EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Country Strategy Paper
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
2007-2013
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Table of Contents
1 THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SITUATION……………………. 7
1.1 Analysis of the political situation 7
2.2 Analysis of the economic situation including trade and social indicators 7
2.3. Analysis of the social situation………………………………………… …….9
2.4. Analysis of the environmental situation……………………………………… 9
ANNEX 6 List of Abbreviations 44 3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The European Commission has been present in Afghanistan since the mid 1980s, with an office in
Peshawar, in western Pakistan, covering the country. ECHO had programmes in Afghanistan from
the early 1990s delivering humanitarian assistance. With the fall of the Taliban, EC engagement in
the country increased to make the Commission one of the largest donors in the country.
The EC’s first CSP for 2003-6 was focused very much on the initial reconstruction phase, building
up infrastructure and establishing new government institutions and public services. This process will
continue in the new CSP period but with an increasing emphasis on strengthening the capacity of
those Afghan institutions and services so they can become more self-sustaining and viable in the
long run.
This new CSP sets out the EC’s commitment to Afghanistan until 2013. It has been drafted against a
background of an evolving political and economic scene. The Afghanistan Compact, launched at the
London Conference in January 2006, provides a new political framework for cooperation between
Afghanistan and the international community for the next 5 years. Complementing the Compact, the
interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (i-ANDS) prioritises the development objectives
for the country for the next 5 years.
The response strategy proposed in this CSP aims to strike a balance between the continuation of
existing, successful programmes and new priorities in response to the changes in the country since
the publication of the last CSP. There are three focal sectors: rural development; governance; and
health. There are also three non-focal areas: social protection; mine action; and regional co-
operation. The activities in the non focal areas directly or indirectly reinforce specific activities
being pursued in the priority focal sectors.
The CSP’s proposed focal areas are all priority sectors of the i-ANDS. The new CSP aims to
contribute to addressing the fundamental challenges facing Afghanistan in dealing with the narcotics
economy and in establishing a proper functioning rule of law. Although there will be continued
support to central ministries and national programmes, there is an increased emphasis in this CSP on
the next 4 years. These activities will be aligned with the objectives of the new i-ANDS.
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Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries
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1. THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION
1.1 Analysis of the political situation
Afghanistan has made impressive progress since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001. The
Bonn Agreement of December 2001, intended to put in place a “broad-based, gender-sensitive,
multi-ethnic and fully representative government”, has been successfully implemented. Milestones
in this process were the adoption of the new constitution in January 2004, presidential elections in
October 2004, parliamentary and provincial elections in September 2005 and the inauguration of the
new National Assembly in December 2005.
However, challenges remain, with growth in the opium economy, continuing security threats, and an
ever apparent potential for ethnic tensions. In particular, the narcotics trade is a primary threat to
stable political development. The opium economy is spreading; and nascent state institutions are
vulnerable to corruption. There is a risk of ‘state capture’ by narco-interests. Insurgents and other
anti-government elements are also thought to benefit from drug trafficking activities. The narcotics
trade is thus undermining both stabilisation and development efforts.
Related in part to the drugs trade, the security situation remains fragile. In the south and east of the
country especially the insurgency led by the Taliban and other armed groups has led to increased
casualties during 2005 and 2006. The intensity of the insurgency in the south and east has been
characterised by an increase in roadside bombings, burning of schools and suicide attacks (until
The new currency introduced in late 2002 has remained stable and inflation has remained low. The
Afghan Government’s efforts to increase the flow of domestic revenues to the centre have borne fruit
– USD 200 million flowed to Kabul in 2003/04 and in 2004/05 domestic revenues reached USD 256
million.
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The current estimation for 2005/6 is USD 309 million. However, there is still a long way
to go before budgetary sustainability is achieved, with a core budget deficit of over USD 1 billion
needing to be financed by the international community. At the Berlin Conference (spring 2004) it
was projected that Afghanistan would take until 2013 to reach self-sufficiency in terms of the
recurrent budget.
Agriculture accounts for approximately 48% of Afghanistan’s GDP, but supports over 85% of the
total population. Other important sectors are services (30% of GDP) and construction (5.0% of
GDP). Construction and services benefit in part from buoyant aid-related demand but also from
illegal opium-related activities.
The income of Afghan poppy growers and drug traffickers was around USD 3 billion in 2005, which
represents less than 10% of the final street value of the illegal drugs, but 60% of Afghanistan’s
formal GDP. Cultivation has now spread to all provinces in Afghanistan, which is estimated to
produce close to 90% of the world’s illicit opium. The UNODC Opium Survey 2006 reported that
there is a 59% increase in opium cultivation in Afghanistan from 2005 levels. Moreover, some 70%
of this increase was from one southern province alone, Hellmand. It is currently estimated that over
a third of the world’s opium supply is derived from Hellmand. In recent times, parts of the south
have come to represent a lack of any functioning government and rule of law. This now represents a
significant challenge to the Afghan Government and NATO troops in these areas.
In terms of industrial base, Afghanistan has a rudimentary manufacturing base. Most factories are
located in Kabul and a few major regional cities such as Herat and Mazar-E-Sharif. These industries
concentrate on traditional activities, such as carpet weaving and dried fruit production. The informal
economy plays a far greater role in Afghanistan. Although reliable estimates are not easily available,
there are indications that informal economic activities, including the drugs trade, may well exceed
the size of the formal economy.
Afghanistan runs an open trade system, is an observer to the WTO and has applied for full
of Afghans have access to safe water, 12% to adequate sanitation and just 6% to electricity.
This situation is exacerbated by massive population movements. In the past two years 2.5 million
Afghan refugees have returned to their home country, while an additional 600,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) have moved back to their place of origin. In total, more than 5 million
Afghans are living outside the country, mostly as refugees in urban areas in Pakistan and Iran.
Repatriation is an ongoing process and although it is expected that a significant proportion will
remain in Pakistan, returns will raise challenges in terms of sustainable reintegration and reinforcing
the rural-to-urban shift in population. In terms of livelihood, migration has become a perennial part
of the Afghan economy. An estimated USD 500 million in remittances are sent back each year by
Afghan migrants, mostly from Iran, Pakistan and the Gulf countries.
The literacy rate in Afghanistan today is one of the lowest among developing countries. Only 28.7%
of Afghans over the age of 15 can read and write. Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made
since the fall of the Taliban. More than 3 million students were enrolled in grades 1-12 in 2004 with
a third of these being girls since 2001. That said, there is still a large imbalance in access to
education between gender groups.
Life expectancy in Afghanistan (44.5 years) is at least 20 years lower than in all of its neighbouring
countries and 6.1 years lower than the average of the Least Developed Countries. The Maternal
Mortality Rate is set at 1600 per 100,000 live births and the Infant Mortality Rate at 274 per 1000,
making Afghan health indicators amongst some of the worst in the world.
1.4 Analysis of the environmental situation
More than 20 years of war, a decade of drought and the unsustainable use of natural resources, which
could not be checked by weak state institutions, have degraded the Afghan environment.
Water shortages and deforestation are particular concerns for Afghanistan’s development. Forests,
which play an important role in maintaining the retention capacity of watersheds and mitigating
climatic fluctuations, have been destroyed. Logging for construction materials and firewood reduced
forest cover from around 4.5% in the 1970s to between 1 and 2% today.
Environmental problems concern both the countryside and the cities. Afghanistan’s economy
depends on agriculture to provide livelihood for the majority of its people. There is no alternative
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After the presidential election of October 2004, parliamentary and provincial elections took place
on 18 September 2005. Election-day itself was largely peaceful and passed off without major
security incident. These were the first parliamentary elections in Afghanistan for 36 years and were
monitored by an EU Election Observation Mission headed by Emma Bonino, MEP.
The new National Assembly was inaugurated on 19 December 2005, formally closing the Bonn
process. The challenge is now to establish a functioning parliamentary system from the elections.
Rooting democratic institutions and attitudes firmly into the Afghan political culture is a long-term
goal with a time horizon stretching way beyond the elections.
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A calm security situation is indispensable for the stabilisation of the political system. Insurgents
supportive of the former Taliban regime as well as local warlords in control of armed groups are
challenges that need to be tackled.
The growing opium economy and the danger of state capture by narco-interests pose a critical
threat to development and state-building in Afghanistan and to sustainable improvement of the
security situation. Without firm and decisive action, this problem could gravely undermine
reconstruction efforts. The government adopted a detailed Counter-Narcotics Implementation
Plan in February 2005. A year on, at the London Conference in January 2006, it published an
update of its existing National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). This strategy will require constant
refinement and continued political support.
In particular, it is critical that the main priorities and pillars of activity under the NDCS are taken
forward in a sequenced and coordinated manner. Any programme for establishing alternative
livelihoods cannot take root without a functioning rule of law. Moreover, the fight against the
narcotics trade cannot be run from Kabul alone; government structures need to be in place in the
provinces to execute the new laws. In this vein, future EC assistance will be focused at both a
national and sub-national level as appropriate.
Related to the drugs trade is the general question of asserting the legitimate authority of the central
government against regional power-brokers. A void in the state’s reach in the regions will result in
a significant lack of law enforcement, which amongst other factors will enable the opium economy to
continue to flourish.
achieved to a remarkable degree against the background of a precarious security situation and
destruction of the country’s productive base over the last decade. Inflation remains under control.
However, revenue collection amounts to only 4.5% of GDP and is one of the lowest in the world,
barely covering 50% of the current operating budget. Domestic revenue increase depends on the
creation of a competitive formal sector, the increased capacity of the tax administration, and the
development of a tax paying culture. Such considerations will affect donors’ – including the EC’s –
future support for the government budget (see Section 4.3).
The domestic reform agenda is complemented by active trade diplomacy in the region and on the
global stage. In order to increase stability and foster economic growth, efforts are being made on
cooperation with neighbours on land transport, border crossings, inter-connection of gas and
electricity grids, transit formalities, sea freight costs and migration. An increase in intra-regional
trade and the competitiveness of domestic industries is at the core of the Afghan economic strategy.
Several conferences and trade fairs have been organised in Afghanistan in the last few years to
strengthen regional economic ties and make Afghanistan more attractive to investors. With a more
developed and effective system for transit and international trade, Afghanistan aims to play a key
role as a land bridge between Central Asia and South Asia.
Afghanistan has applied for membership of the WTO. Membership should help to provide a firm
framework for its legislative development progress as well as offer national and international
credibility to Afghanistan’s market oriented economic policy. However, in view of the supply side
constraints on the Afghan economy and the administrative weakness of the local administration, this
must be considered a long-term ambition.
2.4. Environmental Policy
The Afghan Government, with the support of donors, has put in place wide ranging programmes of
reforestation and water basin management to deal with the most serious environmental challenges in
the country. Examples of these include the EC-funded water management programmes in the North
East region.
But overall, environmental policy is in a nascent state in Afghanistan. Environmental policy
objectives have been formulated by international agencies in cooperation with the former Interim
Administration and the current Government. The following areas into which Afghanistan's most
pressing environmental needs fall have been identified by donors and the Government alike:
support Afghan national actions emerging from implementation of the Good Neighbourly Relations
Declaration and in particular the associated action plans for fostering regional trade.
At a policy level, the EC is a regular partner of the Afghan Ministry of Commerce in discussions on
Afghanistan’s joining the World Trade Organisation.
3.3. Assistance: Achievements and lessons learned
Overview
The European Commission has provided development/humanitarian assistance to the Afghan
population since the late ‘80s with projects for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. During the
1990s, the EC had a three-pronged approach: (i) continued support to Afghan refugees, (ii) support
for returnees to peaceful areas of Afghanistan and (iii) humanitarian aid in conflict-affected areas.
These programmes were implemented through ECHO.
After the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, the first Commission policy papers on Afghanistan
(CSP 2003-2006, NIP 2003-2004, and NIP 2005-2006
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) set out the main focal sectors of EC
assistance in the post-Taliban period. These sectors consisted rural development, health and social 3
Documents avalable at
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protection, public administration reform and infrastructure. Four non-focal sectors were also
highlighted: de-mining, regional cooperation, refugees/returnees and counter-narcotics. In terms of
the health and refugees/returns programmes, the Commission’s assistance very much built on the
earlier interventions of ECHO in the late 1990s.
In the initial transition period, from 2002, EC assistance to Afghanistan has played an important role
in a number of key sectors:
Around €212 million has been devoted to reforming the public administration and strengthening
the government, through capacity building within key government institutions and continued 15
In million EUR
2002-2005 Commitments
Situation as per 31/12/2005
Committed Contracted % Disbursed %
Health and Social Protection 42.66 42.66
100.00
30.09
70.53
Infrastructures 89.87 81.41
90.59
46.43
51.66
Demining 40.40 33.88
83.86
25.42
62.92
Civil Society / Media 42.72 42.25
98.90
37.30
87.31 Regional Cooperation 8.19 7.00
85.47
6.50
79.37
Information /studies 8.66 6.69
77.25
5.34
61.66
Various (monitoring, audits) 6.36 5.32
83.65
3.20
50.31
TOTAL 749.62 632.80
84.42
543.02
between village, district and provincial tiers but much remains to be done to ensure a better
functioning local government.
Integral to achieving better government at all levels is the need to increase efforts to build up the
capacity of local Afghan institutions. Future sector programmes should ensure human resource
development is at the core of activities, be this within partner ministries, such as the Ministries of
Health and Rural Development, or within the provincial authorities.
The EC has been heavily engaged with both the Government and other key donors in helping shape
policy on counter-narcotics. It has supported the UK and World Bank in the policy of
‘mainstreaming’ counter-narcotics across a range of sectors. The approach should be one of
delivering a wide range of services to an area – including social and physical infrastructure, and
agricultural support – and thereby removing conditions which may encourage the farmer to cultivate
opium poppy for economic reasons. In the past, donors have focused on alternative livelihoods as a
single sector or programme for investment and ignored the wider development effort needed to
contribute to reductions in cultivation and trade in opium.
Related to this, the EC should continue to support the Government’s plans to decentralise
development planning to the district and provincial level. A crucial next step is to build up the
capacity of the local authorities to identify and respond to the development priorities in their area,
particularly in dealing with the problem of illicit poppy cultivation.
To date, the European Commission has channelled funds through a number of means. It has directly
funded private contractors and NGOs, as well as channelled funds through the framework of the
National Development Budget, and through the multilateral trust funds established to support the
Government’s recurrent budget and the National Priority Programmes. For the medium term,
multilateral trust funds may continue to be a necessary vehicle for channelling substantial
budgetary support. As and when the capacity of government departments increases, there could be
more scope to provide funding directly through government channels.
Other sectors, such as education and security sector reform, are being covered by other donors,
notably the US; as such, the EC is not closely involved in evaluating lessons learned in these areas.
However, in terms of the education sector it should be noted that Afghanistan is benefiting from the
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Emergency Public Administration Programme 2 (EPAP) and are together providing technical
assistance for PRR, Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC)
capacity building. DFID is also providing technical assistance as well as strategic policy support.
The Korean government provides computer training centres and will provide the IARCSC with
infrastructure (building and hardware) for the future Institute of Public Administration. The ADB is
providing technical assistance in administration efficiency. UNDP supports other components of the
overall Public Administration Reform programme (PAR) in terms of training and recruitment.
The US and the World Bank are the main donors in the education sector. There are many other,
smaller donors, who contribute also to the education sector, including EU Member States. The
substantial commitment of other donors in education has enabled the Commission to concentrate on
other social sectors which are arguably more under-funded, for example primary and secondary
health provision. Moreover, there is an education component related to the social protection
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programme which sets out to address the different educational needs of vulnerable groups, be this
in the non-formal or vocational/technical education sectors.
The security sector is another area where the Commission is not involved. Support to this sector
comes mainly from the US, with smaller contributions from UK, Japan and some EU Member States.
To assure coordination with donors there is a Consultative Group (CG) on PAR and Economic
Management chaired by the Chairman of the IARCSC which meets quarterly. The main donors
(World Bank, DFID, ADB, UNDP and EC) organise regular meetings on PAR to exchange their
views and to coordinate their activities on PAR in order to maximise their resources and to avoid any
overlap.
The Afghanistan Compact provides for the creation of a joint (Afghan and international)
Coordination and Monitoring Board. The Board will be co-chaired by a senior Afghan official and
by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. It is tasked with monitoring the overall
implementation of the Compact and with ensuring that political impetus is maintained. 4. THE EC RESPONSE STRATEGY (INTERVENTION SECTORS)
Government’s own development agenda, as set out in the key guiding documents, the Afghanistan
Compact and the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (i-ANDS) (see section 2.1).
Moreover, there has been an ongoing dialogue with the Government throughout 2005 to ensure that
these priorities dovetail with the emerging i-ANDS.
The response strategy concentrates on three focal areas and three non-focal areas. The EC’s activities
in these sectors build in many ways on the humanitarian work done by ECHO and Aid to Uprooted
People (AUP).
Focal areas:
• Rural development;
• Governance;
• Health;
Non-focal areas:
• Social protection;
• Mine action;
• Regional cooperation.
In terms of funding, the following sector allocations are proposed for the MIP period 2007-10:
Focal / Non-Focal Sector 2007 -10
Rural development 30%
Governance 40 %
Health 20 %
Social Protection 4-5%
Mine action 4-5 %
Regional cooperation 1-2 %
4.2 Rural development
The Commission should continue to be at the forefront of the rural livelihoods agenda. Hence, a
significant level of resources will be channelled into sub-national programmes in rural development
in specific provinces. The East and North-Eastern provinces are to be targeted, not least because of
together with the growing opium economy, has meant an increasing trend towards poppy cultivation
in these provinces, peaking in 2004. Although 2005 saw a decline in this trend, there is a need to
ensure poppy does not become embedded in the rural economy, especially in view of the region’s
agricultural potential. Again, the EC is already heavily engaged in these provinces through its
Kunduz River Basin Programme and the aim will be to build on this intervention, extending it to a
broader-based rural development programme.
The programmes pursued in these and other targeted provinces in the East and North-East will be
wider in scope than the traditional concept of alternative livelihoods as crop substitution. Rural
development programmes will entail a range of interventions aimed at addressing the socio-
economic, legal and political conditions which may encourage farmers to grow poppy. In this
respect, where appropriate, existing programmes at national level should be used in delivering the
regional (sub-national) development programmes.
This sub-national approach dovetails with the Afghan Government’s move towards province and
district based development plans. The purpose of the district and provincial planning process is to
place the responsibility for identifying and prioritising the short- and long-term development needs
of communities with the local authorities. The EC has already been involved in taking forward this
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process in the eastern provinces, through its Programme for Alternative Livelihoods (PAL). Future
EC rural development programmes in the East and North East should build on this approach,
increasing local capacity for district and provincial level planning. This will be part of an overall
capacity building programme within the local offices of the Ministry of Rural Development and
other relevant agencies involved in the development planning process. Efforts will be made to
ensure that all development plans integrate counter-narcotics objectives. Moreover, environmental
factors will be taken into account in the development of these plans at the provincial and district
level, in particular, where possible, building the capacity of local government to develop
contingency plans for dealing with natural disasters caused by severe weather conditions and the
like; (see Annex 4, Country Environmental Profile).
Fundamental to the development and implementation of the district and provincial plans in the
targeted regions will be the need to ensure that donors’ inputs are effectively coordinated. The
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Afghanistan’s economic and political development depends on the progressive strengthening of
a functioning state, governed through accountable, democratic institutions, and able to ensure
security and the rule of law over the entire national territory. Given the rudimentary state of the
administration and the infrastructure supporting it, sustained efforts will be needed to thwart the
threat of Afghanistan becoming a failed state, due to both low capacity and the lack of good
governance, especially in provinces and districts, and the continuing prevalence of poppy culture,
which raises the risk of narco-interests capturing the state apparatus with potential wider implications
in terms of regional stability.
It is therefore vital to support the Afghan government in its efforts to strengthen the rule of law,
good governance and democratisation. Building on the substantial investments already undertaken
during the 2003-2006 CSP, the EC will focus its intervention on two priorities: the rule of law, in
particular the justice sector, and public administration reform.
Civil society organisations will be targeted where appropriate in the planning and implementation
of specific programmes in the justice and governance sectors. Moreover, although there is not a
designated civil society programme in this CSP, civil society organisations are to be targeted across
other key sector programmes, in particular in the health and social protection sectors, e.g.
implementation of public information campaigns and training programmes.
Rule of law
The reconstruction of the justice sector is essential for the establishment of the rule of law, which is,
in turn, a key condition for political stability and sustainable economic development. An effective
justice system is a prerequisite for the success of other projects supported by the Commission, such
as establishing the Afghan National Police, the fight against illegal drugs and support to economic
development. The Commission recognises the close linkage between progress in the reconstruction
of the justice system as a whole and the success of the current anti-narcotics efforts. Failure in either
would put into jeopardy the establishment of the rule of law and, in turn, the success of the whole
state-building exercise in Afghanistan.
The Commission will support the strengthening of the capacity, the efficacy and the integrity of the
justice system as well as the counter-narcotics efforts, following the lead of the Government and in
Police.
Public administration reform
In terms of wider public administration reform and good governance, the Commission will build on
its past efforts and continue to assist the Government of Afghanistan in its objective of establishing a
state structure based on democratic participation, ruled by accountable institutions, deemed
legitimate by its citizens, and respectful of the rule of law and human rights.
Historically, attempts to establish a stable state structure have failed in Afghanistan, as a result of
which its rulers have been left dependent on either outside powers’ financial and material assistance
or manipulation of its internal power structures. Because of excessive personalisation of power and
reliance on ethnic networks, institutions have remained weak and unable to ensure continuity of the
state in the event of a change in regime. The weakness of the state has been reflected in the tendency
for over-centralisation, which has strained further the relations between the centre and the provinces.
For most citizens in Afghanistan, local government is the only form of government to which they
have any relationship. If democratic participation is introduced at state level, but there is little or no
perceived change in local living conditions, the gap between expectations and reality will grow,
giving rise to the loss of legitimacy of the central government. By contrast, a functioning and
accountable local administration capable of delivering basic services will increase the legitimacy of
the overall state structure, in addition to contributing to central development objectives.
If governance is not improved, especially at local level, it will be politically difficult not only to raise
revenue in the provinces, but also to mobilise popular support to tackle continuing violence
associated with local warlords and drugs cultivation. Moreover, if revenue collection cannot be
raised from its low base of an estimated 5% of GDP, the state and local authorities will continue to
be overshadowed by warlords enriched by the opium trade, with the ensuing risk of state failure and
conflict.
Thus, the EC strategy for good governance will follow a two-pronged approach. Firstly,
interventions in the reference period will support democratisation and local governance through
assistance to democratic processes, such as elections, and empowerment of local communities, with a
focus on the provincial and district levels of administration. Through its programmes, the EC will
encourage the Government of Afghanistan to pursue reforms in local governance and the principles
CSP period.
4.4 Health
The EC will support the Afghan government in its endeavour to reach four of the Millennium
Development Goals related to health, of which the reduction of maternal and child mortality are
the most critical. This can be achieved by improving essential health services and institutional
capacity building of the health sector at national and sub-national levels.
Health is a sector where EC expertise has a comparative advantage in Afghanistan. At present
few donors support the sector. The EC has successfully assisted the Afghan government in bringing a
Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) to ten provinces and will continue its support to the
delivery of basic primary health services to the country. At present EC assistance is covering some
20% of the country in terms of the provision of primary health. The World Bank and US are
covering similar size areas. However, 25% of the Afghan population still has no access to any basic
health care and the BPHS programme needs to extend its coverage. The aim will be to assist the
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Government in reaching 90% coverage of primary health services by the end of 2010, as set out in
the i-ANDS.
In terms of secondary health, an Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) has been defined
in support of improved referral of patients between different levels of the health system in district,
provincial and regional level hospitals. Activities related to strengthening essential referral systems
and quality of care and management will receive EC support in the future. The i-ANDS sets a target
of 50% coverage of essential hospital services by 2010.
There will also be increased emphasis in the health programme on preventing and fighting the major
communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. In this vein, complementary
support could come from the horizontal assistance programme “Investing in People” (see section
4.8).
The EC will also increasingly focus on human resource development, especially in terms of the
recruitment, training and participation of women in the health sector. It will also focus on women as
active, well-informed users of the health system. A specific focus will be on reproductive health.
Policy dialogue and studies in support of different fields of the health sector should contribute to