&
Case Study
Organization-internal Transfer of
Knowledge and the Role of Motivation: A
Qualitative Case Study
Thomas Kalling*
Institute of Economic Research, Lund University, Sweden
This paper reports a case study of a knowledge transfer programme in a manufacturing MNC,
and suggests that firm-internal knowledge transfer programmes are exercises requiring a great
deal of recipient motivation. In contrast to existing theory, which has a tendency to address the
role of cognitive factors such as tacitness, causal ambiguity and absorptive capacity, this paper
suggests that motivation needs to be in place first. In the studied case, differences in local per-
ceptions of transfer ventures, aspiration and strategic ambitions, internal competition, the view
on the nature of knowledge and local communication seem to explain success and failure in
transfer ventures. If motivation is not in place ‘naturally’, it can be managed in different
ways, including local and corporate management control routines as well as organization struc-
ture. Consequently, we argue that knowledge transfer theory should not presume that organi-
zational units are interested in the knowledge transferred, or that knowledge is always ‘good’.
Knowledge is contextual, meaning it fits certain operations and strategies better, even in
instances where intra-organizational units are homogeneous. Hence motivation is central to
transfer success. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Knowledge transfer within an organization may be
thought of as the process by wh ich an organization
makes available knowledge about routines to its
members, and is a common phenomenon that can
be an effective way for organizations to extend
knowledge bases and leverage unique skills in a
relatively cost-effective manner. With the increas-
ing resource-based focus in strategy research,
knowledge and ways to develop and leverage it

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structure provided by interpretations of accounts.
We have interviewed more than 30 managers and
employees in SCA Packaging (a European paper
packaging supplier), representing both the sources
and recipients of transferred knowledge, about the
programme. The effects of the transfer programme
have also been measured, enabling comparison
between successful and unsuccessful plants. In
the subsequent sections we discuss the possible
explanations to transfer success and its relation to
existing knowledge transfer theory.
THEORY
Knowledge transfer theory has obvious overlaps
with general knowledge management, the latter
being defined as the individual and organizational
activities by which organizations develop or lever-
age their knowledge base. The specific focus of
knowledge transfer is the processes by which mem-
bers within an organization learn from each other,
without interacting with the environment.
Knowledge transfer theory attempts to explain
the factors that drive or hamper transfer. But in
terms of the dependent variable, the majority of the
empirical research has used ‘accomplished transfer’
(von Hippel, 1994; Darr et al., 1996; Szulanski, 1996),
rather than, say, product quality, or even perfor-
mance effects (exceptions include Ingram and
Baum, 1997; Levin, 2000; Tsai, 2001, McEvily and
Chakravarthy, 2002). Accomplished transfer has

tial factor. The more valuable it is, the more likely it
is that the recipient will attempt to use it (Gupta
and Govindarajan, 2000). The absorptive capacity
will determine whether it will work or not. Another
factor, related to competitive advantage, is the
uniqueness and inimitability of the knowledge. If
knowledge transferred internally can also be trans-
ferred externally, to competitors, for instance
through personnel migration or intelligence activ-
ities, there is a risk that the effects, say on costs,
can be duplicated by competitors. This can lead
to cost reductions across the industry, meaning
there is a risk that price and profit levels are
reduced overall. Here, the commonalty of knowl-
edge across actors will determine the risks of fail-
ure (Zander and Kogut, 1996).
Another risk refers to drawbacks that result from
the articulation of knowledge necessary in order to
be able to transfer it. Articulation requires simplifi-
cation, which means that finer aspects of the
knowledge might have to be removed or be unin-
tentionally lost (Boisot et al., 1997). Some argue
that the risks associated with articulating and
transferring tacit knowledge are so high that it is
more effective to avoid transferring such knowl-
edge and accep t the higher costs associated with
coordinating a diverse set of organizational skills
(Grant, 1996). However, it has also been argued
that organizations must try to diffuse knowledge,
otherwise it will be difficult to reap the leveraged

reported to be a factor (Tsai, 2000).
A third group of factors falls under motivation.
However, the role of motivation appears debatable
and is less clear, according to research. Relatively
few empirical studies claim that motivation is
important. Stein and Ridderstra
˚
le (2001), drawing
on Polanyi (1962), suggest that motivational pro-
blems, such as unwillingness to absorb or share
knowledge, could be dealt with through socialisa-
tion, compensation, documentation, toleration, com-
munication and rotation. Motivation was also found
to drive source units to transfer knowledge (Gupta
and Govindarajan, 2000), but not all studies have
been able to corroborate this, either because they
have not studied it, or because they found it to be
unimportant. Szulanski (1996) studied a range of
factors and found no link between motivation and
transfer accomplishments. Cognitive and relational
factors were more important and therefore, Szulans-
ki suggested, it is better to stimulate learning capa-
cities and relations than incentives. In a subsequent
study (Szulanski, 2000), the downsides to motiva-
tion were elaborated upon. Highly motivated adop-
ters might ‘exacerbate problems of implementation
by prematurely dismissing outside help, expanding
seemingly straightforward modifications into major
projects, making unnecessary modifications to pre-
serve pride of ownership and status or to let out

in accordance with existing theories (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978), whereas others (Miles,
1979; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994) claim that an a
priori theory is important for positioning emergent
theory and stimulating analysis. This study
acknowledges the latter logic and takes its starting
point in the theories described above (see interview
guide, Appendix A). However, the overarching
ambition is to be able to develop or refine knowl-
edge transfer theory, which is done through a ‘pat-
tern-matching’ method (Yin, 1994).
THE CASE
The reported case concerns a corporate-spanning
knowledge transfer programme initiated in SCAP
in 1997. The objective of the programme is to
spread best production practices throughout the
plants in order to improve performance in the
less well-performing plants. The programme is
referred to as an exercise in improving production
skills with the result that cost improvements (less
labour and raw material per unit of output) and
price or sales volume improvements (through stan-
dardized qualities, reliable supply) are antici pated.
SCAP has over 200 plants, but only some 40 (per
2001) are included in the programme discussed in
this paper. The plants (profit centres) are spread
across Western Europe, primarily. The knowledge
inherent in the programme is absorbed both intern-
ally (from knowledgeable plants) and externally
(from the field of science, consultants, alliance part-

RESEARCH DESIGN
The main data collection method used was inter-
viewing. We basically asked respondents how
they perceived the programme and its pros and
cons, which the success factors are, if and why
they have succeeded, their view on the nature of
knowledge, the way they manage the system cen-
trally and locally, organizational interrelations,
control routines, local team work, and so forth
(see Appendix A for the interview guide). We
singled out five to six people at six of the plants
(the general manager, the production manager,
the sales manager, a supervisor, and one or two
operators), located in different countries in Western
Europe. We also interviewed staff at the central
technical department. In total 36 interviews were
made, all personal. Interviews were semi-struc-
tured, including some closed questions and some
open to ensure exploration. Here, the factors given
by theory were further investigated, but we also
asked open-ended questions regarding respon-
dents’ views. One researcher conducted all the
interviews, but fellow researchers assisted in the
interpretation of accounts, checking too radical
interpretations.
Interviews lasted between 60 and 200 minu tes,
and the average run length was approximately
120 minutes. Interviews were taped and tran-
scribed. Where appropriate, for instance regarding
accounts of events, we used respondent validation

on pre-existing theory, and on six dimensions in
relation to which successful and unsuccessful
plants differed.
EMPIRICAL INTERPRETATIONS
In the empirical study, we enquired about a range
of different potential factors behind transfer success
or failure. Six such factors appeared to discriminate:
the perception of the transfer programme, aspira-
tions and strategic ambitions, the view on (firm-
internal) competition, the view on the nature of the
knowledge transferred, programme management
and control, and local communication. This section
is structured accordingly. The (theoretical) areas
where successful and unsuccessful plants did not dif-
fer are not discussed here, but later in the overall
comparison between empirical findings and theory.
Local perceptions
The way that local managers and workers viewed
the programme, in terms of their associations
and the extent to which they liked it or not, differed
between plan ts. The two less successful plants,
referred to as plant 1 and plant 2, saw the exercise
more as a ‘stick’ and a competition that they could
never win, rather than a carrot. None of the ten
respondents in plants 1 and 2 expressed a positive
view.
The fact that not just methods but also the
results of their application (machine speed, direct
CASE STUDY Knowledge and Process Management
118 T. Kalling

acknowledge that there had, previously, been fears
that the programme was a corporate control exer-
cise designed to push up productivity. ‘There was
a fear initially that it was just a big stick, but that
view is gone now’ (supervisor). Respondents also
indicated that the programme has become integral
in day-to-day routines. ‘It is institutionalized now.
It is a way of living’ (production manager). ‘It has
helped us develop team spirit, it is in the minds of
the workf orce’ (operator). The majority of respon-
dents expressed positive experiences. However,
some respondents indicated that their level of
activity in terms of searching, absorbing and apply-
ing new methods was slightly declining. ‘I haven’t
been very active lately in checking which new
methods there are’ (production manager).
Aspiration and strategic ambitions
Because each plant investigated was run as a profit
centre and was normally measured (by corporate
headquarters) on operating margin and/or return
on operating capital , there was substantial leeway
and autonomy for local units to decide upon local
strategies. Corporate headquarters normally
allowed plants to work out for themselves how to
generate the margins and returns required, but
supported in specific areas, such as customer con-
tacts, technology development and information
systems. Therefore, local aspirations and strategic
intents had strong impact on whether central initia-
tives (such as the reported knowledge programme)

al manager). ‘We now have screens at each of the
machines, where they can access the intranet.
Each team also has formal gatherings where they
exchange knowledge’ (supervisor). ‘I use the intra-
net severa l hours a week to seek for new methods.
But there is a time issue’ (production manager).
The view on internal competition
The competitive nature of the programme was
addressed by many respondents, and it was a par-
ticular area where views differed. The programme
was designed as a competition, with official results
and annual award ceremonies. The program me
management stressed competition in their commu-
nications. Posters with formula-one depot teams,
rowing-boat teams and javelin-throwers stressed
the sports-related component of the programme,
intent to make employees aware of the value of
competition, teamwork and sportsmanship.
Knowledge and Process Management CASE STUDY
Transfer of Knowledge and the Role of Motivation 119
‘Merchandise’ such as printed T-shirts, armbands
and baseball caps were distributed and further
emphasized an athletic profile.
The weaker plants did not see competition as an
incentive, partly because they were too far from
being best in the corporation at the outset. ‘Playing
in Division three you don’t really think about Pre-
mier League. Many of our guys have given up com-
peting’ (production manager). ‘We only have one
machine with a chance to win, they might be com-

ently is the nature of the knowledge transferred.
The programme clearly was an attempt to explicate
what previously (and to some still is) viewed as
tacit knowledge. While all respondents admitted
that the knowledge required to run any particular
machine efficiently was not completely explicit,
there were some differences in whether there is a
point in trying to articulate and make transferable
such knowledge.
It appeared that less successful plants perceived
production knowledge to be more tacit and diffi-
cult to articulate, than did successful plants—they
did not trust the articulated knowledge as forming
the only basis on which to develop work routines.
As a consequence, they saw little reason in even
trying to make use of it. ‘We have a complex pro-
cess that we cannot write down. There are many
parameters to think of. We once tried to list all
the parameters to consider but it is impossible’
(general manager). ‘There is a large proportion of
tacit knowledge that cannot be taught or trans-
ferred’ (supervisor). ‘There are many variables,
each machine has its own quirky bits’ (operator).
‘A lot of it is very tacit, we see that when certain,
more experienced people are replaced’ (production
manager).
Respondents in successful plants displayed a dif-
ferent view. ‘There is a certain tacit component but
I want to break it down’ (production manager). ‘We
wrongly believe it to be a form of art rather than

net’ (general manager). ‘We don’t display perfor-
mance figures on the notice board nowadays’
(production manager). ‘I have meetings with key
operators an hour every three weeks where we
might cover it’ (production manager). ‘I look at
the figures quarterly and focus on highlights. I go
through it with the production manager then too’
(general manager). ‘We don’t really discuss the
CASE STUDY Knowledge and Process Management
120 T. Kalling
figures explicitly, we used to. The programme is on
the backburner’ (supervisor).
Successful plants did it differently. The local
management was more involved. ‘I discuss these
things regularly with production management, at
least once a week. I go in ad hoc when needed’ (gen-
eral manager). ‘I get regular updates to be able to
inform my sales guys about current production
performance’ (sales manager). ‘I follow it up daily
and have meetings with key staff three times a
week when we discuss it. Monthly I go through it
with all staff’ (production manager). ‘I communi-
cate daily with operators and they really react
upon it. I have daily meetings about downtime,
overproduction and so on. The planning exercise
is dealt with rigorously with shift leaders and the
teams. We have broken down annual targets into
quarterly to get better control’ (production man-
ager). ‘Within the shifts we talk about it when
new data is displ ayed. All workers know about

that communication is a problem. ‘I am involved
on a monthly basis or if there is an ad hoc debate
about something between Sales and Production’
(sales manager). ‘We are informed about our
production performance and if it suits our pur-
poses we will communicate it one way or another
to our customers’ (sales manager).
DISCUSSION
The empirical interpretations of accounts of percep-
tions and actions in relation to knowledge transfer
give some indications in relation to existing theory,
discussed below.
The empirical interpretations that there are six
types of differences between plants that succeed
with internal transfer of knowledge indicate that
such corporate initiatives need to consider not
just cognitive factors, but also factors connected to
motivation and local and corporate management
control principles or routines. Indirectly, the orga-
nizational context can be seen as a factor as well.
In knowledge transfer theory, cognitive factors
such as the nature of knowledge and the absorptive
capacity of recipients are key ‘knowledge barriers’
(von Hippel, 1994; Szulanski, 1996; Simonin, 1999).
This study implies that cognitive factors, such as
causal ambi guity and tacitness, and absorptive
and retentive capacity, are affected by motivation.
The stronger the motivation to learn, the more
likely it is that individuals will work harder on try-
ing to learn and pick up new knowledge. Trying to

vation drives cognition, and if cognition is not there
motivation might help. Motivation in turn can be
driven by many things: a weak position perfor-
mance-wise, or by a generic will to learn and
improve. If this ‘natural’ motivation is not in place,
local management control efforts may create the
incentive. General managers and production man-
agers can set targets, monitor and feed back to
those involved to stimulate activity. In the reported
case, we saw that successful plants had very active
local management in all these aspects. Further-
more, should local management not be active
enough in inspiring their work staff, corporate (or
middle if that is the case) management control
could help instead. In the above case, the corporate
involvement in terms of stimulating local manage-
ment was primarily through the award routine.
The regular financial reporting between general
managers and their superiors did not focus very
much on the knowledge transfer programme,
unless the general manager included it himself.
The management control factor can thus be seen
as a way to create an incentive to learn, when there
is no natural desire to do so—hence it is again a
factor connected to motivation.
The role of incentive shines through in the
empirical material. It also relates to corporate man-
agement control principles and indirectly to organi-
zational context. The reported company is
decentralized in the sense that local units are con-

of motivation can occur and be managed in transfer
situations. We also suggested that if motivation is
not in place naturally, management control routines
and organizational context may substitute. These
factors are slightly more popular in theory (Epple
et al., 1996; Simonin, 1999; Argote and Ingram,
2000), while others claim they are unimportant
(Szulanski, 1996).
In order to get a more detailed discussion of the
role of motivation, we need to consult more general
knowledge management and organizational learn-
ing theory. However, even within the so-called
organizational learning track (cf. Fiol and Lyles,
1985; March, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993) the
focus on learning is fairly cognitively biased. Con-
sequently, Fiol and Lyles refrain from discussing
motivation but suggest that learning is driven by
strategy, structure, culture and the environment.
As an interpretation, at least the first three of these
can be said to be connected with the concept of
motivation. They set the boundaries of learning
by defining business, norms and beliefs, and orga-
nizational infrastructure. Similarly, Nonaka (1994)
discusses organizational learning and suggests
that there are three factors that induce commitment
in an organiza tional setting: intention (sense-mak-
ing, intentionality), autonomy (autonomous organi-
zational members that interact can help stimulate
‘unexpected opportunities’ for learning) and fluc-
tuation (a discontinuous environment can generate

knowledge in question appears not to be an appro-
priate fit for both equally well. In organizations
with greater heterogeneity, this will be emphasised
even further. The proposition that theory subcon-
sciously makes these assumptions is also reflected
by the fact that most of them see the objective of
knowledge transfer to be accomplished knowledge
transfer rather than improved performance. A
number of the mentioned texts, like Epple et al.
(1991), Darr et al. (1996), Szulanski (1996), Tsai
(2000) and Stein and Ridderstra
˚
le (2001) use accom-
plished transfer as dependent variable. Exceptions
include Zander and Kogut (1995), Ingram and
Baum (1997) and Tsai (2001), who all study the
effects of transfer on competitive advantage, survi-
val and profitability. It should also be noted that
the knowledge transfer theory we have taken into
account is explanatory in nature. There are, as
yet, few theories aimed at outlining the finer causal
structures that exists between knowledge and suc-
cessful knowledge transfer.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to increase the under-
standing of how knowledge transfers can be per-
ceived and managed, and how choices can affect
success. We have studied a particular knowledge
transfer programme in a manufacturing MNC,
and tried to investigate what differences there

knowledge in question, and by fitting the contents
and presentation of knowledge in a way that suits
recipients. Benchmarking exercises, with internally
public methods and output results, awards and
recognition, team-building efforts, is one way of sti-
mulating motivation.
A case study of this kind obviously has some
limitations in terms of generalization to population.
Instead, we discuss findings in relation to existing
theories and propose extensions or refinements in
relation to it (Yin, 1994). A one-case approach also
means the character of the particular case has a
strong influence. The particular pieces of knowl-
edge (hands-on production-related knowledge),
organization (deep decentralization, financial con-
trol), strategies (local), the heterogeneous, local,
character of markets, and so forth, have an impact
on the interpretations. This might explain why this
study focuses motivation so much. In a setting
where knowledge is transferred between, say , two
departments in a functional organization, things
might be different even if this case alone gives a
strong argument why motivation should be part
of a knowledge transfer theory.
The case is re presentative of a typical, fairly
mature, manufacturing industry spread out across
European cultures, and interview respondents
appear to display views that may well be relevant
in other industries as well. In that sense, it is not
unlikely that the suggestions here are applicable

what settings the findings were taken from.
In terms of future research, there ought to be
plenty of opportunities, considering the increasing
popularity of knowledge transfer and similar meth-
ods of learning. Cases such as SCA Packaging high-
light the need to understand better the role of
motivation, and what corporate managers can do
to stimulate it. Both case studies, cross-case studies
and quantitative studies will be relevant, regardless
of which factors and independent and dependent
variables one is interested in.
APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW GUIDE
1. The view on the Knowledge Transfer Pro-
gramme (KTP)? E.g. a knowledge base, a bench-
marking data base, a competition, a mindset, a
social ritual, gatherings etc.
2. What is the plant attitude now and how has it
evolved over the years?
3. The value of KTP?
a. Is KTP valuable to the plant? Examples?
b. How has it changed since 1997?
c. In what way is it valuable? Standardized
behaviour, improved work, control, impro-
ved performance, competitive advantage?
4. What aspect makes KTP valuable? (Grade each,
1–5)
a. The knowledge it contains
b. The competition
c. The social incentives/arrangements
d. The benchmarking/Getting a picture of

c. Is KTP knowledge well docume nted and pre-
sented?
d. Is the KTP knowledge documentation expli-
cit or does it require further input from local
staff to be comprehensive?
e. If it requires local input, is this input easily
documented?
f. Does KTP knowledge help you improve
operations?
g. Does KTP knowledge help you challenge
your strategies?
h. Do you actively search for knowledge?
i. Do you always understand how to use the
new knowledge?
j. Is it reliable?
k. Does it have to be proved elsewhere before
you take it in?
l. Easy or difficult to unde rstand?
m. Easy or difficult to apply?
n. Does it come from reliable sour ces?
8. How do you act when you apply ‘new’ knowl-
edge?
a. Provide some examples of the plant having
identified a weakness and actively having
solved the issue by using KTP knowledge?
b. Are all machine groups equally good on tak-
ing on and applying new knowledge?
c. What, in your view, distinguishes between
groups’ abilities to assimilate and use KTP
knowledge? Which are the success factors?

agement meetings?
c. Who, among plant personnel, discusses KTP
with members of other plants?
d. Does KTP affect the general manager and
plant assessments?
e. What would happen if KTP performance
was added to plant and general manager
assessments?
13. How would you improve KTP?
a. Considering your strategy, how would you
change the KTP project to fit better your
strategy?
b. If KTP supports your strategy, how would
you modify it?
APPENDIX B. BRIEF INTRODUCTION
OF THE SIX CASE PLANTS
The six plants studied share many features, like
technology, machinery, skills levels (many opera-
tors and workers go to the same type of schools
and colleges and they are trained regularly by the
same machine suppliers), raw material sources,
basic manufacturing procedures, structures, custo-
mer segments and physical resources.
What separates them are, among other things,
culture, size, history, financial performance, and
current strategies, but it is important to realize
that these differences appear not to be related to
the differences between the plants in terms of trans-
fer success or failure. Plants 1 and 2 failed to take
on the knowledge transfer, whereas the other four

red figures. Here, personnel turnover is very
high, and the average age of the workforce is
very low comparatively. They are keen to try out
new corporate programmes be they conn ected
to production, IT, marketing, product design or
something else. They are currently working on
improving customer relations while improving
efficiency.
Plant 5 is also based in a large city in Central
Europe. It is a small plant, but has one of the lowest
cost bases in the group. Over the last five years, it
has gone from running with a loss to making a tidy
profit. This is despite having lost its major
customer some years ago. Management has chan-
ged, but the workforce has remained fairly intact.
Production management and cost control have
been instrumental in managing this.
Plant 6 is one of the largest in the corporation,
based in a rural part of Western Europe. It has
been improving its performance significantly over
the last two to three years, but from a low level.
Cost management has been important in that trans-
formation. The management team also changed in
conjunction with the transformation, but the work-
force has remained fairly intact. They have a low-
cost strategy, based on scale economies.
Knowledge and Process Management CASE STUDY
Transfer of Knowledge and the Role of Motivation 125
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