the time of writing.
As much as 100mn tonnes of iron ore stock has been built up at Chinese ports, according to China Daily,
which cites the vice-general manager of Rizhao Port, Zang Dongsheng. China's Iron and Steel
Association has warned that the country's iron ore imports in H109 were excessive, greatly surpassing the
needs of the country's steel industry. According to Dongsheng, current stockpiles are equivalent to three
months' supply, suggesting that import demand will reduce, at least in the short-term.
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009


global steel producer, after China and the US, with 9% of world output in 2008, and a major destination
for raw material shipments, accounting for 23% of global coal imports in 2005.
However, the picture from the US, another key driver of dry bulk shipments, is not quite so promising.
The US is a major importer of steel products, which account for 19% of global seaborne dry bulk cargo,
however, imports have fallen sharply since the start of the downturn on weak demand for homes and
vehicles. Despite encouraging signs of a recovery from some sectors of the economy, steel shipments
were showing no sign of a recovery in June when, at the time of writing, the latest figures were released,
falling by 18% m-o-m and 69% y-o-y. In South Korea too, commodity import demand has remained
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009
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weak as the country's steel industry shows little sign of a recovery with output falling by about 6% m-o-m
in June.
When taken as a whole, we caution that a more concrete recovery from major industrial nations is needed
for the effect of China's falling import volumes to be nullified.
Is Overcapacity Still A Threat?
H109's rise in demand for dry bulk shipments, coupled with severe congestion at major export terminals
in Brazil and Australia, did much to reduce the number of inactive bulkers in circulation. The percentage
of vessels placed in lay-up is estimated to have fallen from a peak of about 8% at the trough of the market
in late 2008 to around 5% at the time of writing. We caution that the current wave of optimism sweeping
through the dry bulk sector may ultimately prove to be detrimental in the longer term, however, as instead
of scrapping older vessels and holding back on new orders, ship-owners find themselves in a position to
take advantage of the current spate of high demand.
A report by Drewry Shipping Consultants, cited by Hellenic Shipping News, shows that the rate of
scrapings within the dry bulk sector has slowed significantly as shipments have risen in recent weeks.
According to Drewry, just 269,000dwt of bulk vessels was recycled in June, down from 1.2mn dwt in
May. Part of the reason for this, they explain, is that older vessels aged over 25 years are being

MOL, the world's largest iron ore carrier, appears to be bucking the industry trend of reducing
expenditure during the downturn, boldly announcing plans for a major company acquisition in 2009.
While no details were presented, senior managing director, Kenichi Yonetani, indicated that the company
was willing to spend 'several tens of billions of yen' buying a smaller company.
Meanwhile In June and July MOL, along with major rivals NYK and Mercator Lines, signed long-term
contracts of affreightments with iron ore miners Rio Tinto and Vale for regular iron ore shipments to
China. Such is the projected demand for the commodity from China over the long term that an increasing
number of companies in the mining sector have taken the additional step of developing their own
shipping fleets in order to curb reliance on third parties altogether. Vale itself has a US$2bn newbuild
programme in place and received its ninth very large ore carrier (VLOC) of the year in July 2009. The
company plans a fleet of 14 newbuild vessels. While the company awaits its newbuilds, Vale is
purchasing a second-hand fleet, buying a Capesize vessel from OceanFreight earlier in July 2009. Indian
steel producer Vizag Steel is also developing its own fleet. VinaMaso reports that, according to unnamed
sources, Vizag aims to acquire three-four 170,000 dead weight tonne (dwt) Capesize vessels on the
second-hand market. This strategy would see the company move away from relying on Indian chartering
agency Transchart.
Predicting The Bulk Market's Next Direction
Predicting the exact movements of the dry bulk shipping sector has proved a difficult and often fruitless
task. However, most observers, BMI's shipping desk included, agree that the market faces continued
volatility over the remainder of 2009 as supply and demand balances take time to readjust to reduced
Chinese demand and a gradual recovery in global industrial activity. Other factors such as rising fleet
capacity and reduced vessel scrapping may also threaten to derail what is still a vulnerable market in the
early stages of recovery. What is for certain is that the dry bulk market in 2009 is unlikely to scale the
heights witnessed in H108 when the global commodity boom drove rates to record levels. Most operators
will be setting their sights on a slow, sustained recovery, which will continue into 2010 as the world
fights its way out of the economic downturn.
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009

decline on average by 2.5mn barrels per day in 2009.
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009
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While much has been said about the beginning of a global economic recovery in recent weeks, western
demand for crude is still forecast to remain below pre-downturn levels in 2009, and BMI expects OECD
demand to decrease by 2.8% over the year as a whole.
Much of this weakness is due to the still weak state of the US economy, and BMI's oil and gas desk
expects US crude oil demand to fall by 3.2% over the year as a whole. Cyclical demand drivers appear to
have had little effect on demand. Data released by The American Petroleum Institute (API) for the week
ending July 17 showed a rise in US crude oil inventories for the first time since April, increasing by
around 0.9% at a time when stockpiles are normally driven down by rising consumer demand over the
summer 'driving period'. Meanwhile, the outlook for the US trucking industry - another key driver of
global crue oil and petroleum demand - continues to look precarious. The American Trucking
Association's (ATA) Truck Tonnage Index fell by 2.4% m-o-m in June on a seasonally adjusted basis,
after rising by 3.2% in May. As US unemployment continues to rise, consumers are still cautious in their
spending on petrol and other oil products, and we expect little or no improvement in demand levels
during the remainder of 2009.
Meanwhile, the major source of a rise in global demand for crude oil shipments is likely be the world's
second largest crude oil consumer, China, which accounts for roughly 6% of global consumption.
Following poor Q109 growth, the Asian powerhouse has since shown increasing signs of accelerating
economic activity and indications of a recovery in China's manufacturing and industrial sectors led to
strong oil import growth in Q209 as crude imports for June rose by 14% y-o-y at 16.6bn barrels. We
expect this to continue in Q409 and into 2010 as China's economy regains momentum.
Oil Supply Cuts
An ongoing threat to tanker operators will be ongoing supply cuts by OPEC member states that together
control a dominant share of the crude oil market, including 40% of global supply and 59% of the output

gasoline. One particular incidence hit the headlines in June when US investment bank JP Morgan was
reported to have chartered a newbuild very large crude carrier (VLCC) to store refined gasoil off the coast
of Malta in a short-term 'opportunity-driven' venture. Brokers cited by Hellenic Shipping News said the
vessel, named the Front Queen, was hired at a cost of between US$35,000 and US$41,000 a day - low
enough to allow for a profit for the onward sale of the product at a higher price. In storing refined fuel
rather than crude oil there may still be money to be made from delivering ready fuel straight into
circulation without the need for refinery costs. The practise of storing distilled oil products is usually
prohibited by the fact that tankers are contaminated from previous crude oil storage; however, in JP
Morgan's case Front Queen was reported to be a new, 'clean' vessel that would not affect the quality of
the fuel.
Overcapacity Still A Concern
Nevertheless, excess capacity continues to be one of the major concerns facing tanker owners in the short-
to mid term, with tanker owners having displayed the same trend for over-ordering at the peak of the
market as operators in the dry bulk and container market. The global tanker fleet is estimated to have
expanded in size by approximately 6% y-o-y between 2005 and 2008 and Clarkson Shipbrokers are
forecasting a fleet growth of 8.9% in 2009. Nevertheless, BMI expects the impact of newbuild deliveries
to be less severe for the tanker sector than either the dry bulk or container sector. Firstly, the number of
idled tankers is currently significantly fewer than dry bulk carriers or containerships - research from
Lloyd's Maritime Intelligence Service estimates that approximately 3.8% of the crude oil tankers above
10,000dwt are currently inactive, compared with 9% of the total merchant shipping fleet.
Another key mitigating factor against the growing threat of overcapacity may be the projected increase in
the rate of vessel scrapping. Regulation passed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
requires tanker operators from member states to withdraw single-hulled carriers from operation by the
end of 2010, while vessels constructed with a double bottom and single sides are permitted to continue
Vietnam Shipping Report Q4 2009
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Market Overview
Saigon New Port
Overview
Saigon New Port (SNP) is a modern port facility established in the 1960s to provide additional capacity to
the existing Port of Saigon. The port has expanded to become the largest port facility in South Vietnam,
accounting for more than 65% of port throughput in the Ho Chi Minh City area, and 42% of throughput in
Vietnam as a whole.
The port consists of three cargo terminals, as well as depot and customs points, situated at different
locations within the Mekong Delta area in the south-east part of Vietnam within an area measuring 60km
in circumference.
The port is operated by Saigon Newport Company (SNC).
Shipping
The port has limited deep-water berthing facilities as it is an inland port, not directly on the coast. The
ship-handling capabilities of the port vary between the various terminals. Tan Cang-Cat Lai terminal has
a berthing depth of 12m, allowing it to accommodate the Panamax series of vessels, while Tan Cang
terminal has a berthing depth of 11m. The newly constructed Tan Cang-Cai Mep terminal is Vietnam's
first deep-water container port facility, offering a berthing depth of 12.2m, and is able to accommodate
vessels with a maximum capacity of 80,000dwt. Tan Cang-Cai Mep offers the only direct container
services between Vietnam and North America, and features as a port of call on APL, MOL and Hanjin
Shipping's Asia-US routes.
Congestion
There have been recent reports of severe congestion and delays on waterways within the Ho Chi Minh
City metropolitan area, according to Cargo Systems, where the Tan Cang and Tan Cang-Cat Lai terminals
are located. Ships entering and leaving the port must compete for space with vessels heading to the Port
of Saigon as well as a number of smaller domestic ports. According to Reuters, Ho Chi Minh City